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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses whether the criticism 
that 20th c economic theory is too abstract, and lacking 
in economic meaning as a consequence of being 
mathematical, is justified, from a methodological 
perspective that is epistemological in character (cf ch2 
and Cheix, 1996). Using, firstly the 'external' 
historical approach, that compares. Economics to the 
sciences (especially Mathematics chs5, 6, 7, 8); and,
secondly, the semiotic approach, that inquires into the 
contribution of notation to meaning, the thesis examines 
the historical and cognitive raison d'être of 
mathematics in Economics.
The thesis identifies (chsl, 2) 20th c 
mathematical, economics with model building and neo­
classical theory. The main lines of argument are 
developed with reference to Jevons' Theory of Political 
Economy and Debreu's Theory of Value. This limitation is 
practical but not unnecessarily restrictive as the 
authors are major neo-classical writers, and 
mathematical economics has developed along the lines 
they envisaged. Further, neo-classical ideas have 
established themselves as paradigms of 2 0th c Economics, 
and have influenced theories in the social sciences and 
their mathematization.
It is shown that Jevons (ch5) used the symbolism, and in
particular, the linearity property of differentials to
unify economic theory and the sciences on the pattern of
Physics. For him however, the mathematization of
economics involved also empirical and experimental
18
inquiries using statistics. For the case of Debreu 
(ch6) it is shown how he used set-theoretic formalism 
and fixed point theorems to provide equilibrium theory 
with logico-mathematical content. This content is viewed 
as an axiomatic and deductive structure implying 
equilibrium.
The definitions of mathematical economic 
models discussed in Part 3 show that economics was 
mathematized through influences not only from Physics, 
but also from Logic, and, more widely from the 20th c 
(socio-cultural) trend of model building in science. It 
is argued that this latter trend is not exclusively, or 
even necessarily, rooted in neo-classical economics.
The semiotic analysis of chs 5 and 6 reveals 
how notations connect different interpretative levels 
('isotopies') of mathematical theories, and how 
inconsistences may arise between these levels.
The general conclusion of the thesis given 
certain methodological provisos, is that 
mathematization, in itself, is not a cause of, or 
explanation for, the emptiness of economic theories.
1 9
PART ONE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE THESIS
CHAPTER 1
ELEMENTS OF THE HISTORY OF 
MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
Elements of the History of
Mathematical Economics
"Mais on doit se demander de quel côté se trouve 
1'ambition la plus exorbitante. N'est-il pas plus 
prétentieux de se prendre pour une mémoire que de 
prétendre exercer un jugement? Du côté du jugement, 
l'erreur est une accident possible, mais du côté de la 
mémoire 1'altération est d ' essence.
Canguilhem (1988)
22
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the reader with major 
methodological difficulties faced by contemporary 
historians of mathematical economics. The first section 
focuses on foundational issues in historical science.
The second section deals with the description of the 
historical sources of this study except primary sources. 
The latter are referenced as when they appear in the 
thesis. Furthermore, it recounts views of 20th c. 
historians on the history of mathematical economics. In 
addition to comprehensive collections of primary sources 
(Baumol et al, 1968; Baumol, 1991; Darnell, 1991a, b, c, 
d, e, f), we shall report the views on the history of 
mathematical economics developed by authors of 
monographs and specialised studies on mathematical 
economics. These are Theocharis (1961, 1983, 1993),
Etner(1987), Zylberberg (1990), Ingrao et ai(1987) and 
Israel(1996).
23
Elements of the History ofMathematical Economics
SECTION 1; HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AT
PRESENT^
At present, some authors are scrutinizing the 
way economists are writing the history of their subject 
(e.g. Backhouse, 1991a; Blaug, 1991; Mirowski, 1989, 
1991; Mirowski et al 1994; Perrot, 1992 pp.7-60; 
'Quelques préliminaires à l'intelligence des textes 
économiques'). At the same time not only is the role of 
the history of economic thought being criticized (e.g. 
Backhouse 1991a, Perrot 1992, Van Parijs, 1990), but also 
new sources are being made available to readers (e.g. 
Perrot 1992, Darnell 1991a, b, c, d, e, f, Bicquilley, 
1804, and sets of fundamental texts have been recently 
published, e.g. the Pioneers in economics series at Elgar 
Publishing Company). These criticisms and these new 
insights also impinge upon the history of mathematical 
economics insofar as it is a subpart of the history of 
economic thought. We shall now develop explanations of 
why it is that methodologists are calling into question 
of the historiography of economics at present.
There are three reasons that explain why 
economists are calling into question the history of 
economic thought today.
The first is the 'crisis' of history 
exemplified by the controversies about the nature of both 
historical knowledge (which might be considered either as 
poetic or as scientific) and the history of the sciences 
(cf. Raison Présente, 1996; Ingrao et ai 1987). Quite
24
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deliberately we do not distinguish between ’history’ as 
a part of knowledge and ’history’ as what happens. This 
is one core issue of the debates but it is beyond our 
scope. The way we handle the history in the concrete 
analysis of historical texts in mathematical economics 
was described in chapter 2 where the difference between 
’external’ history and ’internal’ history is explained. 
An indication that debates in the philosophy of history 
have an impact on the historiography of economic 
thought is that Backhouse (1991a) reports the analysis 
of philosophers such as Richard Rorty in Objectivity, 
Relativism end Truth, on this subject.
Once polemical aspects of debates on history are set 
aside, we claim that one part of their underlying 
subject-matter is the close link between history and 
geopolitics. The Western tradition of historical 
knowledge, which historians usually date back to 
Thucydides (-460, -400) was traditionally dependent
upon the political domain. For example, many French 
historians before the 18th c. were state 
historiographers. History is now an academic subject 
taught in national institutions. Even though there is 
academic co-operation at an international level, 
geopolitical changes still affect historiography. So 
when the world is undergoing important geopolitical 
changes, as is the case today, (e.g. the collapse of 
the former Soviet Union and the re-formation of a
25
Elements of the History of
Mathematical Economics
European Union), some historical facts or some 
historical eras become more relevant to modern thought 
than do others. This is either because they become 
relevant to an understanding of these changes, or 
because these changes reveal the relativity of previous 
historical analysis. Consequently, a critique of past 
historiography occurs and the methods or the topics of 
history as an academic discipline are re-evaluated.
To a certain extent, the history of economic 
thought is affected by these upheavals in history. 
There are two reasons for this: the debates on the
foundations of historical knowledge; and the changes 
undergone by national economies.
The second reason for the criticisms directed 
against the history of economics is the ’crisis’ in 
economic thought itself and that of most Western 
economies since the 1970s (cf. PB, 1993a and Gerrard, 
1995, p.222) Usually when an academic subject or a 
particular theory is undergoing a crisis, the critique 
also affects its history. First such a critique can 
have heuristic virtues since it can lead to the 
exploration and the updating of forgotten ideas. 
Secondly, such criticisms are natural. One function of 
the history of a subject is to legitimate and explain 
its current form. In this connection Perrot (1992) 
suggests that studies on the Anglo-Saxon heritage of 
political economy are over-represented compared
26
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Mathematical Economics
to those on the French tradition. And Backhouse 
(1991a) remarks that most historical studies are only 
dealing with market economies. According to Zylberberg 
(1990) the treatises on mathematical economics 
published in France in the first half of the 20th c. 
fulfil this function'. All these books:
"aim at proving that mathematical
economics is superior to traditional
political economy. Hence these authors enlarge on the history of mathematical 
economics. It gives the reader the
impression that the discipline is not as new 
as it seems to be and that it is rooted in a 
tradition. This explains why Ceva, Canard or 
Isnard, rather than Cournot are usually
referred to as the starting point of 
mathematical economics.
A surprisingly important number of pages is 
devoted to proving the relevance of the use 
of mathematics in political economy and also 
to answering objections to it." (Zylberberg, 
1990, p.153, our translation)
For the purpose of accuracy it is worth mentioning that
these debates about the history of economics are not
caused by present historical circumstances only.
Debates about the history of science are part and
parcel of research in this field and in the philosophy
of science as well, as Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) and
Imre Lakatos (1923-1974) for instance show.
The repercussion on economics of the crisis affecting
Western economies reveals a profound lack of
convergence on the aim of economic knowledge as well as
on the role of the history of economic thought. Such a
lack of convergence about the aim of a science does
Elements of the History of
Mathematical Economics
not seem to exist in medicine. It exists in physics 
between 'pure* theory and technology or engineering but 
it seems that it does not generate as many debates as 
it does in economics. An approach to these debates is 
due to. Van Parijs’ (1990, p.17, our translation) who 
writes as follows:
"I am not saying that a simplified 
reconstruction of the past, that of a 
species, of a nation, an institution or an 
individual is useless. It may help in 
defining and redefining an identity that one 
may sometimes take pride in or just put up 
with. Maybe this is the main rationale of 
historiography - from macro-history to 
biography, of which we are but little 
concerned here. However it seems to me that 
the role of such investigations ought to be 
limited as far as ■ the rest of the social 
sciences we shall be concerned with is 
concerned. Indeed, if for instance, one is 
concerned with the advent of a socialist or a 
post-industrial society, then what is 
important is not to build up a conceptual 
apparatus that presents it as the "natural" 
consequence of an ongoing historical process, 
but it is rather to explore as rigorously as 
possible and without failing to differentiate 
between its desirability and feasibility."
Backhouse (1991a) is right when he remarks
that issues in the methodology of the history of
economics are issues in the methodology of economics.
This is specially obvious in the particular case of
mathematical economics as we shall now see.
For example, when authors believe that mathematics are
not an essential feature of economics, they are likely
to hold the view that the history of mathematical
economics is not very important to contemporary
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economics. They might hold this view on mathematical 
economics because they hold the ontological view that 
it is economic phenomena that are mathematical in 
essence rather than knowledge about them; or because 
they hold the methodological view that mathematical 
economic theories can be expressed without mathematics; 
or else because they hold the teleological view that 
the aim of economics is not to build ’abstract’ 
theories such as mathematical theories are. 
Those who believe that mathematical economics is an 
important tradition are similarly met with obstacles 
about its history. Given a mathematised economic 
problem, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between 
its mathematical side and its economic side. 
On the one hand, economics sometimes uses, and has 
used, well established mathematical tools and results, 
so that mathematics appear to be either a processing 
device, a calculus a sieve for consistency, or from a 
logical positivist perspective, a well defined 
structure that can be empirically interpreted. 
On the other, it is the case that mathematical economic 
theorizing employing such techniques as maxima and 
minima analysis, game theory or the analysis of 
financial markets poses proper mathematical problems. 
In such cases both mathematical and economic inquiry 
are enhanced (cf. Debreu, 1986; by the development of 
mathematical economics. These two sides of
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mathematical economics echo questions of the philosophy 
of mathematics. Is the function of mathematics 
algorithmic or is it a particular way of theorizing? 
What is the role played by syr;JDolism in achieving these 
two functions? In short, from a chronological point of 
view, mathematical economics sometimes looks like 
applied mathematics. Sometimes it consists in a true 
development of mathematics. In the first case the
subject-matter of the history of mathematical economics 
is the transfer of knowledge, which may also concern 
the sociology of knowledge. In the second case it
concerns typically biographical inquiry and the 
philosophical analysis of theorizing.
For these reasons, synoptic historical views 
on mathematical economics are dependent on the
historians’ views on these matters as well as on their 
views of the differences between subjects such as 
mathematics, physics, philosophy and economics.
Mirowski’s (1989) analysis of the relationship between 
physics and economics may be taken as exemplifying such 
a dependence. He takes the point of view of what he 
terms 'universal history’ and postulates that there are 
cognitive ’metaphors’. He identifies variants of these 
metaphors in physics and in economics and compares 
their efficiencies.
In addition to standard methodological
problems about the interpretation of
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historical material - some of which Stigler (1965b) 
describes, the methodologist is faced with small amounts 
of this material. This is the third reason for the 
criticisms addressed against the history of economic 
thought. Here is an appraisal of the importance of 
historical sources for the history of economic thought
and of their neglect, by the French historian Perrot
(1992, p.9):
"Considering the large collection of
archives available [... ] economists have been 
very selective. In fact, they rely on about 
ten books whose authority is not restricted to 
a particular specialized subfield, as well as 
on two or three "secondary" works. From the
XlXth century onwards, the history of the
subject has been built upon far less than ten 
per cent of identified sources."
Similarly, Breton et al (1991a)pinpoint three 19thc 
trends (the liberal, the cooperatist and the 
nationalist) that have not been sufficiently studied 
given their importance on the history of French economic 
thought. Mirowski's (1989) Herculean endeavour to 
reconstruct the history of economic thought proceeds 
from an identification of this lacuna and it seems 
therefore to be a feature both of French and of Anglo- 
Saxon history.
It hits especially mathematical economics for 
which it seems that there is a bibliographical gap from 
1911 to 1961:
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"We have, then, Jevons' extended bibliography in the 1911 edition of TTPE, Fisher's 1897 bibliography, and Theocharis' 1983 bibliography of work prior to Cournot. Together, these are what was, at the time of their compilation, thought to represent 'mathematical economics.'"(Darnell 1991a, p .xvii).
The book of Theocharis to which Darnell refers is in 
fact the second edition of a book first published in 
1961.
Consequently, historical overviews of the methodology of 
mathematical economics are very likely to be ultimately 
limited, however exhaustive the author wishes to be. 
Furthermore, this lacuna is a problem for those involved 
in the philosophy of economics. In addition, the 
bibliographical core of mathematical economics, as 
Darnell (1991, a, p.xviii) points out is hard to obtain. 
There is however a positive aspect to this lacuna; it 
gives a reason for additional studies on mathematical 
economics. Thanks to Darnell (1991a, b, c, d, e, f) and 
the Elgar serie already referred to, this additional 
drawback in the literature is being remedied.
In this context the critical assessment of the 
main authoritative historical sources of this study is 
very important. This is the subject-matter of the next 
section.
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SECTION 2: ASSESSMENT OF THE HISTORICAL SOURCES
OF THIS STUDY 
SECTION 281; COLLECTIONS OF PRIMARY SOURCES
Baumol et ai(1968) collected and occasionally 
translated thirty four articles and excerpts of works 
concerned with mathematical economics to the exclusion 
of those dealing with arithmetic and geometry. The 
texts are classified by economic subject-matter. The 
papers are either original works, or translations of 
original works or secondary literature. They date from 
1736 up to 1965 and they were originally written in 
Latin, French, German, Italian or English. 
They divide the history of mathematical■economics into 
two parts: the first landmark in terms of historical
era is the end of the 19th c. and the exemplar economic 
figures are Jevons (1835-1882) and Walras (1834-1910). 
Before then according to Baumol and Goldfeld, 
mathematical economics studies were not fruitful and 
progress in this field was erratic. Further, according 
to the authors, they are a useless curiosity for 
contemporary economists. From then on, the diffusion 
of mathematical economics is continuous. The editors 
exemplify the continuity of the history of mathematical 
economics with the following authors: Jevons (1835-
1882), Walras (1834-1910), Edgeworth (1902-1950), 
Ramsey (1903-1930), Wald (1902-1950) and von Neumann 
(1903-1957). Overall, mathematics contributed to
33
Elements of the History of
Mathematical Economics
clarifying economic ideas and explanations.
The editors criticise approaches to the history of
economic thought that focus on the genealogy of economic
schools of thought. They suggest that such genealogies
are arbitrary, and it seems that they favour a cumulative
and linear approach to the history of economics.
The editors do not define what they mean by mathematical
economics. However, from the way they picture the
history of mathematical economics, it seems that they
refer essentially to the use of mathematical symbolism in
economic texts. Besides, it seems that the criterion they
use to assess the progress of mathematical economics is
the 'complexity' of the mathematical techniques in use.
Baumol ' s view evolved with time. In the 
foreword he wrote to Darnell's anthology (Baumol, 1991), 
Baumol's view is altered in two major ways. First, he 
points to the fruitfulness of pre-19th c. mathematical 
economists as a source for contemporary analysis. 
Secondly, he plays down the state of mathematical 
economics at the end of the 19th c. Not only was the 
prestige of this activity limited but its proponents 
limited its scope on the ground that economic behaviour 
rests upon psychology, social organisation and social 
practice.
Darnell's (1991a, b, c, d, e, f) work aims
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at increasing the range of sources available and 
thereby he is contributing to the filling in of the 
lack of historical sources that we mentioned previously 
(cf. chapter 2, section 1). He selected 85 pieces of 
work from amongst the following bibliographies on 
mathematical economics, (a) the bibliography published 
in 1892 by Irving Fisher, which is an extension of the 
list published by Jevons in 1879; (b) that of N.T. Bacon 
and that of I. Fisher both published in 1897; (c) the
1911 extension of Jevon’s; (d) these of Theocharis
published in 1961 and 1983, (e) and that of Baumol and
Goldfeld dated 1966. The criteria for selection were 
first that the texts were articles; second, that they 
were first published in the 19th c. ; and finally that 
they were first published in English. By contrast with 
Baumol et al's (1958) anthology all articles appear in 
full length form. Darnell excluded 20th c. works 
because they are accessible and because since the 
1930s, the value of the mathematical method in
economics has ceased to be controversial.
Darnell considers that there are two periods in the 
history of mathematical economics, and the frontier he 
draws between these two periods is the Second World 
War. The reason why he chooses this date is not clear. 
It is half way between Stigler's (1964) choice which is 
the 1920s and Boland et aJ (1986) which is the 1960s. 
The reason for choosing this date might be that
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Darnell subjects time-division in the history of 
economics to general history. This might be the case 
if he considers that because economics is an empirical 
science, theories ought to be pictured in the light of 
the underlying economic context in which they are 
worked out. But the reason might also be that he 
considers that, generally speaking, the orientation of 
economic thought changed at that time. These latter 
remarks aim to show how history, epistemology and 
methodology are correlated to one another, in terms 
mentioned above (cf. chapter 1). Before these dates, 
mathematical economics was a tiny sub-part of 
economics, and one whose impact on the discipline (even 
up till 1930) was slight. Even though the mathematics 
used in economics was simple (algebra, geometry, 
diagrams), they constituted a "language barrier" within 
the discipline. This explains why some mathematical 
economics, which history has shown to be efficacious 
for economic theorizing (e.g. Hicks Value and Capital, 
1939; Marshall's Principles, 1890) first appeared in 
footnotes or in appendices. By contrast, mathematics 
today no longer forms a "language barrier" to 
economists but remains one between economists and the 
layman. In between, 19th c. mathematical economists 
fought for their sub-discipline, and mathematics were 
integrated into the academic syllabus in economics.
Consequently, Darnell's criteria for
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splitting the history of mathematical economics seems 
to be sociological in contrast to that of Collison- 
Black in his preface to Jevons (1871), and that of 
Baumol et al (1968). For the latter two, the criterion 
seems to be the relevance of past texts, whose authors 
are then called the "precursors", to contemporary 
analysis.
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SECTION 202: SPECIALIZED SOURCES ON MATHEMATICAL
ECONOMICS
Theocharis (1983, 1993) considers that the two 
landmarks in the history of mathematical economics are 
1838 and 1871. Those prior to Cournot's essay
Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie 
des Richesses (1838) are termed 'early mathematical' 
economists. This 'proto-historical period' for
mathematical economics opens up a period of transition, 
that runs from 1838 to 1871 when Jevons' Theory of 
Political Economv was first published. The survey of 
his bibliography suggests that Theocharis explored two 
main bibliographical sources on mathematical economics 
namely the 2nd and 4th editions of Jevons ' Theory of
Political Economy respectively published in 1879 and 
1924, as well as Irving Fisher's 'Bibliography of 
mathematical economics from Ceva to Cournot' which is in 
all likelihood included in the 1929 edition of the
translation of Cournot's Recherches(...) by N.T. Bacon. 
In addition, he expanded this bibliography. He jumps 
from Aristotle to the 18th c. He refers both to the 18th 
century's and the 19th century's editions of the books 
he mentions, as well as to the 19th and 20th century 
reprints of earlier editions. Theocharis' books are 
considered to be authoritative on the history of
mathematical economics and Theocharis is quoted by 
Baumol et al (1968), Darnell (1991a) Perrot (1992) and
38
Elements of the History ofMathematical Economics
Mirowski (1991). By contrast with Baumol et al (1968), 
the selection of mathematical economists is not 
restricted to their using a particular type of 
mathematics.
Etner (1987) refers to extracts of his book 
dealing with one aspect of French mathematical 
economics, namely "calcul économique"(economic 
calculation). He defines it as the branch of political 
economy that aims to justify economic and social 
policies. It provides a monetary estimation of the 
economic and social benefits of these policies, and 
criteria for decision making based on mathematical 
formulae. The book consists of both first hand analysis 
of the contributions of famous philosophers, economists, 
learned persons and engineers, as well as quotations 
from these contributions; however, business economics is 
out of his scope.
The book covers the post-16thc historical era, but we 
shall be concerned with Etner(1987), that is, with his 
research on the post-18the period. According to 
Etner(1987), economic calculation developed in the 19thc 
as a result of research in civil engineering and not as 
a result of theoretical studies of society in general. 
In addition to the works of Jules Dupuit(1804-1866) and 
Clément Colson( 1853-1939), whom he views as the most 
well known pre-1945 contributors to economic 
calculation, he studies the works of many others. He 
insists on the role played by the building of transport
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and also by the institutional position of French
government in the development of economic calculation.
French government were involved either directly or 
indirectly in the building or the operating of transport 
networks. This is because they acted either as 
financial investors or as controllers (technical,
financial or commercial) of building companies or
concessions holders, or else because they were levying 
taxes. Consequently, many state engineers -especially 
those who studied at the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées- 
developed thorough costs analysis, detailed traffic and 
earnings estimations. They were also concerned with 
measuring the utility of civil engineering networks. It 
did not refer to the theoretical economic concept of 
utility but to the comparison of the social and economic 
advantages of the networks with the costs incurred. In 
connection to railway economics in particular, the 
mathematical tools and methods that were used came from 
either engineering physics, and were a combination of 
theoretical developments and experimentations, or from 
analytical accountancy, or else they were 
interpretations of statistical data in an econometric 
type of way (e.g. estimations of parameters of linear 
formulae). The engineers were neither applying nor 
developing economic theory in their works. Moreover, 
they were usually ignorant of it. However, it happens 
that they came to use similar mathematical technics and 
economic concepts that were being developed in economics
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during the same period. In costs analysis in 
particular, they discovered the importance of marginal 
costs.
Zylberberg (1990) is concerned with giving an 
account of the state of mathematical economics in France 
between the 1871 war and the first world war. His 
sources consist of articles, textbooks, treatises as 
well as theses. Most of them are written in French. 
Their subject-matter is mathematical economics or the 
methodology of the social sciences. In addition, his 
bibliography contains a few contemporary studies in the 
history of mathematical economics as well as in the 
methodology of economics. He insists on the 
institutional background of mathematical economics. This 
defines his historical standpoint.
He considers that the first landmark in the 
history of mathematical economics in France is the 
beginning of the 19th c. This new science was born with 
Cournot and Canard. Then he mentions Esmenard du Mazet, 
Mathieu Wolkoff and Jules Dupuit who considered that 
mathematics was the appropriate form of economic theory. 
In his bibliography however, only Dupuit's name appears. 
The second landmark in this history is the end of the 
19th c. and the crisis of political economy. Zylberberg 
identifies two traditions in the history of mathematical 
economics between 1870 and 1914 as well as isolated 
individuals. One tradition consists of the followers of 
Walras such as Albert Aupetit (1876-1943), Etienne
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Antonelli (1879-1971) and Hermann Laurent (1841-1908). 
The latter also belongs to the second tradition , that 
of actuaries. From 1872 to 1880, there is no connection 
between the two traditions. The other members of the 
actuary tradition are Léon Pochet, Emile Dormoy, Septime 
Avigor, Fontaneau, as well as Emile Cheysson (1836- 
1910). The latter also belongs to the third tradition, 
that of engineer-economists. in this tradition, there 
are also Clément Colson (1853-1939) and Marcel Lenoir 
(1881-1927). Isolated individuals who contributed to the 
development of mathematical economics are Jules du 
Mesnil-Marigny(1810-1885), Gustave Fauveau(1834-?) and
Louis Bachelier (1870-1946).4 At that time, there are
definite developments in mathematical economics. 
However, mathematical economics is less successful than 
in other countries.
Zylberberg is not definite in identifying the third 
landmark. It is either 1914 or the 1930's. A defining 
feature of this turning point is the convergence of two 
historical trends that were previously separated. This 
convergence coincides with the ’professionalisation' of 
economists. They are the abstract-deductive trend and 
the pragmatic-inductive trend. They converge into the 
econometric tradition,
We shall now report the historical reasearch 
of Inrgao et al( 1987). The book by Israel(1996) is 
concerned with the mathématisation of the sciences in
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general but we shall also refer to its parts that are 
concerned with economics (ch6 and ch22). Their research 
is based on the analysis of first hand economic 
literature from the 18thc onwards, literature on the 
history of economic thought and 20thc philosophical 
literature'. The authors are concerned with explaining 
the evolution of the mathematical side and the economic 
side of general equilibrium analysis in terms not only 
of the history of economic thought but also in terms of 
the history of the sciences. In addition to expounding 
the fundamental contributions to the theory of Walras 
and Pareto, they assess the works of pre-Walrasian 
authors, Hicks and 20thc economics working in the United 
States. They also show that there are many historical 
trends that influenced this evolution, amongst which the 
mathématisation of the social and biological sciences, 
and the evolution of the physical sciences and their 
crisis. As a result, this evolution is complex and the 
mathématisation of economics is atypical compared to 
other social sciences.
Their view is that from the 1930's onwards, there is an 
increasing tendency for the economic side and the 
mathematical side of general equilibrium analysis to 
evolve separately. This separation" has ultimately 
resulted in a contradiction between the theory's aims 
and its hypotheses. The aim of the mathématisation was 
to answer the questions of the existence, the uniqueness 
and the stability of the state of equilibrium of an
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economy. The mathématisation of the hypothesis if the 
theory and their mathematical treatment have shown that 
these three features were not characteristic of the idea 
of equilibrium as defined by the theory. The only 
positive answer to these questions was the Arrow-Debreu 
proof of the existence of an equilibrium state. The 
main reaction of economists to these negative results 
was to adjust partially the theory's hypotheses, in an 
attempt both to define the conditions under which 
unicity and stability occurred and to preserve the core 
hypotheses of the theory. For their part Ingrao et 
al(1987) advocate for "a thorough reexamination of the 
theory's hypotheses, i.e., a paradigmatic revolution".
It emerges from the previous survey that most 
economists and most of the sources they refer to in the 
history of mathematical economics, converge in focusing 
on the 19th c. as an important period in the history of 
the subject. Before then, works in mathematical 
economics were scarce, and afterwards there number 
increased and became a great proportion of economic 
literature. When it comes to qualifying this historical 
development and assessing its importance to economic 
thought the authors' view do not converge anymore. It 
should be noted that the search for cross-references in 
the bibliographies of these sources reveals that their 
works were often independent of one another.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
^ The question must be asked of where the most outrageous ambition stands. Is not there more conceit in claiming to be a memory than there is in meaning to formulate a judgement? Potentially, a judgement may be misleading, whereas alteration is the essence of memory.
^ Blaug(1991) provides material for the understanding of historiography of economics. It consists of fourteen articles originally written between 1964 and 1986. In the first article, Popescu(1964) comments on references that include non-European references. The references are of interest for general and specialised studies into the historiography of economics from the mid-18th c . onwards in various countries. These references are studies into the history of economic thought or bibliographical studies on economic science. The references start with the work of Du Pont de Nemours (1768,1769). However, an earlier author ismentioned, the German Georg Heinrich Zincke.
2 These treatises are; Introduction Mathématique à l'Etude de 1'Economie Politique (1911) by Leopold Leseine and Louis Suret; Les Applications Mathématiques à 1'Economie Politique (1912) byPierre Boven; Théorie Mathématique de l'Echange (1913) by Antonio Osorio; Principes d*Economie Pure (1914) by Etienne Antonelli; Les 
Mathématiques Appliquées à 1 'Economie Politique (1914) by Waoislaz Zawadski; L'Emploi .des Mathématiques .en Economie Politique (1915) by Jacques Mor e t .
 ^ The biographical information that follows is a summary of that contained in Zylberberg (1990). For information on Louis Bachelier, see chapter 2, note 3. To the exceptions of thefollowing authors who appear in the books subsequently mentioned, these authors do not appear in the indexes of the historicalsources we surveyed: Marcel Lenoir, (Morgan, 1990; Stigler 1975a)Aupetit (Theocharis, 1983), Antonelli (Theocharis, 1983), Cheysson (Theocharis, 1993), Colson (Theocharis, 1993), Du Mesnil-Marigny (Theocharis, 1993), Fauveau (Theocharis, 1993).
Albert Aupetit (1876-1943) is the first French economist who used Lagrange multipliers in economic optimization 
problems. He improved the formal aspect of Walras' theory and he added to it. In particular, he studied equilibrium in the production sector which neither Walras nor Pareto studied. He introduced production functions with substitute factors. He also attempted at measuring "value” .
The theoretical contribution of Etienne Antonelli (1879-1971) to mathematical economics is limited. However, he contributed to it in so far as he answered metaphysical and epistem.ological questions addressed against it.
Herman Laurent (1841-1908) contributed to risk theory, to which he applied probability calculus. By contrast with Walras, he had an "econometric approach" to statistical data. He considered that their role is both to suggest economic-theoretical premises and to test economic conclusions. However, he considered that they had not yet reached a mature stage. He developed and he improved mathematical statistics applicable to economics such as least square methods, which he, however, applied only to insurance problems. In addition, he gave a clear
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explanation of the ordinal aspect of utility function applied to the consumer equilibrium.
Léon Pochet wrote an article in 1873 on stock-markets. According to Zylberberg (1990), he explicitly associates actions of brokers to games. However, these games involve one individual only. He also introduces mathematical gain functions.
For taxation purposes, Emile Dornoy defined the value added to a commodity by economic agents.
Septime Avigor studied the price system of an economy in a way similar to Walras general equilibrium analysis. However, Avigor does not mention Walras. In addition, marginal utility does not play a basic role in Avigor ' s system, and the demand functions are not deductible from it,
Fontaneau wrote many articles around 1880 on the theory of value which are not of an outstanding originality. However, he is the first economist both to attempt at describing price variations as a mathematical function of the difference between supply and demand and also to write explicitly a production function.
Emile Cheysson (1836-1910) created the Institut de Actuaires Français in 1890. He developed the use of geometry in statistics for practical purposes. He and Walras exchanged a correspondence on the rationale of mathematical economics and on its development.
Clément Colson (1853-1939) was a public servant. According to Zylberberg he played an essential role in the development of mathematical economics because he trained the French mathematical economists of the 1930s. He was first and foremost a practitioner and not an academic. He understood economic laws as statistical laws. He used not only graphs but also "models" of the economy, which he described in terms of partial and general equilibrium. In connection to partial equilibrium he considered that the law of supply and demand was a manageable approximation of reality.
Zylberberg (1990) compares the work of Marcel Lenoir (1881-1927) on statistics with that of the American Henri Moore, even though the Frenchman was less known. Lenoir only published one book. Etude sur la Formation du Mouvement des Prix, in 1913. It contains the method of relative changes and also trend ratios, which Moore uses at a later date only. His work echoes later works in econometrics. In particular, he aggregates individual 
statistical demand functions. He also uses regressions with more than one variable. In addition, he draws the reader's attention on what will be known later as the identification problem in the econometric literature. However Zylberberg (1990) does not consider that he is an econometrician because his approach does not consist in testing economic theories w i t h ‘statistics.
Jules du Mesnil-Marigny (1810-1885) was a maritime engineer. He and Walras had planned to write a treatise on political economy. It was his ambition to make political economy an exact science, that is a rigorous and quantifiable science. He considered that mathematics was the adequate instrument for achieving this purpose. In particular, he wanted to prove that 
protectionism and liberalism were not contradictory.
Paul Gustave Fauveau (1834-7) was the only mathematical economist amongst those mentioned by Zylberberg (1990) to be recognized by the then orthodox school of
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political economy in France. However he is ignored by historians. He wrote on mathematical economics from 1864 to 1886. Several aspects of his work were innovative. For example, in taxation theory, he identified taxes with a risk bonus given by citizens to the state. He also anticipates the theory of index numbers. According to Zylberberg (1990), Fauveau provides the first dynamic model with continuous time and he is the first economist who uses variations calculus.
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CHAPTER 2
SUBJECT-MATTER AND METHODOLOGY OFTHE THESIS
Subject-Matter and
Methodology of the Thesis
"Si les chiffres ne gouverenent pas le monde, ils indiquent 
au moins la manière dont il est gouverné"
Goethe
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The subject-matter of this thesis is the use 
of mathematics in contemporary economic knowledge. 
Mathematics, including mathematics that may appear 
"sophisticated", is a significant component of this 
knowledge, and since this knowledge is used in political 
decision-making in various countries, it thus 
contributes to social order. Consequently, whilst the
subject-matter of this thesis "abstract" it is connected 
to pragmatic social issues.
In this thesis, a semiotic epistemological approach to 
the subject-matter is taken, which involves historical 
studies. However, this thesis should not be considered 
as a study in the history of economic thought in the
orthodox sense. It is complementary to it but it 
differs from it since the historical dimension is 
subordinate to the semiotic a n a l y s i s ^ .
We shall first define our general historical 
and philosophical approach to the subject-matter and the 
specific research program of the thesis. Then, basic
concepts of the philosophical framework we shall use are
explained.
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SECTION 1: TOPICS, METHODOLOGY AND AIMS OF THE
THESIS
In this thesis, we equate contemporary 
mathematical economics with the general survey of Arrow 
et al (1981, 1982, 1986) and Hildenbrand et al (1991), 
and with its definition by Stigum (1990). These books 
refer to a wide range of mathematical tools including 
probability and non-standard analysis.3 By mathematical
economics therefore, we refer to the corpus of 
mathematical economic theory, to the corpus of 
econometrics, as well as to original logico-formal 
frameworks of economic theory such as Stigum's. We also 
follow Chiappori(1992), who notices that mathematics is 
not merely a 'conceptual tool' for contemporary economic 
knowledge, it also an "empirical tool".
We are interested in the "mathématisation" of economic 
ideas from an epistemological point of view that 
comprises a historical approach. By "mathématisation" 
we mean the historical and epistemological relationships 
between the "mathematical form" and the "economic 
content"*. According to Israel (1996), the history of
mathematical modelling in general, which constitutes an 
important part of the mathématisation of the sciences, 
still has to be written. In addition, according to 
Franklin (1993), epistemological studies neglect 
important newly mathematised scientific fields (economic 
fields included, cf. chapter 7, section 2).
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There are different ways of approaching the history of a
science. One way may be called 'internal history's .
This involves the historical study of ideas and methods
used in a particular academic discipline with references
only to the literature that this discipline acknowledges
to constitute its corpus. The internal approach to
history prevailed in economics until recently, as
Mirowski et al(1994, p246) notice. By contrast,
'external history' aims at setting the history of a
particular science within the history of other sciences,
and as far as possible, within economic and social
history. For example, historical studies in the
sociology of knowledge belong to external history.
This thesis falls within the province of the external
history of mathematical economics. One advantage of
this historical approach is that it includes the study
of the contributions of mathematicians and other
professionals to mathematical economics, and the
contributions of economists to the development of
mathematics.®.
The philosophical approach to the subject- 
matter consists essentially in taking up semiotics as 
the school of thought influencing our methodology for 
reading historical texts in mathematical economic 
theory. Semiotics is a tradition in both linguistics 
and in philosophy, that provides a general theory of 
meaning. Authorities and concepts in semiotics are 
presented in the section that follows (Chapter 2,
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Section 2).
Specifically, this thesis is concerned with 
two topics in the history of mathematical economics. 
One is the Neo-classical school of thought in economic 
theory, the other is the concept of "mathematical model" 
in economics. Both are important for understanding 
contemporary mathematical economics.
The Neo-classical school of thought has long been 
equated, not always accurately, with mathematical 
economics. Many economists share Carlo Benetti's (1995) 
view that the Neo-classical General Equilibrium analysis 
is "the norm out of which economic "science" develops".
In addition, most studies in the epistemology of 
economics take it as their main subject-matter. For 
example, this is the case of Hahn et al (1979), Hausman 
(1992), Hollis et al (1975), Nelson (1984). There are 
two reasons for the predominance of the Neo-classical 
school of thought in philosophical literature. Firstly 
parts of this literature belong to the Marxian 
tradition, which develop an economic theory that 
competes with Neo-classical theory to a certain point^. 
Consequently, an important focus of Marxian epistemology 
of economics is Neo-classical economics'. Secondly, Neo­
classical analysis influenced 20th c. Western economic 
theory as a whole (regardless of schools of thought and 
mathematical economics included), so that much of modern 
economics is neo-classical economics^. Furthermore,
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Ingrao et al(1987, px) and Israel{1996, pp.313-314) 
consider that the mathématisation of economic science 
itself originally developed within General Equilibrium 
Analysis and that mathématisation is its rationale.
The importance of General Equilibrium Analysis for 
contemporary mathematical economics and the philosophy 
of economics does not imply that it is well defined. Its 
status is adequatly defined by Punso(1991, pp2-3):
"What is commonly called the study of general equilibrium is neither very clear nor agreed upon. Is it an analysis, a theory, a sequence of models, a metatheory? Nevertheless, everybody seeems to agree that it is the fundamental economic teory"
Mathematical models in general play an important part in
the production of scientific knowledge today including
economics. In addition, they are important in social
and political decision-making.
After having defined the two topics of this
thesis, we shall now turn to defining our methodology.
The first topic, Neo-classical mathematical 
economics, is treated through the study of two treatises 
in which the use of mathematics coincides with a gain in 
generality in the approach of their subject-matter (cf. 
Part 2). They are Jevons' Theorv of Political Economy 
and Debreu's Theory of Value (cf. Chapter 5; Chapter 6). 
Both are popular representatives of mathematical 
economics. As such, they have a place in the 'internal' 
history of economic thought, and one which is not 
disputed in the literature.
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The methodology of our analysis of these two seminal 
works is as follows. It deals first with the 
mathematics they use (e.g.; finite differences. 
Calculus, Topology of real vector spaces). It comes 
under the heading of 'external' history both with regard 
to the sources it refers to and with regard to its 
scope. Not only does it refer to the texts themselves 
but also it links them to texts by the same authors in 
which methodological views are expounded. In addition, 
it aims to replace the mathematics they use in the 
broader context of the development of both the social 
sciences and mathematics (cf. Chapter 3; Chapter 4). 
Consequently, our historical methodology is similar to 
that of Punzo(1991) and Ingrao et al(1987, Preface). 
Information on this matter is mostly derived from 
secondary sources on the history of mathematics, and 
from encyclopaedias as well as from mathematical 
textbooks.
In each case, the aim of the analysis, apart from the 
description of the mathematical tools used, is to answer 
such questions as:
has this use of mathematics contributed to the 
development of mathematics themselves?
- do the authors consider that mathematics is a 
"conceptual tool" or an "empirical tool" for building up 
economic theory?
- what, if anything, do the authors count as an 
"economic result" as opposed to a "mathematical result"?
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- what are the arguments the authors put forward to 
warrant their using mathematics in economics theory?
The second topic, the concept of mathematical 
economic model, is dealt with from a different 
standpoint (cf. Part 3). We are looking for the lexical 
origin and the historical origin of the concept of a 
model in economic literature (cf. Chapter 7; Chapter 8). 
Necessarily, we rely on the research of others on this 
matter. We communicate their results and what is more, 
we explore additional bodies of knowledge in order to 
add to these results. The 'external' feature of this
historical research is that the search for the lexical
origin involves a comparison with other scientific 
disciplines (cf. Chapter 9).
The philosophical aspect of the methodology
consists in applying semiotic analysis to the reading of 
the texts of Jevons and Debreu mentioned above.
After having explained our methodology we
shall now turn to stating its aims.
First it is expected that this study will 
reveal whether semiotics as a methodological framework 
discloses new insights on the subject-matter. In 
addition, it might reveal how this methodology can be 
improved and extended to topics other than Neo-classical 
economics.
Secondly, it is expected that the study will reveal 
elements for answering the following question:
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does the idea of "mathematical economic modelling' -
which refers today to the aim of a large part of 
economic theorising, come from the Neo-classical school 
of thought which exerted a great influence on economic 
theorising?
In addition, even though in this thesis, we are 
interested in other sciences only in so far as they shed 
light on economics, this study may contain elements for 
methodologists interested in social sciences as a whole. 
For example, readers interested in the methodology of 
the social sciences may find that this study contributes 
to answering the question of whether the domination in 
the social sciences of explanatory frameworks borrowed 
from economics is connected with the "mathematical 
nature" of this model. This domination is acknowledged 
by Van Parijs (1990) and Hausman (1992), who argue that 
it is based on the Neo-classical theoretical framework. 
Consequently, assuming that Neo-classical economics is a 
good representative of the use of mathematics in 
economic theory, the previous question makes sense.
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SECTION 2: PRESENTATION OF SEMIOTICS
SECTION 201;GENERAL PRESENTATION
In terms of academic disciplines, semiotics is 
part of linguistics. However, many disciplinary 
influences from the sciences as well as from the arts, 
are evident in the works of semioticians. So far as the 
subject-matter of semiotics is concerned, it consists, 
as its etymology suggests, in the study of signs, 
without restriction to vernacular languages. 
Historically, the Collected Papers of the American 
Richard Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is referred to in 
contemporary semiotic studies as the main contribution 
to the foundation of semiotics. Eco (1984), who is 
concerned with the historiography of semiotics, shows 
that in previous centuries semioticians are to be found 
amongst philosophers, especially those interested in the 
philosophy of language. One characteristic of semiotics 
is its diversity. It can be considered as Eco (1984) 
and Anderson et al (1984) point out, as a perspective, a 
methodology or a field. As these authors also point 
out, this diversity is at present an important issue of 
debate amongst semioticians.
Before explaining a selection of basic and 
methodological semiotic concepts that are relevant to 
our study of mathematical economics, let us first 
explain the reasons why we believe that this framework 
(as it is dedveloped by Umberto Eco) might appropriately
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be considered in the context of certain methodological 
problems.
Some of these reasons are at most a matter of 
mere coincidence: semiotics puts forward ideas about
history, the sciences and symbolic representations that 
share interests with ours (cf. Cheix 1996).
For example, the semiotic perspective recognises that 
the sciences are a cultural phenomenon, and also a hall­
mark of Western culture (cf. Cheix 1996, section 4), but 
at the same time, that the sciences entail something 
more than culture-related values and ideologies. Thus;
"Science appears to be the more dynamic and emergent dialectic of all constraints, temporal and spatial, informational and energetic, and may be more apt to transcend culture, although it rarely if ever does."(Anderson et al 1984, p.16)
The semiotic perspective seems also to consider that
written communication of results and proofs and also
texts are a defining feature of these sciences (cf.
Cheix 1996, section 4, first philosophical 'landmark')^*
Another similarity between semiotic studies and our 
'philosophical landmarks' is a common interest in 
interdisciplinarity. This means that it is considered 
to be fruitful for a particular discipline to take into 
account what other disciplines have to say about 
subject-matters similar to its own^o. An additional 
coincidental appeal of semiotics is that it is committed
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to a view on science that gives meaning to an idea of 
scientific progress, or evolution of human knowledge, 
that explicitly asserts its non-identity with historical 
evolution and with theories about the evolution of 
species. Semioticians strongly emphasize the fact that 
evolution is a part of a theory and they do not take it 
as an ontological system.
Semiotic analysis has other advantages of a 
more fundamental nature.
For example, it provides a perspective from which one 
can talk about science without having to commit oneself 
to a theory of science, but "only" to a theory of 
meaning (cf. Cheix, 1996, section 4). This theory of 
meaning uses the idea of linguistic competence. This 
has the advantage of asserting the centrality of the 
problem of the relativism of knowledge, and, more 
broadly speaking, problems arising from scepticism. It 
is especially to be noted that the theory or the 
perspective does not get rid of these problems.
A third kind of reason for embracing a 
semiotic perspective is the very nature of our subject- 
matter, mathematical economics, and the issues which 
have been raised about it in the methodology of economic 
literature.
Some of these issues are brought about by the dual 
nature of mathematical economics, a point to which we 
now turn. Mathematical economics can be described in 
semiotic terms as a compound of two systems: one
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consists of mathematical signs, the other consists of
signs of vernacular languages. It is clear that the
dual nature of mathematical economics is the cause of
part of the debates that bring into conflict realists
and antirealistsii. Although the methodological problem
these debates are concerned with today is not clearly 
identifiable or unique, and although they do not seem to 
be targeted on mathematical economics specifically, as 
seemed to be the case in the 1950s, certainly one of its 
facets concerns the interpretation of mathematical 
formalism in economics. Other aspects of mathematical 
economics also lead one to expect new insights from the 
adoption of semiotic analysis in comparison to say, 
formal logic analysis. Indeed, Mahieu (1989) has argued 
that contemporary formal logic do not allow one to 
consider mathematical economic theories as clearly 
identifiable logical objects(cf. Chapter 6, section 2, 
note 8). Consequently, one can expect semiotics to 
provide interesting new insights into mathematical 
economics that are in harmony with current issues of 
inquiry in the methodology of economics.
A second advantage of semiotics so far as this thesis is 
concerned is that, contrary to what is usually 
understood to be the case in vernacular language and in 
philosophy, semiotics does not consider that oppositions 
between the formal and the empirical, the abstract and 
the concrete, induction and deduction etc.are absolute 
(cf. reprint of Anderson et al, 1984, p.14, Table 1).
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Table 1, Fractures in knowledge arising from the division of scientific labor
Imputed discontinuities 
living - nonliving 
animal - plant 
human - alloanimal 
verbal - nonverbal 
Disregarded continuities 
space - time
matter/energy - information
macroscopic - quantum 
Regularly-negotiated boundaries 
inside - outside 
self - other 
digital - analogue
episodic level/storage - continuous flow all 
quantification - qualification 
analysis - synthesis
abduction - deduction - induction all
Soma disciplines affected
natural sciences - physical sciences
zoology - botany
social sciences - natural sciences
linguistics - ethology
Some disciplines affected
ecology - evolution
ecology - ethology
social sciences - humanities
economics - psychology
ethology - biochemistry/astronomy
Some disciplines affected 
all
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When such categories are taken for granted, one is 
sometimes led to caricature the pros and cons of the use 
of mathematics in economics. For example, mathematical 
economic theory is often put exclusively on the side of 
"the formal" and it is said that it lacks "empirical 
content" or "evidence". To contrast "the formal" with 
"the empirical" thus comes down to neglecting the 
connection between mathematical economic theory and 
"empirical" statistics. In addition, this opposition 
results in the disposing the problem of the production 
of economic data. Similarly, Nelson (1984, p.40) 
notices that this opposition is a drawback: "The sharp,
evident division between theory and evidence in 
economics suggests that economists may have been led 
astray by a positivistic philosophy of science, and a 
crude one at that." (our emphasis). In this 
connection. Nelson (1984, chapter 4; "The Micro/Macro 
Interface: Foundations, Reduction, and Unanswered
Questions" pp.125-165) has shown that "empirical" micro- 
economic statistics are currently built up out of macro- 
economic statistics by means of computational procedures 
that resort to "formal-mathematical" micro-economic 
theory. This opposition between the formal and
empirical may also lead to the omission- of the potential 
historical and heuristic co-development of the
"mathematical form" and "the economic content". 
Similarly, the opposition between "induction" and
"deduction" limits the understanding of the research
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programs of traditions in mathematical economics such as 
econometrics (cf. chapter 2 note 16; chapter 3, section 
262).
After having considered the relevance of 
semiotics to the methodological approach to mathematical 
economics, let us point out that, conversely, economics 
actually has its place within semiotic studies both as a 
specific semiotic system and as a field of application 
of general semiotics (cf. "Economics" entry in [7.1] and 
ECO, 1984, p.11). In the Western culture we are 
concerned with, it can be considered that economics is a 
specific semiotic system because it is used as an 
important guide for collective and individual social 
behaviour. It is a specific semiotic system also 
because it can be considered as a kind of logic, which 
can be applied not only to the study of the economy 
stricto sensus, but also to other domains^^. So far as
mathematical economics is concerned, it is less 
philosophically and methodologically committing to 
consider it as a compound of sign systems, rather than 
as something such as a theory, a hypothesis, or a body 
of knowledge that is translated into the language of 
mathematics, as some economists believe. This is so in 
the case of Samuelson (1947, epigraph by the physicist 
Josiah Willard Gibbs, 1839-1903) for instance. A 
hypothesis that one can posit is that the view that 
mathematics itself is a language is one cause of the 
separation of the history of mathematical forms from the
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history of content in the history of mathematical 
economics. The works of Blaug (1990) and Schumpeter 
(1954) on the history of Economic Thought, according to 
Zylberberg (1990), are representative of this trend. 
Because we have an interest in intra-scientific 
epistemology(cf. Cheix 1996), and because we want to 
study the interrelation of the form and the content of 
knowledge, the semiotic perspective on mathematics seems 
a better framework to start with than the linguistic 
one.
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SECTION 2@2: SEMIOTIC CONCEPTS
We are now presenting three basic semiotic
concepts: that of 'sign', that of 'inference', and the
concept of 'cultural unit'.^^ They make clear in particular
why semiotic categories concern the basis of knowledge (cf.
Cheix 1996 , section 4) , In presenting these ideas, we are
following Eco (1984, chapter 1: Signe et Inférence, pp.l7-
62) as well as Eco (1968, section A, Chapitre 2, III: Le
signifié en tant qu' "unité culturelle", pp.63-65) but the
economic examples as well as the commentary, are our own.
In addition, in connection with written sign systems and
with our analysis of texts in particular, we use the
following semiotic terminology as well. We define
'expression', 'content' of an expression,'semiotic
function', 'level of expression' of a text, 'level of
content' of a text as Alain Herreman (1996b) does.
However, we differentiate ourselves from Herreman insofar
as the definition of 'isotopy' is concerned, for in this
14case we follow Michel Arrivé (1973) instead.
Historically, semiotic studies have- identified 
two features according to which something can be called a 
sign rather than, for example, an object: it must be part
of a process of both substitution and interpretation. The 
leading characteristic of contemporary semiotics is that it 
considers these two processes to be of the same kind; both
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are the result of an inference. Depending on the strength 
and on the natural, sociological, cultural etc. origins of 
the constraint upon the inferential process (or, to use 
linguistic terms, on the * instructional power' of the sign), 
the inference itself may appear more or less necessary. 
Perception itself, to illustrate, may be considered as a 
necessary inferential process. On the other hand,
scientific processes such as abduction, are examples of weak 
inferential processes.
Eco points out that this distinction between weak and 
necessary inferential schemes does not match exactly, the 
distinction between reasoning from effects to causes, as 
opposed to from causes to effects. One could also add that 
the first dichotomy (between weak and necessary inference) 
does not match that between induction and deduction. This 
latter dichotomy is traditionally used to oppose the methods 
of the mathematical sciences to those of the empirical 
sciences. Thus when one is concerned with the
mathematization of empirical sciences, this is not an 
entirely adequate distinction to note. This distinction 
between different aspects of inferential processes is also 
useful in breaking down, or decomposing complex traditional 
conceptual clusters. An example of this is provided by the 
formal-abstract-certainty-necessity-scientific connotations 
with which the expression 'mathematical reasoning' is laden. 
In traditional epistemological approaches to mathematical
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economics this connotation is often tacit or understood. 
However, this is unsatisfactory, first because the necessary 
character of mathematical reasonings can be that at one and 
the same time, it displays both rhetorical and scientific 
features. It is also unsatisfactory because the acceptance 
by the scientific community of economics as a science was 
not historically completely tied up with its being 
considered a mathematical science (cf. Chapters , note 6).
In Eco's acceptation of the term, 'sign* does not 
refer exclusively, as it often does in linguistics and in 
the philosophy of language, to a ’static’ sign, that is 
something that stands for something else. By 'sign', Eco 
refers to a dynamic interpretation process. A  system of 
signs consists in a set of (dynamic) signs. Altogether it 
comprises both static signs, and rules of interpretation 
which are partly or essentially disclosed by the analysis.
Let us just indicate further possible avenues of 
enquiry of the use of the concept of sign in economic 
methodology. We shall only raise these questions in this 
thesis, as a way of indicating how the principal lines of 
argument can be further extended. Regrettably, answering 
them is beyond the scope of this present body of work. Eco 
distinguishes between semiotic codes on the one hand and 
scientific laws and hypothesis. He does so on the grounds 
that in the former system, unlike in the latter, inferences
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are determined by social context, whether they be weak or 
necessary. From then on, questions such as the following 
can be asked (and might be answered in a non-conventional 
way). Is economic knowledge better accounted for when it is 
conceived of as a semiotic code or as a scientific theory? 
Has its status as a semiotic system changed throughout the 
history of the discipline? Can mathematics or
mathematization have any function in structuring these 
systems or in transforming one kind of system into another 
kind? etc.
If we return to more traditional methodological questions, 
semiotics might be fruitful as well, as the following 
examples aim to suggest. One deals with the assessment of 
mathematical economic models using statistical data, the 
other deals with the comparison between mathematics in 
physics and miathematics in economics.
In analysing cause-effect relationships, Eco 
considers that the sign from which originates the inference 
can bear two functions. It is 'prognostic' if what is 
inferred causally follows from the sign. However, if that 
which is inferred actually causally precedes the sign, then 
this sign is called 'diagnostic'. For example, in economics 
if we take the cause/effect relationship as being the linear 
temporal relation (or "historical time" to use Mahieu 
(1989)'s terminology) and signs as being the numbers of 
statistical tables, then the same signs can be both
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diagnostic economic signs and prognostic economic signs. 
Consider 'economic prediction' in the sense in which 
Friedman (1953a) in his famous Essays in Positive Economics, 
or more generally as used in the literature of 'time-series 
analysis' (e.g. as applied to a sequence of prices or of 
outputs over the business cycle). Nowadays such models are 
explicitly mathematical, in most cases. However, as Perrot 
(1992, pp.139-140) 's report on Eléonore Marie Desbois de 
Rochefort's work on demographic statistics (published 
between 1784 and 1788) shows, 'models' were once a form of 
reasoning using common-sense knowledge and basic logic. In 
this case, statistics are diagnostic signs because thanks to 
a 'model', one makes inferences about the state of an 
economy in the past. In national planning or simulation, 
using input-output models, for example, statistics are 
prognostic signs from which one makes inferences about the 
alternative (and possibly future) states of the economy. 
Here are some methodological issues that can be asked about 
these two uses of statistical data.
In the practice of economic model-building, are the same 
models used for diagnostic and prognostic analysis? If yes, 
do they differ however in the status they give to some 
symbols (e.g. variable as opposed to parameter, function as 
opposed to operation)or by the sets to which the variables 
belong?
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Since a major debate in the methodology of economic 
literature deals with defining criteria for choosing between 
models, one can ask here whether the same criteria can be 
used for prognostic■statistics as for diagnostic statistics. 
For example, one can ask whether formal generality criteria 
(e.g. capacity of a single formalism to 'give account o f
several sets of statistical data) and confirmation criteria
are more valuable for time-series (diagnostic) analysis as 
opposed to simulation (prognostic) analysis. In the
latter case, what is looked for seems to be not so much the
generality of the model, as its ability to represent real 
and potential relationships between variables, constants and 
parameters (e.g. as in the simulation of alternative tax 
regimes in a computable general equilibrium model). 
Compared to the diagnostic usage of statistics, the 
important issue here may be not so much to have criteria for 
choosing between different models as to have, instead, 
different models, which display a range of configurations or 
scenarios that can be qualitatively analysed so as to get an 
idea of different possible cause/effect relationships.
The semiotic distinction between inferential 
schemes may be of help in providing an explanation of the 
fact that even though the ideas and the symbols used in 
economic dynamics are sometimes the same as those of and in 
mathematical physics, the meaning and'the cognitive content 
of basic notions such a time, cause, effect, equilibrium.
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stability, statics, and so on, are very different from one 
discipline to the other. This point was discussed and 
emphasized at the "Première rencontre interdisciplinaire 
entre physiciens et- économistes", a conference organised by 
the CNRS in Aussois, France 13-17 March 1995. This fact 
might be taken as an argument for supporting the view that 
economics is a specific semiotic system.
Eco uses the definition of 'cultural unit' phrased 
by David M. Schneider:
In a culture, «a unit... is simply anything that is culturally defined and distinguished as an entity. It may be a person, place, thing, feeling, state of affairs, sense of foreboding, fantasy, allucination [sic], hope or idea. Inamerican [sic] culture such units as uncle, town,blue (depressed) , a mess, a hunch, the idea ofprogress, hope and art are cultural units»(Schneider, quoted from Eco, 1968, p. 64).
Cultural units that do not vary from one language to another
are called inter-cultural units. In the paragraph of Eco
(1968) mentioned above, cultural units are linguistic units
in the following sense. They always express themselves as
denotations of a signifier. For example, what we have
called the 'conceptual cluster' (cf. supra) associated with
mathematics may be considered as describing the cultural
unit associated with the term 'mathematics' in economic
literature. The association of a particular term with a
particular cultural unit does not necessarily last over
time. We claim that in the 20th c the cultural unit
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associated with 'mathematics' and 'statistics' has
changed. This, together with our having an 'external' 
historical approach, justifies our devoting several
chapters of this thesis to describing some features of 
the historical context related to the texts upon which we 
comment (cf. chapter 3', chapter 4 , chapter 5, chapter
9 ) .
We shall now define other semiotic concepts which we use 
exclusively in connection to written sign-systems.
Given a text, an 'expression' is one graphic 
mark or a set of graphic marks that occur in the text. 
In order to make clear to the reader that we consider a 
set of graphic marks to be nothing more than an 
expression (e.g.: 'the consumer x ') we shall write it
between two slashes (e.g.: /the consumer x/). Two
visually different set of graphic marks (e.g.: 
'consumer', 'consumers') are considered as one single
expression (e.g. /consumer/). Different forms of
analysis of one and the same text may identify different 
expressions. For example, in a grammatical analysis 
'consumer' and 'consumers' may be considered as two 
different expressions. In all cases however, the 
identification of expressions in a text requires no more 
than the knowledge of vernacular languages. Generally 
speaking, an expression need not be meaningful. As far 
as we are concerned, the expressions we shall identify in
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the texts we analyse are English words or groups of 
words, notations and combinations of those, as well as
figures.
The 'content of an expression' in a given text is what
makes series of typographical marks meaningful in this
text. The content of an expression is determined ideally 
by all the relationships that exist between expressions 
in a given text. For example, the series of marks 'the 
consumption set of consumer i is closed' is not 
meaningful if it is considered as '/the consumption set 
of cons’um.er i/ is closed', because in the English
language a set of alphabetical marks can not be closed. 
In this context, the content of /consumption set of 
consumer i/ is that which makes it closed. Contents of 
expressions {e.g.: the content of /consumer/) are
written in square brackets (e.g.: [consumer]). The
contents of expressions are defined in connection to one 
another. In the sentence just mentioned, [the
consumption of consumer i] comprises the grammatical 
identification of the expression as a subject since the 
sentence is grammatically correct. The contents of the 
expressions of a given text are inter-connected. A 
relationship between the expression and the content of a 
set of marks is called a semiotic function. The set of 
an expression, a content of this expression and a 
semiotic function define a written sign.
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Both the 'level of expression’ and 'level of 
content’ apply to a text. The 'level of expression' of a 
text consists in the expressions of a text together with 
the relationships they have with one another, considered 
as expressions. For example, the numerical series (|i^ ) % 
defined by = number of graphic marks of the ith
expression of the text, belongs to the 'level of 
expression'.
A 'level of content' of a text consists of a set of signs 
whose contents are interrelated, together with this 
relationship. A text may have different levels of 
content if different relationships can be identified 
between the contents of its expressions. We claim that 
because the expressions we identify in the texts are 
words, groups of words, notations and figures, it is 
impossible to know the difference between a mathematical 
and a literary extract of a text by simply studying their 
level of expression, except in a weak quantitative sense. 
Mathematical texts use words and sentences just as 
literary texts use notations and figures. They might 
differ only with respect to the quantity of each kind of 
expression they contain, but we do not consider that this 
difference is significant. Consequently, the difference 
between mathematical and literary signs is a difference 
between their content and not between their expressions.
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Herreman (1996b) identifies an 'isotopy' in a 
text with a 'level of content'. We shall use 'isotopy' 
in a wider sense so as to refer to relationships at the 
level of expression and at the level of content 
altogether. Arrivé's (1973, p.54) definition of
'isotopy' will be ours: "An isotopy consists of the
redundancy of linguistic units related to the level of
expression or to the level of content; these linguistic
units may be tangible or not." (our translation)^® A  text 
that has more than one isotopy is called 'poly-isotopic'.
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NO TES TO CHAPTER 2
1 "It may be that numbers do not rule the world, but at least 
they indicate how it is ruled". (Our translation).
2 Our views on the relationships between epistemology, history and 
methodology are expounded in Cheix(1996).
3 Nevertheless, there is one subfield of mathematics, namely 
abstract algebra, which is not widely used in economic theory. In
particular, quotient sets of points or of functions are rarely
used except maybe in connection with utility theory. They might
be useful however since they provide a straightforward way to 
conduct a calculus on classes of "complex" objects. In addition, 
in some cases, they provide a way to consider the solutions of a 
system of equations as a structured space which is the result of 
an operator. However, Philippe Mongin, who is currently 
conducting research at the Delta (CNRS, Paris) and at the CORE 
(Université Catholique de Louvain), mentioned to us an article
concerned with social choice by Chichilinsky et al (1979) that 
uses basic algebraic properties as a key argument in the proof of 
theorems they provide. Chichilinsky et al (1979) are using the 
decomposition of finitely generated abelian groups into a direct 
sum of a finite number of mathematically identifiable cyclical 
groups.
4 More generally we are interested in the cognitive position of 
numerical structures in the phenomenological division between the 
formal, the empirical and the physical. Aristotle in the Physics. 
book 4 (esp. from 219al0 onwards) analysed this position. So 
also does Beneze(1961), who studies this position in 'experimental 
sciences'. The neurosciences might also provide material for 
defining this place. Studies into the connection between the 
performance of mathematical calculus and neurophysiological 
functions involving language were indeed reported at the Third 
Annual Conference of the European Society for Philosophy and 
Psychology (Paris, 1-4 September 1994),
This is important for the methodology of this thesis insofar as 
the interpretation of mathematical texts is concerned. We believe 
that sometimes mathematical entities play a psychological function 
in reasonings. This function, which is similarly played by the 
use of regular notations, is that of focusing the attention of the 
reader. This is the case of [0, 1], in real vector space
analysis and in probability theory, and it might be the case of 
'O' in maximisation problems. For example, in integration 
analysis, the point of the proofs of general theorems is often to 
come down to solving a problem involving [0, IJ; then the proof of 
the original result is obtained thanks to structural algebraic 
properties. To this respect, [0, 1] has "psychological"
properties. The study of Cantor ' s Set can be considered in a way 
to set apart these properties from the properties of [0, 1]
considered as a "purely" mathematical entity.
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5 According to Philippe LeGall and Claude Menard (book review of 
Morgan (1990), Economics and Philosophy. 8(1), April 1992, pp.286- 
290 'internal history' is defined by Georges Canguilhem in "Sur 
l'Objet de l'Histoire des Sciences" as well as by Henri Guerlac in 
"Some Historical Assumptions of the History of Science" both at 
the beginning of the 1960s. It has also been defined by Imre 
Lakatos.
^ These contributions are sometimes under-estimated. 
Franklin(1981) deplores this lack of acknowledgement of each 
discipline to the other. According to Popescu (1964) and 
Etner(1987, pll5), the history of economic thought usually 
neglects the contribution of business economics.
Here are five examples which illustrate this point. One is the 
mathematician Giuseppe Peano (1858-1932). Peano is an important 
figure in the history of mathematics. He is most well known for 
his contribution to the axiomatization of arithmetic. Peano's 
interest in the foundational issues of mathematics is a feature of 
his work as a whole. By foundational issues it shall be 
understood at the same issues about mathematical logic, issues in 
mathematical logic and issues about their representation through 
symbols (Eco (1992) also consider that he is not a minor figure in 
the history of linguistics. As far as his contribution to 
economics at large is concerned, we have not noticed that it has 
been referred to in the literature of the history of economic 
thought (cf. Chapter 3). In addition, Kennedy's bibliography on 
Peano (Kennedy, 1980, pp.211-215) does not refer to any 
specialised study on this aspect of Peano's work. Our information 
on this subject comes from Kennedy's chronological list of Peano's 
publications (Kennedy, 1980, pp.195-209). From 1901 onwards until 
it seems, 1909, he published studies of insurance systems. For 
two reasons it is likely that he kept an interest in applied 
mathematics : the first is that he published studies on numerical
approximation problems later on, and the other reason is that he 
published an article in a periodical specialising in financial 
mathematics. The titles of Peano's studies on economic subjects 
suggest that most of them contain mathematics. Peano is not an 
isolated example of a mathematician with an interest in insurance 
problems. According to Passemore (1966, p.129) Augustus De Morgan 
(1806-1871) had an interest in the extension of the theory of 
probability to problems of assurance.
The second example which we take from Zylberberg (1990) is 
Louis Bachelier. Bachelier is a historical example of the 
contribution of an economist to the development of a mathematical 
tool which revealed itself useful outside economics. According to 
Zylberberg (1990), who is our source of information on this 
matter, Louis Bachelier (1870-1946) submitted a thesis in 1900 for 
the degree of Doctorat Ès Sciences entitled Théorie de la 
Spéculation for the study in economics concerned with speculative 
phenomena on the stock market. In this thesis, the author 
analyses moves on markets in terms of stochastic processes of a
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martingale type. Even though the underlying subject matter 
concerns economics, the thesis itself is purely mathematical and 
aims at proving that markets behave according to the laws of 
probability. In addition, he uses a mathematical formalism 
adequate to the study of Brownian motion. According to Zylberberg 
(1990), the use of such tools resulted from his considering 
economic agents as particles. There are not many references to 
Bachelier . in the historiography of economics. The table of 
contents, the indexes or the prefaces of Baumol et al (1968), 
Darnell (1991a, b, c, d, e, f), Theocharis (1993; 1961; 1983) do 
not mention Bachelier. As for Mirowski (1989), he refers to 
Bachelier in his bibliography but not in the index. It seems that 
not only physicists, but also economists with an interest in 
stochastic processes in the mid-20th c. do not know Bachelier's 
contribution either. For example, Samuelson (1947, p.268, p.317 
note 13) suggests the use of stochastic analysis in economics. He 
refers to publications in physics and in astronomy as providing 
the bibliographical origin of the study of stochastic processes. 
In addition the economic example he treats is set in parallel with 
an example in physics.
We are indebted to Bernard Bru for the last three examples. 
The first is the mathematical analysis of the behaviour of a 
particular type of function. These functions have great 
differences in real image-values for comparatively small 
variations in the variable. The analysis of these functions 
originally developed in insurance studies in connection with 
generalised bankruptcy problems. It dates back from the beginning 
of the 20th c. it seems. Then it also became a purely 
mathematical subject.
The second example concerns the analysis of time series. It 
seems that the mathematical treatment of randomness into 
continuous processes was inspired by studies of economic time 
series. Today it composes the mathematical theory of processes.
The third and last example is the little known Charles- 
François Bicquilley (1738-1814) and his writings on mathematical 
economics. Apparently, none of our historical sources (cf. 
chapter 3) mentions this author. Between 1784 and 1787, 
Bicquilley wrote a dissertation for the 1787 prize set by the
French Académie des Sciences on "La Théorie des Assurances 
Maritimes" (Theory of Insurance in the Maritime Business sector). 
In 1799, Bicquilley also hand in to the Académie des Sciences a 
manuscript entitled Principes Elémentaires du Commerce. This 
second dissertation was later revised and published in 1804 under 
the title Théorie Elémentaire du Commerce, which Pierre Crépel 
(1995) has recently edited with thorough comments. Bicquilley's 
Théorie is noteworthy in the history of the use of mathematics in 
economic science not only because of its axiomatic (cf. chapter 7, 
section ) and general nature but also because the author makes 
use of probability calculus. These features are noteworthy first 
because the 1799 manuscript precedes a similar treaties, namely
Nicolas-François Canard's early version of Principes d 'Economie 
Politique (1801) entitled Essai sur la Circulation de l'Impôt
(1801), and also because in all probability the two authors did
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not know each other's work in 1799. In addition, according to 
Crépel (1995), previous writings in mathematical economics such as 
Paolo Frisi's or Condorcet's lack the generality of Bicquilley's 
treatise. Finally, whereas Bicquilley draws no epistemological 
difference between calculi performed on probability numbers and 
calculi performed on other numbers, later authors either do make 
such an epistemological difference, or they simply do not use 
probability calculus. Contrary to Canard, Bicquilley was neither 
a mathematician, nor an academic. He was first a royal body-guard 
and he later worked as an administrator in Toul and Metz. 
Consequently he knew both the noble milieu and also the business 
milieu. In addition, thanks to few of his acquaintances, he got 
into contact with the academic milieu. Even though he was awarded 
prizes for his economic writings, it seems that they have long 
been ignored by historians of economic thought.
7 We are grateful to Professor Reid for drawing our attention on 
Catephores, George; Morishima, Michio; 1978. Value. Exploitation 
and Growth; Marx in the Light of Modern Economic Theory. The 
authors show the conceptual common ground shared by Marxian and 
Neo-classical theory, which is classical economic analysis. 
Methodological similarities between these two schools of thought 
are also mentioned later (cf. Chapter 7).
8 This view is supported by Van Parijs (1990, p.29 esp. note 4), 
Hahn et al (1979), Hausman (1992) and Backhouse (personnal 
communication).
9 What leads us to believe that semioticians as a whole share this 
view is Derrida's idea of 'inscription', which Bruno Latour and 
Steve Woolgar have used to conduct their anthropological study of 
a biological research unit (cf. Latour et al, 1988, note 2 p.35).
10 Concretely, an application of this principle with regard to 
economics and the assessment of game theory in particular, is that 
we agree with authors such as Nemo (1995). His view is that there 
is something to learn about the game theoretical analysis of 
economic interactions and about these interactions themselves from 
considering sociological and linguistic studies of individual 
interactions. In doing so, one can understand the limits and the 
strength of game theory and also explore alternative perspectives 
on economic interactions.
11 A description of this debate in the methodology of economics 
from the 1980s onwards is provided in Backhouse (1991b) as well as 
in Pierre Jacob (1988) and P. Salmon (1986).
12 Here are examples giving evidence that economics can be 
considered as a kind of logical system or, to use the 
epistemological terminology, a hermenentics. In Cours de 
Linguistique Générale, the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857- 
1913) compares the linguistic analysis of the meaning of words 
with the economic analysis of the value of goods. In drawing a
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difference between the signification of a word and its value he 
implicitly parallels Adam Smith's distinction in the Wealth of 
Nations between the "utility" of a good also termed its "value in 
usage" and its "value in exchange". Gary Stanley Becker (1930-) 
applies maximisation techniques to social behaviour in general, 
such as criminal behaviour and political behaviour of pressure 
groups (of. Sandmo, 1993). Similarly, in an article stuffed with 
puns. Boulier et al (1991) compare the explanatory power of human 
capital theory with that of the economic theory of defense to 
give account of schooling behaviour of fishes. Another reason for 
considering economics as a specific semiotic system was suggested 
at the first interdisciplinary conference of economists and 
physicists (cf. chapter 2, section 302).
13 The term ' symbol ' is used in this thesis, in a vernacular, 
non-theoretical meaning.
14 We shall not use the basic semiotic concepts of the 'form' and 
the 'substance* of the expression, and of the content, because 
they are not relevant to our analysis of texts.
15 According to Eco ( 1984), abduction as well as deduction are 
patterns of reasoning that consist in applying a general rule to a 
particular case. In deductive reasoning however, both the rule 
and the applicability of the rule to the particular case are taken 
for granted, and the result is a product of the reasoning. In 
abduction on the other hand, the result is taken for granted and 
both the rule and the case to which it is applied are based on the 
reasoning.
16 The distinction between weak and necessary inference may be 
more useful than that between induction and deduction. For 
example, it may provide a more adequate account of the history and 
the nature of econometrics. Thus econometrics can be seen, 
retrospectively, as a successful attempt to turn the initially 
weak inferential scheme of (statistical) "induction" into a 
stronger form of (mathematical) necessary inference.
17 For example, it can be considered that the Quantitative Theory 
of Money achieves generality in accounting for price levels. in 
this connection Friedman (1968) points out that several historical 
eras of the history of money such as the discoveries of mines of 
silver or gold in the New World in the 16th c.,- the hyperinflation 
in Central Europe after the First World War, and also price 
variations in the United States after the Civil War (1861-1865), 
can be accounted for with mathematical models inspired by the 
Theory.
18 For example, lexical categories are non-tangible linguistic 
units; and a word or a letter are tangible linguistic units.
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Summary and Conclusionof Part 1
It is maintained that this thesis is concerned 
with the methodology of economics and that it also has 
attributes that are included in the epistemological 
studies of mathematics and of the social sciences (cf. 
Cheix, 1996). By methodology, we mean the study of the 
methods used in a particular science and the problems 
occurring in a science. By epistemology, we mean the 
philosophical study of scientific knowledge, 
equivalently named the philosophy of science. The kind 
of epistemology this thesis claims to be relevant to is 
what Piaget (1976) calls 'intra-scientific'
epistemology. It aims neither at being normative, nor 
at being unifying. It is based on the study of problems 
occurring in a particular science and it treats general 
epistemological questions only in connection with these 
problems. In this thesis however, we shall focus on 
specific problems, and only mention general 
epistemological questions. It is also maintained that 
neither methodological studies nor epistemological 
studies can avoid considering the history of science. 
This is a way to cast light upon what, in scientific 
practice, is based on cultural habits and what is not.
The subject matter of the thesis is
mathematical economics. The first topic it analyses is
mathematical economics in the theory of the Neo­
classical school of economic thought. This school has 
its roots in the late 19th c and prevailed in the 20th 
c, both within academic economics and, generally
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speaking, within Western ideology. The second topic 
analysed is mathematical economics, considered within in 
the 20th c. scientific practice of model-building. The 
originality of the thesis does not lie in its topics, 
but in the way they are approached. This approach is a 
critique of the use of mathematical formalism in 
economic theory. It is an epistemological-
methodological critique that uses a semiotic framework. 
It is neither a teleological critique of economic 
science nor a critique that procédés from a Political 
Economy perspective. The first part of the thesis is 
concerned with describing both this approach and the 
methodology of the thesis.
A standard approach to the use of mathematical 
formalism in science is that of an important movement in 
20thC. philosophy of science, namely logical positivism. 
This movement has many facets and we can only claim to 
convey its views in connection with our subject-matter. 
From a positivist point of view, the use of logico- 
mathematical formalism, as opposed to vernacular 
language, is one characteristic of a true science. In 
so far as a theory is formal, its logical cogency can be 
assessed. In so far as it is grounded on arithmetics 
and it formulates equations and inequalities, its 
statements are quantified. They can be assessed 
empirically, with the aid of statistics in particular. 
Logico-mathematical formalism thus guarantees the
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objectivity of both the reasoning and its results. This 
approach tends to focus on the role of mathematics as a 
conceptual and logical tool rather than as an empirical 
tool, as in statistics.
In this thesis, another approach to the use of 
mathematics in science and in economics in particular is 
developed. We follow Gilles Gaston Granger (cf. 
Bibliography) and Giorgio Israel (1996) and understand 
the subject-matter, namely mathematical economics, as 
the mathematization process of economic science. By 
mathematization, we mean the historical and 
epistemological relationships between the "mathematical 
form" and the "economic content" (cf. chapter 2, Section 
1).
This approach leads us to adopt an 'external' 
perspective on the history of mathematical economics for 
the reasons that follow. Firstly, the mathematical 
formalism used in economics has sometimes developed 
initially in other fields (cf. chapter 2, note 6) such 
as physics (cf. Mirowski, 1989), commercial life (see 
Bicquilley, 1804) and political science (cf. Armatte, 
1991; Perrot, 1992). By 'external' perspective, we mean 
(cf. chapter 2, section 1) that we replace the history 
of the use of mathematical formalism in both the history 
of science in general, and in the history of 
mathematics. Authors who have adopted a similar 
approach to the history of economic thought are; 
Armatte (1991, 1995), Ingrao et al(1987), Israel (1996),
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Mirowski <1989, 1990, 1991), Mirowski et al(1994),
Perrot (1992), Punzo(1991), and Zerner (1993). Authors 
who adopt an 'internal' approach are: Morgan (1990),
Theocharis (1961, 1983, 1993), Stigler (1954, 1964), and 
Zylberberg (1990). The survey of the academic corpus 
available on the history of mathematical economics shows 
first that there are not many sources on the subject 
(e.g. Theocharis, 1961, 1983, 1993; Baumol et al, 1968; 
Darnell, 1991a, b, c, d, e, f ; cf. chapter 1) and that 
they proceed from 'internal' historical approaches. 
Consequently, any general historical or epistemological 
statement on the development of mathematical economics 
must be handled with caution. Secondly, the survey of 
this corpus also shows that contemporary historians and 
epistemologists challenge the historiography of economic 
thought (cf. chapter 1, section 1).
From an epistemological point of view, 
approaching mathematical economics in terms of 
mathématisation does not lead us to contrast vernacular- 
unscientific language and mathematical-scientific 
language as sharply as in a positivist perspective. In 
economic practice, vernacular language is indeed used to 
relate mathematical symbols to economic ideas. This 
also applies to mathematics, since mathematical texts 
also contain vernacular language. Taking this position 
is also a way to avoid the layman's paradoxical 
position, that on the one hand, economics is not a 
"true" science, but on the other hand, it is scientific
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because it uses mathematics intensively. Our keeping a 
distance from positivist approaches to the subject
matter does not contradict general concerns emerging 
from the literature in the epistemology and the 
methodology of economics (cf. Cheix, 1996, section 2 and 
section 3 ). One concern is that economic science and 
standard epistemological categories are not adequate to 
one another. One explanation is that standard 
epistemology, logical positivism included, has been 
strongly influenced both historically and 
sociologically, by the study of problems typical to 
physics. Our position on the epistemological status of 
mathematical formalism explains our choice of semiotics 
rather than formal logic for the study of the structure 
of two Neo-classical texts in mathematical economics 
upon which we focus, namely Jevons' Theory of Political 
Economy and Debreu's Theory of Value (cf. chapter 2). 
Because the semiotic approach to "meaning" strongly 
differs from that of the positivists, the semiotic
perspective is explained in some details (cf. chapter 2, 
section 2 and Cheix, 1996, section 4).
To the extent that this thesis is concerned
with the 'external' history of mathematical economics, 
it places the two topics it deals with (the use of
mathematical formalism both within the Neo-classical 
tradition and also in connection with model-building), 
in the history of science (chapter 3; chapter 6, section
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1; chapter 9, section 1) and in the history of 
mathematics (chapter 4; chapter 6, section 301). In so 
far as it is concerned with the 
methodological/epistemological analysis of the use of 
mathematics in economics, first it defines the 
mathematics which are and have been used in economics 
(chapter 5, section 301; chapter 6, section 201; chapter 
6, section 302; chapter 7). Then, it explains both the 
biographical origins of this use (chapter 5, section 1; 
chapter 5, section 2; chapter 6, section 301), and the 
historical origin of model-building (chapter 8). 
Finally, it attempts to 'describe' the role of 
mathematical formalism in economics. A general 
description is provided (chapter 9, section 2). In 
addition, specific analysis, using semiotics, attempts 
to clarify the idea that mathematical formalism in 
economic theory may have either several "meanings" or 
none (chapter 5, section 302; chapter 6, section 303; 
chapter 6, section 203).
The reader may find that the foundational part 
of the thesis is extensive. This is justified because 
we are taking an unorthodox philosophical view on 
mathematical economics and also because comprehensive 
historical sources on the subject are lacking. The 
reader might also find that such philosophical authors 
such as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Larry 
Laudan etc. are not referred to as often as the
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reader might expect since it is claimed that this thesis 
is relevant to epistemology. This lack is not a sign of 
ignorance. It results from the choice to refer to 
philosophers (e.g. Granger, 1955; Hausman, 1992;
Rosenberg, 1983; Morton, 1990, 1993; Van Parijs, 1990) 
with specific interest in economics rather than in 
physics or in general epistemology, so as to avoid 
difficulties to which we have already alluded.
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MATHEMATICS AND THE NEO-CLASSICAIiTRADITION
CHAPTER 3 19TH c. SCIENTIFIC HISTORICALCONTEXT
19thc. Scientific
Historical Context
"II en résulte qu'à titre même d'institutions sociales et 
de produits de la civilisation d'un peuple, les 
religions, les systèmes philosophiques, les sciences se 
succéderont dans l'ordre indiqué, partout où 
l'accumulation des incidents historiques, les révolutions 
et les importations étrangères ne troubleront pas cet 
ordre régulier. Mais l'énoncé même des conditions montre 
que l'exception peut être aussi, fréquente ou plus 
fréquente que la règle; et dans les cas qui nous 
intéressent le plus, c'est bien l'exception qui 
prévaut."i
Antoine Augustin Cournot, Considérations sur la Marche 
des Idées et des Evénements dans les Temps Modernes.
1872 .
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter is concerned with describing 
external and internal features of the historical 
background of the development of the use of mathematical 
formalism in economic theory. It focuses on the state of 
science in the 19thC. because historians of economic 
thought agree that this century is an important period in 
the history of both economics and mathematical economics 
(cf. chapter 3),
In the first section, we shall first sketch the
state of Social Sciences in Europe in the 19th c . ,
considering it as the union of two trends: one towards
the separation of the social sciences; and the other 
towards their institutionalisation. Then we shall 
consider whether this picture applies to economics in 
particular. The purpose of the first sub-section is
simply to indicate the nature of a historical trend; in
this sense, it is illustrative. The second sub-section 
has a more descriptive purpose. Consequently, the 
conclusions of this section should not be generalised out 
of the context of this thesis. In this thesis concerned 
with external history (cf. Chapter 2, section 1@1 and 
section 2 ), this section aims at suggesting links between 
the history of economic thought and the history of the 
social sciences.
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The second section focuses on features of 
19thC. mathematical economics. Generally speaking, 
authorities consider that the 1870s ’marginalist 
revolution’ is an important event in the history of 
mathematical economics. However, it was pointed out that 
there was a lack of convergence in the literature in 
qualifying this statement. This is why, before giving 
some indication on the state of mathematical economics at 
the end of the 19thC., we shall attempt to define what 
kind of historical event the marginalist revolution was.
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SECTION 1: SOCIAL SCIENCES; SEPARATION AND
INSTITUTIONALISATION?
SECTION 161; SOCIAL SCIENCES, OUTSIDE OF EC0NC»1ICS^
The 19th century is an important epoch in the 
history of the Social Sciences. Even by the end of the 
19th c., their various branches did not resemble their 
current form. In showing the limitations of Jevons'
epistemology of the social sciences, Mays (1962, pp.232-
233) is therefore right to point out that:
"Jevons then suffered from the drawback that he wrote before many of the socialsciences, as we know them today had adequatelydeveloped"
However, as the inquiry that follows will suggest, 
supporting the point made by Louis (1988), the 19th c. is 
the time when the seeds of contemporary specialisation in 
the Social Sciences were sown. This view is supported by 
Porter's (1986) view that new scientific fields were 
being delineated in the 19th c. However, our view 
differs from his because we believe that the idea of a 
'new science' is an empty concept (cf. Chapter 1, section 
4, first philosophical landmark).
We shall now define what we mean by specialisation.
The 19th c. is the time when manifestos 
defining the methods and the objects of what we now call 
the Social Sciences were published. Here are some 
examples. As far as Psychology is concerned, the first 
part of the 19th c. is important. Two views
9 5
19thc. Scientific
Historical Context
were competing with one another. One was that of Auguste 
Comte (1798-1857) who believed that there was no such 
science as Psychology, whether it be Psychologie 
Rationalis or Psychologie Empirics as defined by Wolff in 
the first half of the 18th c. The proponent of the other 
view was John Stuart Mill. In 1843, he published A 
System of Logic and advocated that Psychology was fully 
scientific and separate from other sciences. Later in 
1895, Sigmund Freud published with Joseph Breuer Studien 
über Hystereie in which the psychoanalytical methodology 
was laid down. As far as 'sociology' is concerned, 
Auguste Comte is in all probability the first French 
author to create the word in the 1830s in order to 
replace the term 'social physics' which was previously in 
use. After Comte, Emile Durkheim is worth mentioning. 
In 1895 he published the Règles de la Méthode 
Sociol ogique. In this book, he defines the subject-matter 
and the methods specific to Sociology in a way that is 
still controversial. Durkheim (1858-1917) considered 
that sociological explanations must be homogenous in the 
sense that a social phenomenon must be explained by 
another social phenomenon as opposed,• say, to a natural 
phenomenon. According to Durkheim, social phenomena 
ought to be considered as 'objects', by which he meant 
that in Sociology as well as in the Natural Sciences, 
scientific phenomena are not given by Nature but they are
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the result of a minute analysis. Further examples could 
also be given from Linguistics and Anthropology, but 
these are omitted for the sake of conciseness.
Not only were particular Social Sciences promoted by
literate individuals in the 19th c ., but they became 
institutionalised. Thus specific learned societies were 
born, and specialised journals were launched which 
contributed to define their scope and purpose. In 
addition, SociaT Sciences began to be taught as academic 
subjects proper, thereby replacing ’moral sciences’. For 
example the German Society for Sociology came into being 
in 1910; L ’Année Psychologique, was born in 1895 and 
L ’Année Sociologique was first issued in 1896. Similarly 
in 1903, the University of Munich in Germany created a 
chair of Sociology.
The separation of the Social Sciences and their
institutionalisation really make the key distinguishing 
differences between the 19th c. and the previous
centuries. Earlier, one can still identify, post hoc, 
inquiries which were not identified as belonging to a
particular social science, as nevertheless having a 
disciplinary application. For example, La Bruyère’s 
Caractères (first published with no authorship in 1688) 
and Descartes' Les passions de l ’âme (1649) contain 
elements of psychological investigation. So also with 
anthropology: Jesuit missionaries' reports and diaries
have today an ethnological value. In view of the
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Scottish context and his Saint Andrews affiliation, Adam 
Ferguson's (1723-1816) Essay on the History of Civil 
Society, published in 1767 is worth mentioning since it 
is considered as a precursor of contemporary sociological 
treatises.3 It is however the union of the trend towards 
the separation of different subjects with the birth of 
the social status of the 'scientist' that characterises 
Social Sciences in the 19th c. This term occurs in 
French and English at that time. More precisely, 
Nightman (1980) writes that the term 'scientist' did not 
exist in the English language before 1839. This union 
may be called specialisation.
A first symptom that the separation of the
Social Sciences had become substantial by the 19th c. is 
that in 1890, John Neville Keynes was in a position to
make a comparison between economics and other Social
Sciences in The Scope and Method of Political Economy. 
At the beginning of the 20th c. Max Weber (1864-1920) was 
in a position to write a methodological critique of the 
Social Sciences. In the last two decades of the 19th c ., 
he wrote a series of books and articles concerned with 
the philosophy and the methodology of the Social
Sciences.4 The methodological issues dealt with in these 
publications are still being debated today. So also the 
Problemi Della Scienza of Frederigo Enriques (1871-1946) 
first published in 1906. Enriques expounded a critique 
of Positivism and his analysis is echoed today in the
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philosophy of the Social Sciences. Following a line of 
argument which has since been explored systematically by 
the logical positivists (cf. chapter 5, section 2@2 ) 
Enriques (1910) describes the role of linguistic symbols 
and of graphic symbols in the conduct of reasoning. He 
considers that they are essential tools for expressing 
general statements. In addition, he brings into light 
the limitations both to the use of symbols in science and 
to the concept of homo-economi eus in economics. The 
first criticism anticipates criticisms such as 
Caldwell's (1982), that if a ' schematization ' - to use
Enriques’ (1910) terminology, or equally 'mathematical 
formalism' - to use contemporary methodological terms, is 
too abstract or too general, it runs the risk to lack 
cognitive content. The second criticism anticipates 
criticism’s such as Van Parijs (1990)'s criticism of 
methodological individualism. It is that the concept of 
rational homo-economieus, which has long been used in 
economics as the representative of the economic behaviour 
of individuals is a misleading representative because it 
does not take into account collective economic behaviours 
that influence individual economic behaviours.
The trend towards the unification of 'the sciences, and 
not only the Social Sciences, that began at the end of 
the 19th c. can be considered a contario as a second 
symptom of the separation of the sciences, Social 
Sciences included, that occurred in the 19th c. The
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periodical The Monist belongs to this trend. A survey of 
all issues of this journal from 1890, when it was first 
issued, to 1896, reveals that its contributors were 
reacting against scientific specialisation. It is clear 
from this survey that the specialisation does not concern 
only the disciplines in relation to one another. It was 
also an intra-disciplinary phenomenon. Two additional 
later elements characteristic of this trend are the 
Vienna Circle's advocacy of a unified scientific language 
(cf. Neurath, 1931 and 1935) as well as the commissioning 
and publishing of the International Encyclopaedia of 
Unified Science. The latter appeared in parts from 1938 
onwards. Historical trends towards the unification of 
the sciences in the inter-war period can indeed be 
interpreted as a reaction against the institutional and 
methodological separation process of the sciences in the 
19th c. and the beginning of the 20th c. As our 
selection of authors and periodical suggests, the two 
features of the Social Sciences we described are similar 
in different European countries. The holding of an 
international congress for the teaching of the Social 
Sciences in Paris in 1900 confirms this suggestion (see 
Zylberberg, 1990) .
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SECTION 102; ECONOMICS
In this sub-section, we are concerned with 
presenting evidence for the institutionalisation of 
Economics and of its separation from other Social 
Sciences in the 19th c. Unless otherwise stated, the 
main sources for this evidence are Armatte (1991, pp.8 ; 
31-32), Etner(1987), Le Van-Lemesle(1991), Zouboulakis
(1993), Zylberberg (1990) as well as general references.
Compared to England and France, Germany seems 
to have been an early innovator as far as the creation 
of University chairs of Political Economy is concerned. 
Some were created by Frederic Wilhelm I (1688-1740) as 
early as 1727. In 1870, the chair of Political Economy 
of the University of Lausanne was created for the 
precocious Léon Walras, who was unable to obtain a post 
in France.
In 1877 the French government issued a decree, making 
Political Economy a compulsory subject in the syllabus 
of legal facilities within the universities. This 
dating explains both why Zylberberg (1990) considers 
that until the 1860s there were no professional 
economists in France, and why Breton(1991, p402) holds 
the view that the profession was born in 1877. However, 
the institutionalisation of economics (that is, to use 
Le Van-Lemesle's(1991) definition, its appearance in 
education, proper learned societies, journals and
1 0 1
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textbooks) developed during the entire 19thc. Before 
then, Economics or Political Economy was essentially 
taught in independent institutes and at the Grandes 
Ecoles. In 1860, there were indeed three chairs of
Economics in these institutions; one at the Ecole des 
Ponts et Chaussées, which was created either in 1846 
(cf. Le Van-Lemesle, 1991) or in 1847 (cf. Etner, 1987, 
pl26); one at the Centre National des Arts et Métiers, 
which was created in 1820 and the third was created for 
J.B.Say (1767-1832) at the Collège de France in 1831. 
Later, in 1864, a chair of economics was ceated at the 
Faculté de Droit de Paris. Similarly, when the Ecole 
Libre des Sciences Politiques was established in 1871 in 
Paris, a chair of economics and a chair of statistics 
were set up. It was considered that the courses 
delivered in statistics were the practical complement of 
courses in economic theory. Still later, in 1878, a 
department in Economics and Politics was created at the 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes and in 1885, a chair of 
Industrial Economics was created at the Ecole des Mines, 
where Walras first studied as an engineer.
England stands between Germany and France so far as the 
dates of creation of chairs of Political Economy is 
concerned. Nassau William Senior (1790-1864) was the 
first Professor of Economics in England. He held the 
Drummond chair at Oxford in 1825. A chair of Economics 
was created for Richard Whately (1787-1863) at Trinity 
College, Dublin, in 1832. So far as the academic
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separation of political economy in England was 
concerned, it consisted, on the one hand, in the 
separation of Moral Sciences from Divinity. At 
Cambridge, this separation emerged out of the 1871-1882 
academic reforms. On the other hand, it consisted in 
the separation of Political Economy from the Moral 
Sciences. At University College, Bristol, it seems that 
it occurred under the Principalship of Marshall (1842-
1924} between 1877 and 1 8 8 1 . 5  At Cambridge, it
occurred, due amongst others, to John Neville Keynes in 
1906.
Other evidence supporting the argument for the 
institutionalisation of economics is the birth of 
learned societies as well as that of specific 
periodicals. The Société des Economistes was created in 
franee in 1842 and was named Société d'Economie 
Politique from 1847 onwards. In 1841, the Journal des 
E co no mi s t e s  was created in France. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics and the Revue d ' Economie Politique 
were created respectively in Harvard in 1886 and in 
Paris in 1887. The first issue of the Economic Journal 
was published in 1891. As far as the Giornale deali 
Economist! is concerned the first issue was published in 
Padua in 1875.
At first sight. Economics in the 19th c. fits 
into the above picture of the institutionalisation of 
Social Sciences. Institutionalisation is part of what
103
19thc ScientificHistorical Context
is sometimes referred to in the economic literature as 
the 'professionalisation' of economics. According to 
Zouboulakis (1993), it is both a European and North- 
American phenomenon, and it accelerated in the 1890s.
It is a much more delicate matter to identify the 
separation of Economics from the other Social Sciences 
in the 19th c. We shall now present four elements that 
provide prima facie evidence for such a separation. The 
first is the professionalisation of Economics described 
previously. The second is the fact that Economics was
considered a science from the 19th c. onwards In
addition, it is often considered in the literature that 
in the 19 th c. Economics became separated off from 
politics. This resulted in the study of the 'social 
organism' being sub-divided into specific studies of its 
particular components. This division gave to each 
Social Science a specific and central object of 
analysis. The fourth is the definition of the proper 
object of economic science. According to Zouboulakis 
(1993) the Ricardian tradition contributed to a large 
extent to the last three points. For example, Ricardo 
defined the two most important phenomena to be studied 
by economic science as being produced goods and income. 
Zouboulakis (1993, p.49) points out that this tradition 
is the first in the history of economic thought to 
insist on setting limits to economic inquiry and on 
defining its relationships with the other Social 
Sciences.
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It might be argued, however, that the last 
three elements are not convincing reasons for supporting 
the view that in the 19th c. economics has separated 
from the other Social Sciences, and has become an 
independent body of knowledge.
One could argue first, that Economics and, more 
generally, theories in the Social Sciences are not 
separable from politics. This is the point of view held 
by Breton et al(1991), since their historical 
methodology consists of considering the evolution of 
economic science in France in connection with that of 
political life. The first reason for advocating this 
view is that institutions such as universities or 
learned societies are connected to politics. The second 
reason concerns the ambivalent connection between 
statistics and the Social Sciences in general. On the 
one hand the Social Sciences, from the 19th c. onwards 
relied on statistics as their 'empirical' and 
'objective' foundations. On the other hand the 
evolution both of statistical data and statistical 
analysis was partly, but strongly, connected to
politics, from at least 1800.6 Secondly, one could argue
that the object of economic science was not separate 
from that of the other Social Sciences. A first line of 
advocacy of this view would minimise the importance of 
the Ricardian tradition for the development of economic 
thought in the 19th c. , and insist, rather, that Comte's
1.05
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Positivism had a greater bearing on economic thought.?
A second line of advocacy for this view would be to 
point out that few economists, even in the Ricardian 
tradition, denied that, to a certain extent, economic 
phenomena are dependent on non-economic data. What is 
meant by the isolation of economic phenomena from the 
subject-matter of other Social Sciences depends on what 
is meant by the last two phrases in italics.
On the whole, there is evidence for supporting 
the view that Economics became institutionalised in 
Europe in the 19th c. and, in all likelihood, in the 
United States as well at this time, just as the Social 
Sciences did. However, arguments in favour of the view 
that Economics separated from other Social Sciences are 
not yet conclusive, at least so far as they can be 
assessed from the literature we have surveyed.
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SECTION 2: MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
SECTION 201; REMARKS ON THE SO-CALLED
MARGINALIST REVOLUTION
Zouboulakis (1993, 'L'Emprise de l'Ecole 
Historique sur la Théorie Economique', pp.150-159) 
shares our view that the end of the 19th c. is an 
important, though ambiguous, era in the history of 
economic theory. He reports the views of historians of 
economic thought on this period from the 1950s to the 
1980s. The subject-matter of the literature he refers 
to is the appraisal of the contribution of differential 
calculus to the progress of economic theory. The lack 
of convergence in this literature is striking. The 
historical events themselves are; the publication of 
devons' (1835-1882), Theory of Political Economy in 
1871; the publication of Carl Monger's (1840-1921) 
Grundsatze der Volkswirtschaftslehre in 1871; and the 
publication of Walras' (1834-1910) Eléments d'Economie
Politique Pure from 1874 to 1877 out of dissertations 
published from 1873 onwards. It seems that these events 
are not considered to be historical data out of which 
the evolution of economic theory may be reconstructed. 
Instead, these events play the role of either 
illustrations or counter-examples to general views on 
the evolution of economic thought. These views are 
sometimes a consequence of deploying a philosophy of
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science which is not fully adequate to the history of 
Mathematical Economics (cf. chapter 4, section 2). 
Authors, who want to emphasize the use of mathematical 
symbolism in theorising, tend to identify this event 
with the works of Jevons and Walras mentioned above, to 
the exclusion of the work of Menger. Authors, who 
consider that it is the 'marginal reasoning' about value 
itself that is mathematical, include Menger as well. 
Specifying the marginalist revolution is even more 
difficult if one takes into account Etner's(1987) 
research (cf. chapter 1 ) and also the influence of 
railways studies on devons' work (cf. chapter 5, section 
101). Etner(1987) shows that in the second part of the
19thc, French engineer-economists who were using 
mathematics, focused on the importance of marginal 
values (e.g. marginal costs) for assessing the economic 
utility of engineering work (e.g. bridges, roads, 
railways). According to Etner(1987), they were not 
influenced by the theoretical studies of the 
marginalists. Hence one could go so far as to argue 
that the marginalist principles have practical origins 
and not merely theoretical ones. The lack of 
convergence in identifying unique features of the 
marginalist revolution as an historical event is not a 
characteristic which is specific to the contemporary 
historiography of economic thought. It is also 
mentioned in the work of J.N, Keynes (1917). This shows 
that it is also a feature of the historiography of
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economics at the beginning of the 20th c. In accordance 
with chapter 2 we shall focus on mathematical symbolism 
and identify the marginalist revolution with the works 
of Jevons and Walras mentioned above. This focus on 
symbolism and writing in science has neither an 
ontological nor theological meaning, as it does in 
Jevons’ view on the matter (cf. chapter 5). Our idea is 
rather that the mode of writing plays a special role in 
the diachronic and synchronic communication of 
knowledge, and that this role may be a defining feature
of scientific knowledge.8
Zouboulakis (1993) also explores how, and when 
the marginalist revolution was perceived in both Europe 
and the United States. It is worth noting that the 
phrase ’marginalist revolution’ does not occur in J.N. 
Keynes (1917)'s table of contents, nor in his index, nor 
in the chapter referenced. However, he compares, in the 
core of the text, the Jevons' and Walras' books just 
mentioned; and he also refers to Walras in this 
connection in notes. Generally speaking, the opinion 
that prevailed in the 1870s, was that Political Economy 
was going through a crisis. In the first place, the 
novelty of Jevons' theory was either ignored or else put 
on an equal footing with authors who are no longer 
important today. Zouboulakis' view, that the
marginalist revolution was neglected, is confirmed by 
Jevons' own words (cf chapter 5). Alternatively, 
Jevons' use of mathematics was condemned simply on
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principle. The acceptance of Jevons' theory was both 
slow and late. It did not occur before the 1890s, and 
Zouboulakis reckons that Marshall contributed to it to a
great extent.9 According to Zylberberg (1990) Walras'
contribution to marginalism was met with a similar fate 
and it was neglected in France; Zouboulakis (1993) 
points out that generally speaking, Walras was similarly 
ignored in the United Kingdom.10 For his part,
Punzo(1991) opposes the view that the marginalist and 
neo-classical movement was a revolution in the history 
of economic thought. Instead, he considers that the 
impact of the school of mathematical formalism on the 
Viennese circle of mathematical economists is what the 
historiography should consider as revolutionary.
Given this historiographical context and the 
subject-matter of the thesis, we shall now report only 
the admitted contribution of Jevons to the marginalist 
revolution. It consists in the combined use of 
differential calculus and of marginal values in the 
theoretical explanation of economic actions. It is 
considered that an economic action is virtually composed 
of a succession of sub-actions, and that the value or 
the utility of the original action essentially depends 
on the value or the utility of the last sub-action 
(marginal value). The values of economic actions are 
considered as differentiable mathematical functions, and
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the values of sub-actions are the corresponding values 
of the differentials.
From a broader perspective than Zouboulakis' 
study, the assessment of the mathematics used by the
marginalists ought rather to be placed in the context of 
quarrels about the methods of Political Economy. In 
France, according to Breton(1991), these quarrels lasted 
fron 1800 to 1914, and were concerned with the 
relationships between economic science, mathematics, 
history and statistics. This context explains
Zylberberg (1990)'s remark that even mathematical 
economists such as the engineer Emile Cheysson, put 
forward a philosophical argument against the 
mathematical deductive and numerical method in
economics, namely that it conflicted with human
freedom. 11 The ethical side of the argument was that
such a method amounts to considering humans as objects. 
The epistemological side of the argument was that human 
actions do not follow laws that can be accounted for 
with numbers or within a deterministic scientific
framework, and also that they are not directly 
measurable. One idea involved was that social phenomena 
are not stable enough over time to be investigated 
mathematically. Such philosophical questions about 
mathematical economics have been repeatedly addressed 
throughout its history. For example, as late as the 
1960s, the same questions are raised in Lipsey (1963)'s
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economics textbook. These questions have been addressed 
either because they were conceived to be epistemological 
obstacles to this kind of inquiry, or for mere
rhetorical reasons. Some authors in this tradition are 
opposed to Mathematics because they were opposed to the 
use of a purely deductive method in economic theory. 
Others, such as Mill, were opposed to Mathematics first 
because they equated mathematical formalism with 
quantification, and secondly because they believed the 
changing nature of economic phenomena made such 
quantification impossible. In contrast with the
'marginalist revolution' it seems that the 'quarrel on
methods ' is not just an element in contemporary 
historiography but is present in 19th c. historiography 
as well. Zylberberg (1990) mentions never-ending 
debates on the definition of the right method for
political economy in that period. The existence of 
these debates is confirmed by J.N. Keynes (1917) who
mentions them and reviews the arguments involved. In 
these debates, the historical-inductive method was 
opposed to the deductive method. It was also debated 
whether the proper scope of economic inquiry was to deal 
with individual phenomena or the general feature of 
these phenomena. Finally the view that economics was a 
descriptive science, was opposed to the view that 
economics ought to find laws and patterns.
The use of mathematics by the marginalists was assessed 
along these lines rather than by direct analysis of the
1 1 2
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formalisms used in the theory. It was criticised very
differently, from one author to the other, depending
both on where they stood in the general methodological 
debate and on what they identified mathematics to be. 
When authors referred to statistical data, the use of 
Mathematics was an example of the study of an individual 
phenomenon. When they referred to statistical theory,
it was an example of historical deduction or of
generalisation. Alternatively, it was identified with
the deductive method. Also under discussion was whether 
it was necessary to state the laws of Economics in
mathematical terms in order to be able to check their 
concordance with the facts. In addition, it was
discussed whether Mathematics as in statistical data
could heuristically suggest such laws.
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SECTION 202; TRADITIONS IN MATHEMATICAL
ECONOMICS
In this sub-section, we shall be concerned 
with putting the marginalist revolution into the context 
of 19th c. Mathematical Economics as this context 
presents itself from a 20th c. standpoint. According to 
Zylberberg (1990), the first French thesis in 
Mathematical Economics was attended by Albert Aupetit 
(1876-1943) at the Faculté de Droit de Paris in 1901 and 
published in 1901 under the title; Essai sur la Théorie 
Générale de la Monnaie. It deals with the study of 
monetary fluctuations. In his thesis, Aupetit considers 
that there are two kinds of mathematical analysis in 
Economics. One is rational Economics and the other is 
experimental Economics which is based on the study of 
statistical data. In this case, Mathematical Economics 
institutionalises as a synthesis of the different 
traditions in Mathematical Economics which we shall now 
describe.
One tradition in Mathematical Economics is usually 
referred to as economic 'theory'. In this connection, 
historians of Economic thought refer chiefly to 
neoclassical economists such as Jevons, Walras, 
Marshall; or else they refer to Cournot, Fisher amongst 
others (cf. chapter 1, section 2). Other traditions 
include those of the French engineers (cf. Etner, 
1987,;Zylberberg 1990; Theocharis, 1993, pp.20-103) that
1 1 4
19thc ScientificHistorical Context
of specialists in actuarial science as well as the 
theory of finance (cf. chapter 2 note 3). In addition, 
there is the tradition of statisticians who deal with 
economic subjects, which culminate with Arthur Bowley 
(1869-1957).
Those who have aimed to embed the history of 
mathematical economics into a scientific context larger 
than that of the internal history of economic thought 
have had a tendency to explore no further than the 
history of Physics rather than other traditions (cf. 
chapter 4, section 2). In this sub-section, we shall 
focus on statistics instead, and on the practical 
origins of Mathematical Economic 'theory' in the sense 
stated above, in order to shed new light on the wider 
scientific context. Another reason for this focus on 
statistics is that we are interested in the use of 
numbers as an intermediate between formal reasonings and 
apprehension of objects (cf. chapter 2). Statistical 
reasoning provides an example of such an intermediate 
process of thought. Finally, we affirm that the subject 
is important because statistics contributed to the 
development of Mathematical Economics are defined in 
chapter 2 .
It is common to refer to the 1940s, and the 
development of econometrics as the key period in which 
the connection between mathematical economic theory and 
statistics was previously explored. However, this
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connection has been located earlier since Desrosières 
(1992, p.2), after Morgan (1990), traced the genealogy 
of econometrics before 1940. He shows that the 
connection between statistics and mathematical economic 
theory was being explored by economists from the 1910s 
onwards. Even earlier, as a methodologist, Jevons had 
disagreed with the view that the 'inductive' method 
usually associated with statistics Was opposed to the 
'deductive* method usually associated with mathematics. 
As a marginalist, Jevons did not separate the use of 
mathematics as a theoretical tool in economics from the 
use of statistics both at the heuristic stage of the
theory and at the stage of its v a l i d a t i o n . 12 By
theoretical tool, we mean both an instrument for 
organizing a body of propositions as in the 'deductive' 
method and an instrument for defining concepts. 
Similarly, Zylberberg (1990) points out that ingeneer- 
economists such as Lenoir, Cheysson as well as the 
actuary Laurent (cf. chapter 1, section 202) put forward 
ideas that appear in econometrics in the 1930s. He 
holds the view that econometrics developed over the time 
interval 1870-1914. Breton (1991, p411) shares this
view since he considers that Marcel Lenoir's thesis 
(examined in 1913) entitled Etudes sur la Formation et 
le Mouvement des Prix is the first French thesis to use 
the then new mathematical statistical technique, and 
that it is the first French study in econometrics. For 
his part, Etner(1987, ppl74-181) considers that in the
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second part of the 1880's, the engineer Théophile 
Ricour(1831-?), developed economic calculations in 
connection with railways economy, that proceeded from a 
true econometric approach to economic analysis 
Consequently, at a time which is considered in economic 
historiography to be critical to the foundation of 
mathematical economic theory, such a theory was 
conceived of in relation to statistics or at least the 
foundation coincided with early developments in 
econometrics. We shall now consider the nature of 
statistics as a discipline at the end of the 19th c.
It is very difficult to give a sharp picture 
of the state of statistics in the 19th c. Armatte 
(1991; 1995) shows that from a 20th c. standpoint, it 
appears to be a combination of various historical 
trends. This is also the picture that both J.N. Keynes 
(1917) gives of statistics and Breton(1991, p413) gives 
of 19thc statistics. Intellectuals working within these 
various traditions sometimes ignored one another, even 
though some problems set by one tradition were deal with 
independently by another. One tradition, which is 
identified by Theodore M. Porter (1986) as well as by 
Armatte (1991), is the theory of errors. At the end of 
the 19th c. the tradition of the theory of errors in 
statistics was itself very diverse. It was composed of, 
amongst others, problems formulated in geodesy, 
artillery, and psychology. It embraced the studies of 
business cycles and manufacturing control. Another
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tradition is that of descriptive and comparative 
statistics which had a German influence. This tradition 
comprises inquiries financed by governments in order to 
get a general 'realist' picture of the state of their 
country. It developed prior to the 19th c. Then there 
is the tradition in political arithmetic. According to 
Armatte (1991) it dates back to the 17th c. This is 
confirmed by Keynes (1917, p.330, note 1). Armatte 
(1991) associates this tradition with the names of 
Graunt (1620-1674) and Petty (1623-1687). As for the 
18th c., the tradition can be illustrated by the work of 
Condorcet and Laplace. Not surprisingly, with this 
inheritance, the subject-matter of statistics in the 
19th c. was varied. It ranged from geography to 
politics and economic subjects.
Unless otherwise stated the information on statistics 
that follow draws on Armatte's (1991, 1995) study of
fifty six treatises of statistics from the beginning of 
the 19th c. to the mid-20th c. The theoretical 
foundations of statistics existed in Germany from the
mid 18th c.l3 However, the first treatise in which the
theoretical side is more important for the author than 
the applications, dates back to the beginning of the
19th C.14 Armatte's statistical study consists of a
breakdown of the percentage of pages in the treatises 
cited into theoretical and applied subject-matters. 
Overall the study shows that the importance of 
statistical theoretical subjects significantly increased
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during the 19th c. From the 1860s onwards every 
treatise but one has more than sixty per cent of its 
pages dealing with statistical theory rather than with 
its applications. Consequently Armatte defines a 
'second birth of statistics' at the end of the 19th c. 
Keynes (1917) mentions both the empirical and the
theoretical tradition in statistics. From a 20th c. 
standpoint, the aim of statistical inquiry by the end of 
the 19th c. appeared to be the formulation of general 
laws from statistical data, and then the explanation of 
these laws. Armatte makes the following remark; on the 
one hand, this aim is not clearly expressed in the 19th 
c. statistical treatises themselves; but on the other, 
this aim is stated by Condorcet earlier on, at the end
of the 18th c. and the beginning of the 19th c. in the
context of applying the probability calculus to moral
sciences, even though Condorcet himself does not refer 
to 'statistics'.
We shall now consider the place of Economics 
amongst these 19th c. treatises on statistics. 
Economics appears in Armatte's classification as an
application of statistics under the following topics ; 
production, consumption, income, business cycles, 
actuary, rents insurance, and micro-economics as well as 
labour and the statistics of the firm. The importance 
of Economics compared to other applications varies
considerably from one treatise to another. Armatte
remarks that overall, statisticians in the 19th c.
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consider that Political Economy is an ideological 
discourse, or that it consists in reasonings the 
assumptions of which are not legitimate. For their 
part, economists such as J.B. Say criticised statistics 
on the ground that it provided only static and ex-post 
pictures of reality (cf. also Breton, 1991). Another 
critique addressed by economists to statistics is 
reported in Perrot (1992). At that time, economists, 
whatever their view on the nature of economic theory, 
were well aware that, given its then current state,
statistics could not provide the theory with a sound
empirical basis. This applies to the French economist 
Jacques Peuchet, according to whom economic inquiry is 
inductive. It is clear from Armatte (1991, pp.13-16) 
and Perrot (1992) that Peuchet was opposed to the use of
Algebra, Geometry and graphs in statistical analysis
meaning the analysis of a collection of government data 
but not to that of arithmetic in cases when there is a
limited number of numerical d a t a . 15 A t  the same time,
Peuchet is in favour of the use of 'complex' mathematics 
and probability in political arithmetic. However, when 
it comes to analysing statistical data, Peuchet uses 
estimation techniques that were of concern to political 
arithmetic. According to Perrot (1992), the mistrust of 
statistics also applied to early equilibrium theorists 
(cf. chapter 6) according to whom economic inquiry was 
deductive, and to Ganilh (1815) who believed it was both 
inductive and deductive. According to Breton(1991), not
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only did French economists mistrust statistics in 
general until the 1840's; after that period, they still 
considered that statistics were of secondary importance, 
compared to political economy, in the discovery of 
causal laws. In contemporary terminology, we would say 
that these economists agreed that statistical data did 
not have an axiomatic value for economic theory, in the 
sense that they did not contain information reliable 
enough to be taken as valid in a line of reasoning. The 
following quotation confirms that this view on 
statistical data was very probably a widespread one 
amongst economists :
"But to proceed, we find that the essay of 
Malthus on population far from being, as many 
people probably suppose, a collection of rash 
generalisations and hypotheses, consists 
mainly of a most careful inquiry into 
historical and statistical facts concerning 
the numbers and conditions of mankind in all 
part of the world. It is a model of inductive 
inquiry so far as information was available in 
his day." (Jevons, 1876, p.226).
Later, Keynes (1917 and 1891) similarly assessed the 
limitations to the use of statistical data.
As far as one can judge from Perrot's (1992)
and Armatte's (1991) inquiries, the contrast between the
use of statistics in economic theory before the 20th c.
econometrics tradition, and its subsequent use by this
new tradition, has not been eased by the discovery of
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new methods of statistical investigation. It seems that 
these methods and technical devices had been formulated 
by Laplace and Condorcet before the 19th c. As early as 
1795, Pierre Simond de Laplace (1749-1827) suggested 
ways to dealing with technical problems which were 
attributed to the limitation, both qualitative and 
quantitative, of statistics. He later commented on 
them, before 1814 in Essai Philosophique sur les 
Probabilités. These methods mostly consist in
generalizing about the use of probabilities, as 
Condorcet also did in his late writings in 1782-1785. 
Probabilities were previously only used in calculation
life r e n t s . 16 But Laplace has promoted the modern ideas
of 'significant relationship', 'confidence intervals', 
'least square method', and 'scatter phenomena'. These 
concepts were to be used in cases where chance and 
natural laws were combined. By chance Laplace, who is 
known mainly as a determinist means chance resulting
from human ignorance.1? Even though, in retrospect, it
so happens that Laplace frames concepts that were 
sufficient to answer the questions his contemporaries 
were asking about the application of Mathematics to the 
study of social phenomena, his important suggestions 
went unnoticed. One may explain the lack of recognition 
of Laplace's ideas by biographical or sociological 
factors. By this light, the time lag between the 
statement of a statistical calculus and it subsequent 
development into econometrics appears to be either a
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sociological phenomenon, such as the willingness by the 
community of economists to adopt the use of techniques 
developed by Laplace; or else a mathematical phenomenon, 
such as the development of these techniques. Perrot 
(1992) attributes the phenomenon of this lag to the 
background of metaphysical belief that prevailed in the 
18th c. and not to concerns of economic or social 
inquiry as such. One indicator of this, which is noted 
in Armatte (1991), is that until the end of the 19th c., 
statistical studies and the probability calculus 
developed fairly independently. According to Armatte
(1991) two metaphysical views were commonly held in the 
19th c. The first was that numbers could represent only 
material objects or forces. The second was that 'moral' 
forces were involved in political and economic 
phenomena, in addition to physical factors. 
Consequently numbers and probabilities in particular 
could not represent these 'moral' factors. However, 
Keynes (1917, p.339; 1891) notices in passing that;
"There is a close connexion between the statistical 
method and the doctrine of chances". He refers to 
Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874) and considers that the 
doctrine of chances may help separate features of 
statistical data that fall under a law- from those that 
do not.
Even though the use of statistical data in 
economic theory was criticised by 19th c. economists, 
Perrot (1992)'s and Etner's(1987) inquires show that
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together with practical factors dating back to the 17th 
c., statistics significantly influenced mathematical 
economics in the 19th c. According to Perrot (1992) a 
number of new techniques were being developed at the 
same time: statistics; the use of double entry book­
keeping (generating large bodies of data on business 
enterprises) the use of diagrams. These techniques were 
a necessity because of the increasing complexity of
economic and commercial life. One possible origin of 
economic curves Perrot mentions might be the political
graphs of Pierre Samuel Dupond de Nemours (1739-1817).18
Another possible origin of economic curves Perrot
mentions is the graphs of the long-running empirical 
studies conducted before 1789, by William Playfair for 
the British Treasury's department, out of which curves
were extrapolated.19 Perrot (1992, p.31) holds the view
that in all likelihood the convex or concave shape of 
some of theoretical economic curves such as those of 
Cournot, was suggested by such empirical studies. He
holds the view that the development of the mathematical 
analysis of such curves occurred later, with Cournot in 
particular. Etner(1987) shows that the work in
mathematical economics of the French 19thc engineers was
grounded on the analysis of detailed statistical data
provided by empirical inquiries or used for the 
managment of large industrial firm.
This view that there is an empirical origin to
Mathematical Economics is independently confirmed by
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Stigler (1954). He shows that there have been two 
approaches to the analysis of consumers' behaviour since 
the end of the 18th c. One is utility-maximisation 
techniques. The other consists in generalisations out 
of empirical observations. He shows that, as far as the 
theory of income, empirical studies have preceded the 
theoretical approach, whereas the contrary holds good so 
far as supply and demand analysis is concerned. This 
view might also be indirectly confirmed by the 
comparison of Bicquilley (1804) (cf. chapter 2 note 3) 
and Jevons (1879). Jevons (1879, pp.74-80) illustrates 
the inobtrusive occurrence of probability numbers in his 
'theory' with the example of a hazardous maritime 
journey. It might be argued on this ground, that 
practical commercial problems are the historical origins 
of his theory. According to Bicquilley (1804) and 
Crépel (1995), it was usual in the late 18th c. and 19th 
c. to treat such problems with the help of probability 
calculus. The reluctance of economists for using 
statistics must not be overestimated, since according to 
Breton(1991, p418), the majority of French economists, 
at the end of the 19thc, considered that statistics 
could assess both economic theories and principles of 
political economy.
By the mid-19th c., what we would call today 
statistics had passed the stage of being just a 
collection of data. By 'statistics' authors belonging
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to this historical era referred not only to such 
collections, but also to mathematical analysis which has 
no immediate reference to any applications. However, 
some early techniques, which we would today identify as 
statistical, even though they have existed since the 
18th c., had still not identified as such by the end of 
the 19th c.
There is evidence that some elements of 19 th c. 
mathematical economic 'theory*, as defined at the 
beginning of this paragraph, were suggested both by 
statistical data and by practical problems. However, it 
seems that economists as a whole were reluctant to use 
statistics in their theoretical inquiries. This 
reluctance did not only concern statistics, but also 
mathematical economic theory per se, as Breton(1991, 
especially p419) and Le Van-Lemesle(1991) notice as far 
as French economists and the pre-1880's period are 
concerned. In spite of the prejudice of 19th c. 
economists against mathematical economics, it followed 
the trend of economics and social sciences towards 
institutionalisation.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1 "Given that the religions, the philosophical systems and the 
sciences are social institutions and given that as such, they are 
the product of a people's civilization, they will succeed one 
another in the order mentioned above whenever it is not disturbed 
by historical upheavals, revolutions and alien causes. The very 
terms of these conditions shows that the exception may be as 
common as the rule or even more common than the rule. In the 
cases we find most interesting, exception prevails." (Our 
translation).
2 Social sciences may also be called moral sciences or human 
sciences. We choose the former, firstly in order to emphasise the 
dependence of the activity of human beings on social structures, 
intellectual activity included. We choose it also to leave the 
question open of whether there is a social behaviour in animal 
life. This explains why we consider Psychology and Psychoanalysis 
to social sciences. Marcel Mauss in 'Une Catégorie de l'Esprit 
Humain; la Notion de Personne, celle de "Moi"' (in Sociologie et 
Anthropologie. [1st edition 1950; 9th edition] Paris; P.U.F. 
(Quadrige), 1985, 428p., pp.333-352) as well as anthropological 
studies, has indeed shown that the perception of the 'self, which 
plays an important part in intellectual activity, depends to a 
great extent on social representations and habits,
3 We are grateful to Professor Reid for signalling this 
historical figure to us.
4 In 1883, he wrote; Untersuchungen über die Methode er 
Sozialwissenschaften und der politischen Okonomie insbesondere. 
In 1903 he published Roscher und Knies und die logischen Problème 
der historischen Nationalokonomie. In 1904, he wrote an article 
entitled "Die Objektivitate sozialwissenschaftlicher und 
sozialpolitischer". And in 1917, he wrote about axiological 
neutrality.
5 We are indebted to John Broome as he was a member of the 
department of Economics at Bristol (UK) for this suggestion.
^ However, in the 17th and 18th c., according to Perrot (1992) whose research we now report, the issue about the scientific nature of economics was disconnected from that of the mathematization of both economic theory and economic data. Such an author as J.B. Say (1767- 1832) for instance, neglected the use of both mathematics and statistics but did not claim that economics was not a science. He did not think mathematics was appropriate for human-related facts because he believed there was a contradiction between human-related values 
which are necessarily changeable, and fixed mathematical variables. He neglected statistics because they were dealing with the particular, which was not considered by him and by most of his contemporaries as a suitable object for scientific inquiry. Economics began to be claimed a science, in France, in the mid-lBth c. ; at that time, science referred to knowledge of the general and to the study of cause/effect relationships. The first occurrence of the term 'science' in the title
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of a book on economics is in one published in 1751 by Real de Curban. It had been used previously in the core of economic texts but the term was used in a pejorative sense and it pointed to an illegitimate knowledge or an illegitimate practice. At that time and before, matters that would be regarded today as matters for economic science were dealt with by statesmen. It is later used more generally from 1767 to 1774 (nine books have it in their title) with the development of the Physiocrat school of thought. When this school became less fashionable in the 1770s, the term disappeared until the years 1799, 1801 and 1802. From then on, it became accepted. According to Perrot, this terminological change is not connected with an epistemological or methodological change. Instead, there is a continuity in the authors' guest for rational and causal knowledge in economics. Whether or not this state of affairs which Perrot describes With regard to the history of French economic thought applies to the British case as well is not straightforward; but it might, since at that time, exchanges of ideas were common between economists of these nations. As far as 'PoliticalEconomy' (Perrot, 1992, note 27, p.71) mentions its use by Stewart (in 1767), SiTiith (in 1776), in Britain as well as in Italy.
7 cf. Armatte (1991) for the period 1800-1914 and Bihr et al 
(1995) for the identification of this link today with a particular 
phenomenon; social inequalities.
8 Comte was indeed opposed to the view that there could be a
separated economic science because economic phenomena were
essentially connected to social factors.
9 Diachronic communication refers to communication from one human 
generation to another. Synchronic communication refers to 
communication with individual of a given generation.
10 We are grateful to Professor Reid for pointing out to us that 
this statement needs qualifying. In a book review of Jevons' 
Theory of Political Economy, Marshall may have at first criticized 
Jevons* use of Mathematics and he assessed this book more
positively only later.
11 This does not apply to Jevons, who corresponded with Walras 
(cf. chapter 5, section 181).
12 For details on Cheysson, and his work, see Zylberberg (1990) 
and chapter 1, section 262.
13 However, it seems that Cournot and Walras were opposed to 
statistics to some extent (cf. Armatte, 1991, p.4 note 35).
14 In this connection, Armatte (1991, p.8) mentions the following 
names; Conring, de Oldenurger, de Bielfeld, Achenwall (1719- 
1772). These individuals were professors of Political Economy in 
German universities who also taught the principles of the analysis 
of statistical data fairly independently from this analysis 
itself.
15 The treatise Armatte (1991) refers to is the French 1805 
translation by D.F. Donnât of de Schloetzer's writings in; 
Introduction à la Science de la Statistique, d'après l'Allemand de 
M. de Schloetzer.
16 Perrot refers to Peuchet's Essai d'une Statistique Générale de 
la France mentioned in Armatte (1991, p.6).
17 According to Perrot (1992), the first detailed presentation of 
statistical techniques applies to economic problems is
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Deparcieux ' s Essai sur les Probabilités de la Durée de la Vie 
Humaine (1746). Deparcieux refers to de Montmort's and de
Moivre's works on probability.
18 This would be called as opposed to in the
Aristotleian terminology, because it concerns being who can act 
(Physics II, 4-7).
19 Perrot refers to Dupont de Nemours' dissertation entitled "Des 
Courbes Politiques" which is referenced in Perrot (1992, note 77).
20 Perrot (1992, p.30 note 76)refers to William Playfair Tableaux 
d'Arithmétique Linéaire du Commerce, des Finances, et de la Dette 
Nationale d'Angleterre. 1789, French translation. Playfair later 
wrote himself a treatise on statistics which is referenced in 
Armatte (1995, p.584) and which was published 1800.
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CHAPTER 4
THE MATHEMATICS OF THE MARGINALISTS
The Mathematics of
the Marginalists
"L'objet mathématique est d'abord caractérisé par 
l'apparition de «contenus formels», absents de la 
logique. [Ils] n'ont pourtant pas leur origine dans les 
donnés du sensible [...]. «Contenu» signifie ici 
propriétés de l'objet échappant d'une certaine manière au 
système opératoire démonstratif, bien que l'objet en 
question ait été introduit comme corrélat du système 
opératoire. La sémantique, pourrait on dire, prend alors 
une vie propre et se détache de la syntaxe."%
G.G. Granger (1994)
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INTRODUCTION
Mathematicians and historians of mathematics 
agree in acknowledging that the 19th c. is important for 
contemporary mathematics. This is the opinion of Boyer
(1949), Edwards (1979), Guillaume (1994), Gispert (1994), 
Fichera (1994) and Dahan-Dalmedico (1991). Our analysis 
in this section relies on these authors both for our 
knowledge of contemporary mathematics and for general 
reference sources. Many mathematical ideas and also the 
formalisms that are used today, were developed in the 
19th c. The history of Mathematics in this century is 
also very important, since in this time there has been a 
crisis surrounding the 'geometrical model', by which we 
mean both a model for mathematical intuition and for 
deduction in general. In addition, this period, or more 
precisely from the mid-19thc. onwards, is important in 
the history of logic. From that point onwards, the 
Aristotelian formal logic handed over to symbolic formal 
logic.
In this section only the first aspect of the 
history of mathematics will be presented. The second 
aspect which concerns logic, is important for the study 
of individual mathematical economists of this period such 
as Jevons as we shall see. For example, Boole's logic 
influenced Jevons' epistemological views on science (cf. 
Chapter 5 , section 1) . But it is less important in the
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historiography of mathematical economics since it 
identifies the marginalist revolution both as having 
introduced differential calculus in economics and as 
having promoted the use of mathematics in economics on 
the grounds that it is the model of rigour, of scientific 
method and of scientific proof. After explaining what 
the 'geometrical model' consists of and why 
mathematicians challenged it in the last third of the 
19th c., we shall focus on the state of differential 
calculus at that time.
In the second section, we assess a particular 
methodological and epistemological appraisal of the 
mathematics used by the marginalists, namely that of 
Friday (1950). Friday’s (1950) thesis is considered in 
this thesis as a fair representative of historiographical 
approaches to Economics aiming at explaining the use of 
mathematical formalism in the discipline.
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SECTION 1: IN THE CONTEXT OF 19THC. MATHEMATICS
SECTION 161: MATHEMATICAL LIMITATIONS TO THE GEOMETRICAL
METHOD
Before the 19th c., geometry was important not 
only within mathematics but for philosophy and science in 
general. The Elements of Euclid were often considered as 
the canon for a logically ordered theory. For example, 
Baruch d’Espinoza (1632-1677) gave his treatise on Ethics 
the "axiomatic " form of the Elements. As the Scottish 
philosopher Dougald Stewart (1753-1828) clearly saw, 
according to Blanche (1955), this order was either used 
as a rhetorical device or it had the merely logical 
function of making clear the link between ideas, for 
communication purposes. For Euclid, it seems that it 
bore the latter function, whereas Pascal considered that 
geometric reasoning was a model for rhetoric. In 
mathematics, many ideas used today in the study of 
functions were formerly approached only from the point of 
view of geometry, but this is no longer the case. From 
the 17th c. onwards integration was associated with the 
calculus of areas so that, to use the modern terminology, 
the existence of an integral for a - function and the 
measure of its areas were considered one and the same 
problem. The continuity of a function was either 
associated with the idea of a segment of the real line or 
with the uninterrupted drawing of a curve. Similarly, it
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was common to illustrate the idea of a limit by 
considering a circle as the limit of a polygon. We are 
grateful to Professor Reid for drawing our attention to 
the Scottish mathematicians such as MacLaurin, who took 
an active part in the development of the use of 
geometrical devices in analysis. Colin MacLaurin in his 
Treatise on Fluxions (1742) attempted to provide 
geometrical and Euclidean foundations to Newton‘s 
fluxions. According to Davie (1964), the study of the 
Elements of Euclid was the basis of the mathematical 
syllabus in Scottish Universities in the 18th c. until 
the 1820s. This over-emphasis on Euclid, compared to 
the then new developments of algebra (cf. Diagne, 1989), 
was the core of a controversy on mathematical education 
in Great Britain in the first half of the 19th c. 
Throughout the 19th c., mathematicians build up and 
explored entities that challenged this geometrical 
intuition. Such entities or 'objects' were 
introduced at the beginning of the century. As early as 
the end of the 18th c. there had been attempts to 
depart from the traditional geometrical intuition. 
However, it is in the second part of the 19th c. that 
these new ideas became a challenge to mathematical 
communal sense i.e. the experience of the mathematicians
considered as a community (cf. Danesi, 1992)2. it can
be argued that Riemann’s 1854 dissertation, which was 
published in 1867 is a sign of this awareness. This
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dissertation expounded a new theory of integration. From 
then on, there were clear attempts in this community to 
build mathematics on non-geometrical grounds, a process 
which constituted the axiomatization of mathematics. 
Before this happened individual mathematicians already 
called into question the mathematical 'evidence', or 
common sense. In this connection, Louis Abrogast {1759- 
1803), Peter Gustav Lejeunne-Dirichlet (1805-1859) and 
Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) and also Thomas Reid (1710- 
1796) and Nikolai Ivanovitch Lobachevski (1792-1856) were 
precursors of the later development of mathematics. The 
first three contributed to the renewal of analysis, the 
latter to that of geometry. Firstly, the Euclidean axiom 
that there exists a unique line containing a given point 
that is parallel to a given line was challenged. This 
gave birth to alternative geometries, which Thomas Reid 
had explored, and which Lobachevski published as a system 
in 1829, but on which he had already been working in the 
1820s. Secondly, as far as functional analysis is 
concerned, in 1829 Dirichlet presented an example of an 
analytically well defined function, which was, in modern 
terminology, discontinuous everywhere. In 1834, Bolzano 
gave an example of a continuous function with no 
derivative anywhere, as Weierstrass had done in the 
1860s, with more success. In 1875, Darboux (1842-1917) 
studied integrable functions which are discontinuous at 
an infinite number of points.^ Similarly, in 1890
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Guiseppe Peano (1858-1932} published an example of a 
function on [0, 1] whose image is a surface, namely a 
square i.e. a curve filling an area. This amounted to 
identifying two geometrical objects which were previously 
considered to be substantially different. Georg Cantor 
(1845-1918) obtained a set, the triadic cantor set which 
is a discontinuous set with the power of the continuum, 
and which has counter intuitive properties in many other 
respects.
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SECTION 1Q2; DIFFERENTIAL CALCULUS IN THE 1870S
Let us now consider more specifically the state 
of differential calculus at the time of the marginalist 
revolution in the 1870s. Two related historical trends 
in Western culture converged at the end of the 19th c. to 
create today’s standard calculus. One, that of
infinitesimal calculus, can be traced back at least from 
the 17th c. onwards and its origins are traditionally 
illustrated with the names of the R.P. Bonaventura 
Cavalieri (1635; 1598-1647), Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz
(1646-1716), Blaise Pascal (1654-1659; 1623-1662) and
Isaac Newton (1642-1727) . It can be characterized as an 
attempt to extend the operations on finite quantities to 
operations on infinite ones. The other trend is the
study of functions. Its origin is unclear but it is 
closely linked with the study of motion. The mid-18th c. 
is an important landmark for this trend because Euler 
identified a function as the combination of several
operations. This trend culminates with Vito Volterra’s 
(1860-1940) definition of ’functions of lines’ in the
1910s. It consists in disconnecting the function 
considered as one and the same object from its unique 
analytical representation. In 1872 several seminal works 
on the foundations of the calculus were published, 
described by Boyer (1949, pp.288-289) as follows:
"It saw, besides the presentation by
Weierstrass of his continuous nondifferentiable
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function and the publication by one of his 
students of Weierstrass’ lectures on the 
elements of arithmetic, (...) the appearance of 
the following: Nouveau précis d ’analyse
infinitésimale of Charles Méray [1835-1911]; a 
paper in Crelle’s Journal by Eduard Heine 
[1821-1881] on "Die Elemente der 
Funktionenlehre"; the first paper by Georg 
Cantor [1845-1918] on the principles of 
arithmetic (...); and the Stetigkeit und die 
Irrationalzahlen of Richard Dedekind".
Before then, the idea of the derivative of a function was
generally unclear. It either referred to an algebraic
operation over a differential ratio, as is the case in
Leibniz and Carnot’s works, or it referred to one
particular coefficient in the serial development of a
function, as is the case in Lagrange’s work. Since the
18th c. it contained the idea of differential ratio of a Fix + Ax') — F(x'\function: ------------ , that of its limit F' (x) andAjc dythat of a differential, — , Bolzano made clear thedx dydistinction between f ’ (x) and —  by interpreting thedx
first as a symbol for a limit and the second as a symbol 
for a function. If Boyer (1949) has strictly reproduced 
Bolzano’s symbolism, then the one above is Bolzano’s. 
This is partly confirmed by Vojtech (1948). In Voljtech 
(1948), Bolzano indeed uses the two ratio in the sense 
mentioned above. However, he does not use the symbols 
/F'(x)/ or /f'(x)/. He uses instead IjxIJjxIJfxIy for 
the derivatives of F(x). With the same proviso, Augustin 
Cauchy (1789-1857), who also helped in clarifying these 
concepts, used instead the following symbolism:
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—  = ^ , f ' (x) and —  . He contributed toAx / dx
defining the derivative of a function. Around 1874,
there were other notations in use for differential
calculus. In thermodynamics for instance, the following
were used, according to Ramunni (1988). Rudolph Julius
Emanuel Calusius (1822-1888), following Leonhard Euler
dz\ . (dz(1707-1783) it seems, used; d2 = \—r\dx^ —  h/y thedx d } '
following were also used by others:
dz =  I  \dx-^ dyz ( Sz ^  ^Sz—r~\d}< dz-\^\dx+ “  • The importance ofd}'J \dxJ \dy;
the metaphysical problem of the existence of 
infinitesimals was accentuated in the 19th c. by the 
posthumous publication of the philosophical writings of 
Leibniz. In order to solve this problem, 19th c. 
mathematicians worked on definitions of the operation of 
'taking the limit ' of a quantity, which ultimately led 
them to a definition of the real numbers.* These 
researches generated the contemporary concepts of 
differential calculus. According to Dahan-Dalmedico 
(1991, p.208) , the ideas of the limit of a series, the 
limit of a function and the continuity of a function 
became well defined from the end of the 1870s onwards. 
That is to say, these ideas were operational in the 
1870s. As for the existence of infinite quantities 
involved both in these ideas and in differential 
calculus, it had long remained a metaphysical problem.
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It can be considered as an algebraic operation on a set 
of functions or as a calculus on infinite quantities (cf. 
chapter 4, note 3). However, Dahan-Dalmedico (1991)'s 
statement needs qualifying or at least, its application 
to the case of differential calculus needs scrutinising. 
Throughout his work, which was published after the 1870s, 
Peano expressed axiomatic ' concerns about the ideas 
involved in functional analysis. For example, in an 
article published in 1912, Peano (1912) reviewed the 
different uses and the symbolic representations through 
history of the derivative and the differential of a 
function. In this article, Peano quotes a text by Henri 
Poincaré dated 1899. This quotation suggests that there 
was no standard notation for these entities at that time.
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SECTION 2; IN THE CONTEXT OF 20TH C.
HISTORIOGRAPHY
SECTION 261; A  BORROWING FROM PHYSICS?
One view on the use of mathematics in economics 
is that they are borrowed from physics. According to 
Friday (1950) this view was standard amongst economists 
in the 1940s. In this connection, most approaches to the 
history of mathematical formalism which are concerned 
with connecting it to the history of science tend to 
focus on the historical link between economics and 
physics only.
This is the case of Friday's (1950) thesis on 
the historical and conceptual relationship between 
physics and economics. We consider that it usefully 
portrays this standard approach. It is useful in the 
sense that as a stylization of most 'external' historical 
approaches to mathematical economics it therefore 
contains their main points. We shall now turn to the 
relevant content of Friday's thesis.
His historical thesis concerns the foundations of the 
methods used by classical economists. * Friday interprets 
'classical' in the Keynesian sense and he takes Marshall 
as the representative of this trend in the history of 
economic thought.% According to Friday the methods used 
by the classics, including the 'mathematical method’ were
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similar to the methods of ’classical physics’, by which 
the author means Newtonian physics and cosmology. These 
methods involved considering an economy or a physical 
system both as the result of forces bringing about a 
state of equilibrium and as an isolated system. Also 
these methods entailed the assumption that time and space 
were divisible. However, the basic assumption,
determinism, held that the subject-matter of scientific 
analysis endures over time. This assumption is connected 
to the metaphysical belief in the world’s harmony. One 
cause of this harmony is the existence of unchanging 
natural laws. These various views on the foundations of 
knowledge define the ’static’ approach to physical 
phenomena and economic phenomena.
Friday (1950) extends this historical 
comparison of physics and economics in two directions. 
One is a comparison of physics and economics in the first 
half of the 20th c. The other is a view on scientific 
methodology. In considering the first view, Friday
extends the historical comparison between classical 
physics and classical economics in terms of scientific 
methodology. He considers that there is a unique
scientific method for all the sciences at a given time in 
history. He attributed to philosophy a pivotal role in 
providing the foundations of this method for the 
sciences.
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The second view which Friday expresses as an 
extension of the method of historical comparison, is that 
economics in the 1950s should be influenced by the 
emergence of relativist Physics, especially as regards 
mathematical methods. There are two arguments that 
support the author's requirement. The first is that
there had been a philosophical shift from the pre-19th c. 
to the post-19th c . Since he confers on philosophy a 
foundational role, he holds the view that the sciences 
should echo the philosophical shifts in the methods they 
use. Consequently economics, as well as all the
sciences, should regenerate the classical methods. The 
second argument is that methods in accordance with the 
new philosophy were initially developed in Physics , thus 
physics is a good representative of this new
scientific methodology. Consequently one way for
economics to adopt elements of the new philosophy is to 
use and adapt the methods of the ’new physics’. 
According to Friday (1950, p.16) the cause of the time- 
lag between the use of the new method in physics and its 
use in economics is that; "(...) most economists get 
their philosophical ideas in a second hand and haphazard 
manner."
In the main, Friday views the mathematical methods used 
by the classics as a part of a methodological heritage 
from Newtonian physics. He does not analyse the 
improvements of these methods by classical economists.
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Neither does he search for mathematical methods that 
economists may have developed independently. Friday’s 
statement that economics borrowed many of its concepts 
and methods from the physical sciences is not an isolated 
case in the historiography of economic thought. No 
matter whether historians praise these borrowings as 
Friday (1950) does, or whether they hold the view, as 
Mirowski (1989) does, that they are unfortunate and 
unsuitable, or, even, that they are neutral as Perrot
(1992) points out, there is evidence of this borrowing. 
Historical references on this topic can be found in Sebba 
(1953), or Mirowski (1989, 1990, 1991). They can also be 
found in economic theoretical texts themselves. We shall 
identify such borrowing throughout this thesis. At this 
point, let us mention Adam Smith and Jan Tinbergen 
(1933a). One connection between Smith’s views on 
Astronomy and his views on economics is the idea of an 
’invisible hand’. According to Wightman (1980, note 5, 
p.49), this connection has been extensively studied.® 
Another connection between Adam Smith's view on Astronomy 
and his view on Economics is the correspondence he 
establishes between "gravity" in physics and "sympathy" 
in social philosophy. According to Lefebre (1995), both 
are concepts used by Adam Smith to explain a state of 
harmony either between planets or between individuals. 
Lefebre (1995) reports that the extent to which Adam 
Smith's Wealth of Nations ought to be considered as a
1 4 5
The Mathematics of
the Marginalists
perfect translation of Newton’s astronomical system is a 
very fiddly topic discussed amidst historians of science. 
Later Tinbergen (1933a) uses the concepts and the 
formalism of oscillation theory in connection with the 
study of business-cycles.
Overall, it is highly probable that Friday’s 
account of the origin of mathematical formalism in 
classical economics is faithful to historical events. 
However, it is limited from the point of view of the 
methodology of economics (of Cheix, 1996).
In addition, it is not clear whether the association of 
the mathematical tools used by economics with statics is 
valid so far as the marginalists are concerned. We shall 
now look for limitations on the view that mathematical 
formalism in economics has historically been borrowed 
from physics.
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SECTION 2(82 ; CRITIQUE
In this sub-section, we shall use Friday's 
(1950) work as a representative of standard historical 
studies which are concerned with comparing economics with 
other sciences. We shall analyse the philosophical
background of Friday's approach. Then we shall turn to 
explaining why, from the point of view taken in this 
thesis, they may impose boundaries on the study of
mathematical economics. First we shall consider
boundaries to historical studies, and then boundaries to 
methodological studies.
There are three philosophical views that Friday 
(1950) holds and that overtly influence his study.
The first is Mill's view on scientific method, which 
Friday quotes. According to Friday, Mill's view is that 
if a method succeeds in one discipline it should then be 
developed in disciplines in which other methods have 
hitherto been revealed as unsuccessful. The second is
the view that the referent of theories in physics is 'the
external world'. The third view is that these theories 
constitute the 'common ground' of various sciences. Even 
though Friday does not refer to Otto Neurath in his 
bibliography, similar ideas occur in the letter's work 
(Neurath, 1931; 1935). They are components of the
philosophical view called 'physicalism'. Another
characteristic of Friday's view, which is that of
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physicalism as well, is the advocacy by its proponents of 
the unity of science. Neurath (1931, p.49) describes 
physicalism as follows:
"In the formulas of science, with the aid 
of which human beings succeed in understanding 
one another, only logical-mathematical signs 
are utilized. [...] How my friend combines 
the symbol 'red* with other signs clarifies for 
me the structure of his system of expression. 
More cannot be done by science. Signs can 
indicate a 'near', a 'between' and a 'so much’, 
but no more. [...] In a sense unified science 
is physics in its largest aspect, a tissue of 
laws expressing space-time linkages - let us 
call it physicalism."
Thus Neurath identifies the symbolic ’mathematical
method’ with scientific method. In his view, the feature 
of mathematics which makes it fully adequate for
scientific purposes is that it is a way of communicating 
reasoning that does not rest on metaphysics. This 
identification is not solely a historical remark about 
the influence of the methods of classical physics on 
other sciences. The quotation shows that it is a crucial 
feature of the philosophical programme of physicalism 
which Neurath (1935) describes in general terms. We 
shall now turn to analyse two drawbacks to this view so 
far as the subject-matter of this thesis is concerned.
When used to study the end of the 19th c., 
physicalism may imply a limitation to the corpus of 
potential contributors to mathematical economics to
physicists. It may also lead to an underestimation of
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the contributions of supposedly 'non-scientific’ figures 
such as merchants, accountants, engineers, statesmen and 
financiers.’ In addition, the identification of pre- 
1950s ’mathematical method’ with static classical 
analysis may lead to the underestimation of 
thermodynamics as one origin of the use of mathematical 
symbolism in economic theory.® Economists such as Paul 
Samuelson and Nicolas Georgescu Roegen were influenced by 
thermodynamics, and it is clear from Passet (1979), that 
generally speaking, Development Economics is also 
strongly influenced by this discipline. In addition, we 
showed (Chapter 3, Section 102) that the symbolism of 
differential calculus was used in thermodynamics in the 
1870s. From a methodological point of view, Friday
(1950)’s ideas that the mathematics of economic theory is 
a borrowing from physics is incomplete. It is obvious 
from our reading of him that he defines the ’borrowing’ 
of mathematical methods from a historical standpoint, 
treating it only in terms of the precedence of its use in 
one field of study as compared to another. We have seen 
that contemporary methodologists do not content 
themselves with merely pointing out this historical 
borrowing, but that they identify ’fortunate’ and 
’unfortunate’ borrowings. It is unclear whether Friday’s 
definition of a borrowing is sufficient to make such an 
identification. Does Friday consider that the borrowing 
of differential calculus was fortunate because it
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coincided with a renewal of the economic theory to which 
it was applied? There was such a fortunate borrowing in 
thermodynamics in the 19th c. it seems. According to 
Ramunni (1988) the use of the then new infinitesimal 
differential calculus coincided with the development of 
the concept of entropy and the use of probability 
distributions. Friday does not pinpoint such a
development in economics. In the literature however, the 
definition of the value of a commodity as a function of 
the marginal value of that commodity is considered to be 
such a development. But we mentioned (Chapter 3, Section 
201) that people disagree on the extent to which this 
definition of value relies on its expression in terms of 
the formalism of differential calculus. Another
definition of fortunate borrowing would be that it has 
been used over a longer period of time. According to 
this definition then, differential calculus would be a 
fortunate borrowing. Samuelson (1947) still used it in 
his Foundations of Economic Analysis but it is true that 
Debreu (1959) brought discredit to it in his Theory of 
Value. However, according to Ahmed (1993, pp.191-195) 
differential calculus has been used again in important 
contexts by Steve Smale (1930-) in the 1970s. Steve 
Smale considered that it was an adequate tool for 
approaching dynamic economic phenomena. In addition, he 
considers that differential calculus served a practical 
function. It provides a method for the approximation of
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functions and as such, it can be used as a computing 
device. Friday’s justification of ’fortunate’ borrowing 
differs somewhat from the two definitions we have just 
mentioned, Friday’s justification rather rests on his 
philosophical view that mathematical physics is a more 
accomplished science that economics*. This view, when 
applied to the 19th c. and the beginning of the 20th c., 
leaves out the fact that the use of mathematics in 
physics itself has been controversial. Allais (1992) 
mentions a physicist, Douasse, who criticised the use of 
Mathematics in Physics in the 1920s. He held the view 
that there were cases in which the use of mathematical 
formalism was not necessary to the physical theory, which 
could be expressed in vernacular language. In addition, 
the attempt to define the use of Mathematics in Economic 
theory as mere borrowing from Physics does not draw 
attention to the special features of mathematical 
economics that are identified in what follows. The idea 
that economists have been using, and still do use, 
concepts and mathematical formalism (such as those of 
equilibrium) , that are used in physics as well is not 
controversial. However, physicists at the first
interdisciplinary workshop with physicists and economists 
(C.N.R.S., Aussois, March 1994), while acknowledging this 
borrowing pointed out that such concepts and techniques 
had a different meaning in physics and in economics. 
Friday’s historical and philosophical definition of a
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borrowing is not sufficient to accommodate the fact 
mentioned by physicists that the transfer of mathematical 
formalism from one field of study to another goes 
together with a change in meaning. Explanations of such 
transformations may be found in the philosophy of 
mathematics or in the theories of interpretation.
152
The Mathematics ofthe Marginalists
N O TES TO CHAPTER 4
1 "A mathematical entity is identified first and foremost with the emergence of "formal contents" which do not belong to logical systems. Neither do [they] come from sensible data [...]. "Content" refers here tothese properties of the mathematical entity which can not be accounted for in terms of the operations of the existing demonstrative system; this is the case eventhough the entity were introduced as a correlate of this system of operations. It is as if the semanticsdeveloped a proper life and separated off from thesyntax." (our translation).
2 Following Danesi (1992) reporting Giambattista Vico's (1668-1744) analysis of common sense, we hold the view that what is commonly referred to as 'common sense' - which we term 'general common sense', might be divided into 'common sense* on the one hand and 'communal sense' on the other. Common sense refers to physico-biological experiences of human beings, such as sight; communal sense refers to the cultural experiences of human beings. With this principle, we want to point out that when assessing a scientific theory, it is important to bear in mind that it is "general common sense' oriented in two ways.First of all, science is grounded on the shared experiences of living human beings. Up to a point, physics and medicine can be considered as being originally founded on common sense. Had our senses been different, then physics would have evolved differently . By contrast, the social sciences are built up from communal sense which involves shared cultural values. Secondly, science is grounded on the economically and culturally dominant representation of the world available at a given time. This representation is based on vernacular languages.As for the question whether human beings share general common sense, one way to find an answer to this question is to look for an ontological argument such as a proof or a refutation of 'the real world'. Another way, which is ours, consists in considering that it is a fact that human beings do share general common sense essentially though language. The question then is not to find the ontological ground of common sense. It is instead to describe the process of communication of experiences. It is a linguistic problem, not an ontological one. We believe that in reflecting on the foundations of the sciences, it is impossible not to raise the question of what is meant by "common sense" . We believe that in reflecting on the foundations of the sciences, it is impossible not to raise the question of what is meant by "common sense" .
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3 Presumably Dahan-Dalmedico (1991) from whom we take this information refers to Riemann type of integration.
^ This type of answer must be contrasted with that of non-standard analysis in the 20th century, which was instigated by Abraham Robinson (1918-1979/1974). It consists in the definition of new rules for the calculus, adapted to the 18 th c. reasoning on infinitesimals.
According to Keynes (1936, note issical’ economist was first used 1
Marx, but controversial, as it includes many who are regarded as neo-classical economists. In addition, it comprises John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), F.Y. Edgeworth (1845-1926)and A.C. Pigou (1877-1959).
^ The reference Wightman (1980, note 5 p.49) gives is: A.L. Macfie, 1971, 'The Invisible Hand of Jupiter', Journal of the History of Ideas, 32, pp.595-599. This is confirmed in Macfie et al. (1976, note 7, pp. 184- 185). It is pointed out that Smith first used the phrase 'invisible hand' in the Historv of Astronomy (III, 2). He uses it also in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (IV, ii, 9) and in the Theory of Moral Sentiments (IV, 1, 10).
 ^ In the 20th c., there are such contributors. One is the financier Karl Schlesinger (1889-1938). According to Ahmed (1993, pp.80-85) he did not belong entirely to the academic world, which was therefore slow to recognise his work. However, Ahmed argues that he made important contributions to general equilibrium analysis. Even though he did not solve them, Schlesinger was very good at discerning the mathematical difficulties involved in solving general equilibrium equations (e.g. confining prices to non-negative real values). Ahmed (1993, p.83) writes that: "(....) the examination ofthe existence of competitive equilibrium first began with a paper by Schlesinger." Other 20th c. and 19th c. examples are mentioned in this thesis (e.g. Chapter 2, especially note 3; Chapter 3, section 2@2).
8 For example, it remains to be shown that the French mathematical economist-engineers applied only 'static' analysis to economics, since during their training, they benefited from a good training in the whole range of mathematical sciences.
9 Even though Friday's philosophical view on the historical precedence of physics over other sciences
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conforms to historical facts, it is somehow inconsistent. This inconsistency reveals itself if one analyzes the arguments he puts forward to support the claim that there ought to be a new Economics imitating the new physics • Recall the first argument he puts forward, which is that there ought to be a new science because there is a new philosophy. On the one hand Friday points out that the main feature of this philosophical shift is the relinquishing of determinism in favour of a probabilistic approach to the world as well as the focus on the interrelation between phenomena. On the other hand, the author reckons that these shifts were caused by shifts in physics. Overall, there is a contradiction between the thesis Friday holds on the prominent role of philosophy in science and the historical arguments he puts forward for promoting the new economics. On the one hand his thesis is that philosophy is the ground for scientific methodology. On the other, he identifies concepts of physics as the basis for the new philosophy as well as the basis from which scientific methods are to be derived.
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CHAPTER 5
EMERGENCE OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS: THE CASE OF JEVONS
Emergence of Mathematical
Economics: The Case of Jevons
"(...) there can be no doubt that the form of the most 
available arithmetical instrument, the human hand, has 
reacted upon the mind and moulded our numerical system 
into a form which we should not otherwise have selected 
as the be s t ."
Jevons, 187 0
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter is concerned with the study of the 
mathematics used in Jevons' Theory of Political Economy, 
this book is considered as an uncontroversial 
representative of the neo-classical school of
mathematical economics. The first section expounds 
Jevons' view that generally speaking, mathematics is the 
method of science. The second section expounds how
Jevons qualifies this role in connection to economic 
science. The third section is concerned first with 
identifying the mathematics used in the Theory _of 
Political Economy. It also uses the semiotic concept of 
an 'isotopy' (cf. chapter 2, section 2@2) to define the 
connection between the mathematical formalism and the 
English language in the extract of the treatise known as
"The Analogy of the Theory of the Lever".
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SECTION 1: MATHEMATICS AS THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
SECTION lei; THE PROMOTION OF MATHEMATICAL SYMBOLISM OUT 
OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE VIEWS
In the preface to the second edition of the 
Theory of Political Economy, Jevons complains about the 
lack of positive impact upon his fellow countrymen of his 
former attempt at "investigating economics 
mathematically"{Jevons, 1879, p.xviii). In between the 
first edition of the book in 1871 and the next, not only 
did mathematical economics fail to be incorporated into 
common practice, but paradoxically it also added to the 
confusion about economics, which Jevons originally wanted 
to allay (Jevons, 1871a). He reported that debates were 
focusing on defining "the logical method of the science" 
and on "the question whether there exists any such 
science at all". He blamed the predominance of Ricardian 
thought for the neglect of mathematical economics in 
Britain and suggested that the case was different in 
other European countries'.
From a historical point of view, he viewed Condillac 
(1715-1780), Dupuit (1804-1866) and Cournot (1801-1877) 
as the substantive contributors to mathematical 
economics. As far as direct influences on his own work 
are concerned, he referred to French, German and Italian 
scholars. Amongst the correspondents who contributed to 
the second edition of the book were Walras and Harald 
Wastergaard of Copenhagen, who suggested to Jevons the
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use of the symbolism of differential calculus.- From a 
biographical point of view, his project originated back 
to the mid-19th c. It sprang from the reading of an 1850 
study by Lardner on "Railway Economy". Jevons then 
developed his thought around 1860 into a synopsis of the 
Theory of Political Economy.- Using his own words, his 
achievement was to apply differential calculus to 
economic quantities and specifically to optimisation 
problems as it is the case in physics. {Jevons, 1879, 
Preface and Introduction to the second edition). By 
differential calculus, he meant both the symbolism and 
the corresponding reasoning on infinitesimals, which 
extended finite differences analysis. In order to 
appease his opponents' reluctance to accept mathematical 
economics, he repeatedly asserted that the novelty of his 
enterprise did not consist in introducing mathematical 
reasoning into economic theory but rather in introducing 
mathematical symbols : "Economists have long been
mathematicians without being aware of the fact." (Jevons, 
1879, p.xxiv).
If we turn now to his writings, in addition to the 
symbolism of differential calculus he referred to studies 
in the physical sciences that used this calculus, namely 
kinetic and energy studies. Indeed Jevons (1879, pp.101- 
102) mentioned first the difference between statics 
(finite quantities) and dynamics (infinitesimal 
quantities) as a difference in the nature of quantities
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involved in the calculus, and secondly he compared 
economic equilibrium in exchange with the physical 
equilibrium of a lever subject to opposing but balancing 
forces (cf. chapter 5, section 302), On the grounds of 
these three aspects of this work, Jevons may be said to 
have been influenced by Mechanics.
The reason Jevons put forward for "a symbolic 
treatment of the theory" (Jevons, 1871a) was that it 
would thereby be regarded as scientific. In order to 
bring about the improvement of the gnosiological status 
of economic knowledge, he suggested a terminological 
shift that remains in place today. It consisted of 
eradicating the "old troublesome double-worded name of 
our science" - Political Economy and in using Economics 
instead (Jevons, 1879, p.xiv). He equated the 
achievement of science in general with physics because, 
he claimed, physicists agreed about the notions and the 
words they used (Jevons, 1879, Preface and Introduction 
to the second edition) . He deplored the fact that 
economists, unlike physicists did not have an unequivocal 
terminology. He exemplified this inconsistency with the 
1870s debate on the measurement of utility: "It
cannot be surprising that many debates end in logomachy, 
when it is still uncertain how many meanings the word 
value has, or what kind of a quantity utility itself is." 
(Jevons, 1879, Preface and Introduction to the second 
edition)."
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In his view, the use of symbolism was a sufficient method 
of reaching agreement.' And to paraphrase him: when the
real meaning of the formula was seized, mathematics 
became self-evident(Jevons, 1871a). Not only did Jevons 
consider that the unequivocal meaning of terms was a 
prerequisite for sound debates, but he claimed that it 
was a necessary condition for producing knowledge. 
Science was the art of producing knowledge from out of 
the unknown, and one of its principles was the identity 
principle. As economics dealt with quantities, this art 
would consist of a symbolic algebraic calculus, also 
called Universal Arithmetic (Jevons, 1864, §15) . In
economics, this methodology was in his view practised by 
Cournot, who:
"Presents a beautiful example of 
mathematical reasoning, in which knowledge is 
apparently evolved out of ignorance" [...] "In 
reality the method consists in assuming certain 
simple conditions of the functions as 
conformable to experience, and then disclosing 
by symbolic inference the implicit results of 
these conditions." (Jevons, 1879, p.xxxiii).
However, the mathematical symbols were not necessary for 
the performance of the calculus. Whenever one used the 
words ’equal' and ’ratio’, one was reasoning 
mathematically. In addition, referring to Laplace for 
authority, Jevons wrote that mathematical results could 
be expressed in language. In economics in particular:
"Whether mathematical laws of economics are 
stated in words, or in the usual symbols, x, y, 
z, p, q etc., is an accident, or a matter of
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mere convenience." (Jevons, 1871a and 187 9 
p.4) .
The use of symbols in science is therefore a sieve for 
consistency and, it seems, a visual device to recognise 
identity of terms. Jevons (1870, §3) notices that:
"mathematicians are well aware that their 
science, however much it may advance, always 
requires a corresponding development of 
material symbols for relieving the memory and 
guiding the thoughts."
Similarly, he asserted that mathematical symbols 
facilitated reasoning. In Economics in particular, they 
helped to handle complex relations and a large body of 
data (Jevons, 1871a).
According to Jevons therefore, symbolic 
mathematical investigation in science and Economics in 
particular, had a cognitive and a heuristic function. 
The former was a sufficient condition for the latter to 
be efficient, but only the latter was typically 
scientific in Jevons' terminology.
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SECTION 102: THE LIMITATIONS TO THE USE OF MATHEMATICS IN 
SCIENCE AND SCIENTIFIC PROOF
The latter view on the connection between 
science and mathematical symbolism must be contrasted 
with Jevons’ view that mathematics have no demonstrative 
power, a statement that is correlated with the assertion 
that mathematical symbols are obscure. Both Jevons' 
alteration of Boole's logical system and his logical 
machine are illustrations of his views. He wrote that 
Boole "shrouded the simplest logical processes in the 
mysterious operations of a mathematical calculus" 
(Jevons, IB'^ O, §10; 1864) and criticized Boole's system
(Jevons, 1864; 1870). This led Jevons to alter the
notation of Boole's calculus. In addition, he disagreed 
with Boole on how sentences connected by 'and' in common 
language had to be symbolised. Boole made the
distinction between the exclusive and inclusive 'and'. 
It is admitted that he represents the former by a(l- 
b)+b(l-a) and the latter by a+bd-a)." Jevons held the 
view that this distinction should not be made in logic 
because logic had to stay close to general common sense 
and any symbolic result should be easily interpreted. 
Also Jevons criticized the fundamental Boolean law, 
namely x.x=x on the ground that it was not obeyed by all 
numbers. As far as the logical machine was concerned, he 
considered that:
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"The chief importance of the machine is of 
a purely theoretical kind. It demonstrates in 
a convincing manner the existence of an all- 
embracing system of Indirect Inference, the 
very existence of which was hardly suspected 
before the appearance of Boole’s logical 
works." (Jevons, 1870, §56).
He also considered that his machine was a "visible
proof".9 Consequently Jevons' wish to achieve the
"mechanics of utility and self-interest" (Jevons, 1871a) 
in economics proceeded from a broader mechanistic view of 
science, whose abstract findings, first are mechanically 
produced, and secondly have to be materially or
technically embodied in order to be proved.
The influence of theological Unitarian
doctrine, as well as Jevons' original training in
engineering, partly explain the contrast in his opinions 
about mathematical symbolism^ as well as his mechanistic- 
technological view on science. The importance of such 
doctrine on Jevons' life is remarked upon by R. Kdnekamp 
(1972). The Unitarian doctrine was influential in the 
British Isles from the mid-19th c. to the early 20th c. 
and it was associated with social idealism and faith in 
scientific progress. This influence explains Jevons' 
trust in the laws of thought "on the habitual use of
which our existence as superior beings depends" (Jevons, 
1870, §10) and his mistrust of reasoning by symbols
alone. The epistemological facet of the Unitarian
doctrine is indeed agnosticism. In so far as thought is 
a superior and divine feature, its laws cannot be known
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by human beings if they are not materially embodied. In 
Jevons (1972, p.202), there is evidence that in 1866 
Jevons had contacts with the Unitarian milieu. However, 
his commitment to agnostic ideas was expressed in 1857 
(Jevons, 1972, pp.154-157) when he wrote against revealed 
religion that:
"God is seen if anywhere in the wonderful 
order and simplicity of Nature, in the 
adaptation of means to ends, and in the creation of man to which everything refers, 
with power capable of indefinite 
improvement,(...)
I feel no conviction of anything because it 
is the Bible and I examine Matter and Mind in 
order to found my conception of God.
I perfectly comprehend everything that may 
be deduced from Nature, as to design, order, 
unity of conception &c of the universe, and I 
confess that both the theory of Chances and 
that of Conditions of existence are perfectly 
inadequate explanations."
This influence on Jevons' views on symbolism must not be 
overestimated, since he considers that symbols belong to 
material phenomena and that knowledge of the laws of 
thought is not out of the reach of human beings . In the 
sentence mentioned above he adds:
"...only well-trained mathematicians could 
ever [if Boole's system were to retain its 
"peculiar mathematical form"] comprehend the 
action of those laws of thought..." (Jevons, 
1870, §10, emphases added).
In addition, the use of machines to solve problems set in 
abstract or symbolic terms is not only a biographical 
feature of Jevons’ work, it is also a general cultural
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feature of both physics and mathematics (cf. Rashed, 
1991).
Furthermore, part of his mistrust of symbolism can be 
explained by pedagogical motives since Jevons was 
concerned with the vulgarisation of scientific ideas, 
both in the Theorv of Political Economy and in pyre 
Logic .^  The theological influence was greater on his 
overview of scientific method, for which he was accused 
of being a materialist (Mays, 1962).
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SECTION 2: SCIENTIFIC PROOF, SCIENTIFIC METHODS
AND ECONCMICS
Jevons’ approach to science was not restricted 
to the view that qualitative algebra (logic) and 
quantitative algebra (mathematics) had a crucial 
heuristic function in science. This view on the method 
of scientific discovery was supplemented by his view on 
what he called the "logical method of science" and the 
"philosophical method of science". Let us consider these 
methods in the exact science of economics or, to use 
contemporary terminology, the empirical science of 
economics.
A science is exact to the extent that a 
confrontation with facts or data is part of the 
assessment and framing of its theories(Jevons, 1871a). 
In this respect. Economics must pay tribute to Cournot 
for grounding his theoretical assumptions on measurable 
observations instead of a priori notions, rather than to 
Canard, Whewell, Esmenard, du Mazet and Du Mesnil-Marigny
did (Jevons, 1879, Preface and Introduction to the second
edition).
The complete logical method of Economics consisted in 
observation, deduction and induction:
"Possessing certain facts of observation, 
we frame an hypothesis as to the laws governing 
those facts; we reason from the hypothesis
deductively to the results to be expected; and 
we then examine these results in connection
with the facts in question; coincidence
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confirms the whole reasoning; conflict obliges 
us either to seek for disturbing causes, or 
else to abandon our hypothesis." (Jevons, 
1871a and 1879, p.19).
Observation involved what we would call
today introspection because the "laws of Economics", also 
called, axioms were: "Known to us immediately by
intuition, or, at any rate, they are furnished to us
ready made by other mental and physical sciences."
(Jevons, 1871a and 1879 p.19).
These laws were valid at the individual and the nation­
wide level. There were three such laws. The first was 
that, confronted with economic choice, it was natural to 
choose the better apparent good. The second was that
there were degrees of fulfilment of wants. The last was
that the time allocated to work and the subjective
experience of pain were proportional. It seems that, 
ideally, the observations were those of an individual, 
and that introspection was a particular case of such an 
observation :
"I must here point out that, though the
theory presumes to investigate the condition of 
a mind, and bases upon this investigation the 
whole of Economics, practically it is an
aggregate of individuals which will be 
treated."(Jevons 1871a and 1879, p.16).
Consequently, Jevons pleaded for the statistical 
appraisal of economic laws alongside results deductively 
obtained from these laws.
According to Jevons, the use of statistics was, it seems, 
a specific feature of the social sciences. It provided
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an answer to specific methodological problems encountered 
in these sciences as opposed to physics. Because social 
facts deal with human action, it is hard to disentangle 
their causes. It is hard therefore to make trustworthy 
predictions to test social theories and to perform 
measurement of social variables. In both of these 
functions, statistical analysis ought to supersede direct 
observation of individuals. Statistical analysis
involved social experimentation. Jevons held the view 
that institutions (e.g. Parliament) were experimental 
instruments for the social sciences and, conversely, that 
institutional measures were an unintentional form of 
social experimentation. Even though observation of 
statistics may reveal regularities in social phenomena 
that do not appear at the individual level, their 
significance was limited. Factors which limited
statistically determined laws, and therefore scientific 
theories, involved large scale social changes, such as 
migration flows and social discontent(Mays, 1962).
Because social phenomena have characteristics 
that differ from physical phenomena, the method of
observation differed in the social sciences and in the 
physical sciences. But the deductive mathematical method 
was common to all empirical sciences:
"Many persons seem to think that the
physical sciences form the proper sphefe of
mathematical method, ' and that the moral 
sciences demand some other method - I know not 
what." (Jevons, Theory of Political Economy, 
quoted from Mays, 1962).
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As far as economics is concerned, one argument Jevons 
puts forward to warrant the use of mathematics and of 
differential calculus in particular, is that economic
quantities are continuous. By continuous, he means that 
they change continuously with time, a position that rests 
on his view that economic phenomena are essentially 
dynamic phenomena.
The general scientific "logical method" was
completed, in economics, by the "philosophical method", 
by which Jevons meant the historical method (Jevons, 
1871a). In his view, any subject-matter had two aspects: 
a logical/formal aspect and a historical aspect(Jevons, 
1864 and Mays, 1962) . Even though he was designated as 
an opponent to the historical method in the 19th
century's methodological controversy about the social
sciences, he was not opposed to it and promoted it as the 
basis for a branch of social science. It is worth
mentioning that, according to Konenkamp(1972) he viewed 
economics as part of anthropology. In addition.
Economics stricto sensus, was only a part of economic 
science :
"As I have previously explained, the 
present chaotic state of Economics arises from 
the confusing together of several branches of 
knowledge. Subdivision is the remedy. We must 
distinguish the empirical elements from the
abstract theory, from applied theory, and from 
the more detailed art of finance and
administration." (Jevons, 1879, pp.xxi-xvii).
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As he subsequently mentioned, one can subdivide 
economic science from a methodological point of view into 
theoretical, empirical, historical and practical 
treatments of the subject-matter. The subdivision may 
well be subject-based (Economic Sociology, Fiscal 
Science, Mathematical Economics). The methodological 
unity of science must however be granted and Jevons 
suggested that the general principles of Mechanics play 
such a unifying role. In addition to the
phenomenological argument (some economic phenomena are 
quantities) and the epistemological argument (calculus 
produces knowledge) for investigating economics 
mathematically and symbolically there was a ’political' 
argument to it. To a certain extent, using coherent and 
unequivocal terminology would eliminate unnecessary 
debates and makes Economics look a more coherent 
subj ect. ■
On the whole, and generalizing from Jevons' 
views, one can interpret the marginalist's advocacy of 
the use of mathematics as follows.
The marginalists who promoted the use of mathematics in 
economic theory identified this use as the most important 
feature that would make Economics a science as opposed 
to a form of Politics in particular. It seems that in 
previous centuries, this identification was not common 
[cf Cheix 1996, note 16). Both Walras and Jevons 
considered that using Mathematics results in separating
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the assessment of political proposals from their 
consistency. In philosophical terms, they believed it 
was a way of removing teleological issues about knowledge 
from the scope of knowledge itself. They were also 
committed to the view that logico-mathematical structures 
could be assessed out of pragmatics, since they believed 
mathematics was 'neutral*.
Retrospectively, one can venture also the following view 
on the motivation of the marginalists for the 
mathematical and 'neutral' approach to economic ideas, 
particularly as applied to utility. The use of utility- 
m.aximisation techniques in order to explain achievable 
levels of social welfare and efficient trade levels, 
provided economists with the means to put forward 
alternative economic systems (e.g. socialism) and 
improvements to existing systems (e.g. by correcting 
market failure) without challenging existing economic and 
political organisations. In this connection, one must 
recall that in the European 19th c. there was a contrast 
between the refinements of Economic science, economic 
prosperity and technological achievements related to the 
industrial revolution on the one hand, and devastating 
poverty on the other.^ Thanks to Mathematics, these 
alternative systems appeared as natural logical results 
or idealized frameworks endowed with authority but with 
no pragmatic consequence attached to them.
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As for Jevons’ view on the use of statistics in economic 
theory, there are, as Professor Reid has suggested to us, 
similarities between these views and later methodological 
views. For example, Jevons’ view that statistics can be
used to assess the conclusions of deductive reasoning was
later used by members of the Chicago School of political 
economy from the mid~1930's onwards. These members were 
Milton Friedman (1912-), George Stigler (1911-), W. Allen 
Wallis, Henry Simon (1899-1946) and Aaron Director. As a 
group, they are known as empiricists, by which it is 
meant that they were in favour of testing economic 
theoretical propositions against statistical data. 
Similarly, the idea that Economics does not consist 
merely in observing phenomena but also in social
experimentation has been developed in the mid-20th c. 
Authors who are referred to in this connection as the 
originators of this approach are F. Hosteller, P. Nogee, 
E. Chamberlin for their studies of market behaviour. 
Later, similar studies were conducted to test game
theoretical analysis. In addition societal
experimentation are conducted in politics on the pattern 
of medical experimentation with control groups and groups 
that are being experimented upon. This is often the case 
in taxation policy.
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SECTION 3: MATHEMATICS IN THE THEORY OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 
SECTION 301: DESCRIPTION
Jevons identified his main achievement in the Theory 
of Political Economy as being the introduction of differential 
calculus into economic theory. However, Breton(1991), 
Etner(1987, pl54) and Theocharis(1993, pp.178-197, esp.196-197) 
show that earlier authors had used marginal reasoning or 
differentials in connection to mathematical analysis 
Breton's(1991) reports on the works of Gustave Fauveau (cf. also 
chapter 1, note 4 ) suggests that this author might have used 
integration and differential calculus before or at the same time 
jevons did. More significantly, Etner(1987) quotes Jules 
Dupuit(1804-1865) who used a differential equation in 1844 in 
his attempt at assessing the utility of the building and the 
use of a bridge. The authors Theocharis mentions are Daniel 
Bernouilli and Paolo Frisi in the 18th c. as well as Georg von 
Buquoy , Charlemagne Courtois and Augustin Cournot in the 19th
cl2. In addition, he mentions von Thünen(1783-1850) as the first
economist who has formulated the mathematical theory of marginal 
productivity, even though he did not touch upon marginal 
utility. He used the idea of the marginal productivity of a 
field in an attempt to work out the maximum revenue one can get 
from a field. And he stated that this problem ought to be seen 
as the mathematical problem of maximizing a function of two 
variables. To judge from Theocharis' (1993) report. Von 
Thiinen did not use the symbolism of differential calculus. It is 
difficult to check this piece of information because, as Hall 
(1966) notices there are many versions of Der 
Isolierte Staat and they are not easily available. 
Generally speaking, the symbolism used in Hall (1966) and
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Von Thünen (1850) falls within the province of
bookkeeping rather than within the province of
differential calculus. However, there are isolated
occurrences of /x + dx/, /dx Æ t  / (Von Thünen, 1850,
{« - f a  +  yly I— 7 r— \/ (Von Thünen, 1850, p.549) and also
(i(a + y)  J
of + - adz = 0 / (Von Thünen, 1850, p.551) in(1 + ^r)
the study of labor in relation to capital and rent. The 
last two expressions, which are used to work out a 
maximisation problem, are explicitly identified with a 
differential functions and their algebraic calculation is 
actually carried out by Von Thünen. According to
Theocharis, Walras, Menger and Jevons did not know the
work of Von Thünen in this connection at the time they 
were building up their own theories, whereas Marshall 
did.
T h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  n o t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  first edition o f  t h e
Theory of Political Economy are "the limit of the
fraction —  fj—  where A refers to finite variation and At dxdu—T- is the differential coefficient of u. They are used dx
in the theories of rent, exchange, utility and labour.
In addition, the first edition contains the ratios
/'•(f +  A / ) - F ( / )  ,  f / A  . .  . ,  ------ ami’—r- in the theory of capital. AccordingA/ dt
to Professor Reid, Jevons got the idea of using 
differentials from his teacher De Morgan at University 
College London. It is clear from Jevons' Journal that
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he studied De Morgan’s lectures thoroughly (Jevons, 1972, 
p.65 and p.69). Provided Boyer(1949) reproduces original 
symbolism (cf. Chapter 4, section 102), Jevons' symbolism 
is that used by Bolzano, except from the notation 'F't'. 
This is confirmed in Vojtech (1948).
In addition to Differential Calculus, Jevons uses
thirteen two-dimensional diagrams. Some diagrams he uses
(Jevons, 1879, pp33-34, p50, p53, p.136, p250, p257,
p279) are of the kind which is usually used nowadays as a
visual representation of Riemanian-integra I of
functions. Even though it is clear, in utility theory at
duleast, that he identifies with a line and u with andx
duarea so as to suggest that u is the integral of —  , hedx
does not use the corresponding symbol of integration 
except in one chapter. Jevons (1879, pp.110-111)
justifies this lacuna as follows;
lacuna as follows:
"The process of integration, if I 
understand the matter aright, only ascertains 
other equations, the truth of which follows
from the fundamental differential equation."
The exception concerns the theory of capital 
(Jevons, 1879, pp252-253) and the calculus of the
total magnitude of repeated investments. He represents 
this total investment with the symbol Zt.Ap and remarks 
that it is 'the customary mode of expression' (Jevons, 
1879, p.252) of total investment. He uses this kind of 
diagram to represent a magnitude that depends on two 
variables which he refers to as 'dimensions'^. Or else
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he uses them to illustrate this reasoning involving 
comparisons between a magnitude and its parts. In 
addition, in one case (Jevons, 1879, p.136) the reasoning 
involves a comparison of two derivatives through the 
comparison of two areas. When time or capital are 
involved as variables in the diagrams he is commenting 
on, Jevons does not justify the extension of his 
reasoning from finite variations of the variables or from 
finite divisions of the variables to infinitesimal ones. 
However, when physical quantities such as food are the 
variables, he does. The argument he gives for considering 
infinitely small quantities of a commodity can be put as 
follows. From an ontological point of view, these 
quantities represent finite quantities. From an
epistemological point of view, the quantities they 
represent are infinitely small compared to the aggregate 
finite magnitude they make up.Jevons uses another diagram 
to represent the exchange of two commodities, even if he 
remarks that: "It is hardly possible to represent this
theory completely by means of a diagram."(Jevons, 1879, 
p.104).
Two diagrams are also used by Jevons (1879, p.156) to 
represent the "functions of utility"< of commodities in 
the theory of exchange as the area under a curve. In the 
theory of labour, the utility of producing labour and the 
utility of the corresponding output are compared 
geometrically on a diagram(Jevons, 1879, p.187). The 
theory of rent is similarly illustrated but the reasoning
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on the diagram(Jevons, 1879, p238) involves comparisons 
of derivatives. The Theory of Political Economy contains 
one geometrical figure (Jevons, 1879, p251) in the theory 
of capital. It is an isosceles triangle. It is used 
together with a reference to Euclid's Elements to justify 
the choice of relevant magnitudes in the calculus of 
investment.
Finally, the Theory of Political Economy contains a 
figure that illustrates the mechanical theory of the 
lever (1879, p.114).
In addition, the book contains numerical examples and 
tables. One of the tables is referred to in the 
literature (cf. Stigler, 1994) as the King-Davenant Law 
and it relates the price of corn to the harvest sizes. 
Jevons (1879, pp.169-174 works out a function that 
approximates the data of the table. In the theory of 
utility, there is an analysis of what we would call today 
'expected utility'. In this analysis, Jevons uses 
probabilities that refer to the uncertainties of nature 
that might be estimated(Jevons, 1879, p.77-80). This 
analysis is not an attempt at introducing probability 
calculus into economic theory. It is instead an attempt 
at showing how practical economic problems actually dealt 
with calculus (e.g. insurance problems in maritime 
business which Bicquilley (1804) had also dealt with, cf. 
chapters section 202), are consistent with the theory of
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SECTION 302: SEMIOTIC ANALYSIS OF THE ANALOGY OF THE
LEVER
In this subsection, we are concerned with 
defining isotopies in the Theory of Political Economy 
along the lines defined above (cf. Chapter 2, section 2 ) 
and with studying their relationships both within the 
text itself and in the light of the historical context 
(cf. Chapter 3 , Chapter 4). We shall focus on the 
'Theory of Exchange' (Jevons, 1879, Chapter 4) in 
particular because in this chapter, one of the most 
important semiotic functions of the text is defined. 
This function consists in giving àn economic content to 
symbols used in differential calculus. It is important 
with regard both to the historiography of economic 
thought and to Jevons' explicit purposes (cf. Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5- , Section 101). Evidence supporting this 
latter point are Jevons' introduction of the 'Analogy to 
the Theory of the Lever' in the second edition in order 
to reinforce this connection.
The first isotopy we shall identify is the 
'notational and graphic isotopy'. We shall give an 
ostensive and non-comprehensive definition of it. The 
following are notations: /AA'/, /P/, / ^  /»D D d L
/ ^  / , m ,  / /, /PxArcAA'/, /4>i(a-x)/.
Notations are a subclass of expressions, they contain 
typographical designs that do not belong to the 
vernacular alphabet, or else they are isolated letters
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with no obvious grammatical function. In Jevons*
explicit terminology, notations are called 'symbols *. 
Amongst the figures are graphs of functions and also a 
diagram representing a lever moving away from equilibrium 
(cf. Chapter 5, Section 301).
The second isotopy is the 'economic isotopy'. It is 
defined by the redundancy of expressions belonging to
economic vocabulary in vernacular contemporary English.is 
Such expressions are /commodities/, /utility/, 
/exchange/, /market/, /supply/, /demand/.
The third isotopy is the 'mechanical isotopy'. It is 
defined by the redundancy of expressions which: (a)
Jevons identifies as belonging to mechanics, by quoting 
and paraphrasing books from this corpus; (b) occur in
'Analogy to the Theory of the Lever' (Jevons, 1899,
pp.110-115). Such expressions are /fulcrum/, /force/, 
/the law of energy/, /resistance/, /Theory of virtual 
velocities/, /the work done by P equals P x arc AA'/,
/the angle of ACA'/, /finite arcs/, /work/,
1  AA' AC  ^/perpendicular to/, /—  = %%; = ---;/.P BB BC
The fourth isotopy is the mathematical isotopy', it is
defined by the redundancy of expressions that are used in
contemporary mathematics, such as: /equations/,
/integration/, /differential equations/,
/infinitesimals/, /the angle ACA'/, /perpendicular to/,
AA' AC/finite arcs/, /algebraic sum/, /—  ^=  / as well asBB' BC
graphsiG.
181
Emergence of Mathematical
 ^ Economics: The Case of Jevons
The 'notational isotopy’ concerns the level of 
expression, the ’economic isotopy' and the 'mathematical 
isotopy' concern the level of content. The 'mechanical 
isotopy' concerns both the level of expression and the 
level of content. It is defined indeed both by the 
occurrence of expressions in a particular extract of the 
text, and also by the membership of the corpus of 
mechanics, which gives a specific content to these 
expressions. It can be considered that this isotopy is a 
non-vernacular extra-textual semiotic function^\ All 
isotopies are explicit isotopies. The identification of 
the first three isotopies requires no additional ability 
than knowledge of vernacular language. That of the 
'mathematical isotopy' however, requires specialised 
mathematical knowledge.
The mathematical isotopy is directly connected 
to all other isotopies. Its connection with the 
•mechanical isotopy' is part and parcel of the semiotic 
function defining this isotopy in other words, it is, for 
Jevons himself, a legacy from the history of p h y s i c s . i* 
Jevons defines the connection between the mathematical 
and the economic isotopy by using figures and symbolism 
to represent his arguments. Avowedly, the connection 
between these arguments and geometrical figures is 
partial, whereas it seems that he considers that their 
connection with symbols is comprehensive. As far as the 
connection between the 'notational' and the mathematical 
isotopy is concerned, we showed that it is to Jevons a
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legacy of the history of mathematics (cf. Chapter 4, and 
Chapter 5, Section 301).
The connection between the 'mechanical isotopy' and the
'economic isotopy' is achieved at the level of expression
with the use of vernacular expressions; /equilibrium/
and /body/ and also with the use of one notational 
expression in particular: . dy y , ./ —  = _z_ = 4. / in the two<f>y dx X
isotopies. We shall now analyse the.role of this latter.
At the mechanical isotopy levels, d>y is
defined as the ratio of two finite forces applied at the
ends of a lever (1879, pp.113-114). According to the
diagram used by Jevons (1879, p.114), he considers that
these forces are functions of the position of the 
dy is a ratio of finite or infinitely smallfulcrum. d.x
displacements AA' and BB' (1879, pp.111-113) IS a
ratio defining the position of the fulcrum (1879, p.113).
In / —  /, [ = ] is the lav/ of energy (1879, p.111).dx
In / —  / [“ ] is the law of virtual velocity (1879,dx X
pp. 112-113) , that is, the proportionality of the
finite or infinitely small arcs (Arc%a) of a circle to
the radius (R) (1879, pp.112-113). In modern
trigonometric terminology, [=] is the equation ArcR=aR.
cD;c"’ is the ratioIn the 'economic isotopy'.
of finite, final utilities of the quantities x and y of
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the goods exchanged (1879, p.113). i-S explicitly a
ratio of exclusively infinitesimal quantities of thercommodities exchanged (1879, pp.113-114). —  is the
ratio of the final and finite quantities exchanged (1879,
p.114). ■ In / - ^  = —  /, [ = ] is the "general form" of theOjc dx
definition of economic equilibrium (1879, p.104 and
p.113). In / —  = —  /, [ = ] is the Law of Indifference
dx X
(1879, p.103 and p.114). This law may be called the 
'unique price hypothesis'. It states that on a market 
with perfect knowledge, no parts of given quantities of 
homogenous commodities can be exchanged in a ratio 
different from the ratio of the given quantities. Hence 
Jevons defines not only term by term correspondences 
between the equation of the notational isotopy on the one 
hand, and the mechanical and economic isotopies on the 
other hand; but he also defines correspondences between 
[ = ] at the notational level (i.e. the rule of 
substitution of symbols) and scientific laws. These 
correspondences imply a third implicit correspondence 
between the mechanical and the economic isotopies: (a)
The idea of a 'force' and that of the 'utility' of a good 
(or 'value') play similar roles. ’ - This is a point 
Mirowski (1990) has justly noticed about 19th c. neo­
classical analysis in general. (b) Similarly, may
be considered at the characteristic feature of the 
phenomenon (machine, exchange) which is analysed. (c) As
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Tdy-xfar as —  is concerned, the correspondence is less
clear, which is confirmed by Jevons’ subsequent 
alteration of the first edition and we shall go back to 
it l a t e r . ( d )  The trigonometric law used in mechanics 
corresponds to the Law of Indifference. However, in the 
economic isotopy, this law, as Schabas (1990, pp.39-40} 
notices, is specifically an economic law, whereas in the 
'mechanical isotopy', it is a mathematical law as well.2° 
(0 ) It could be argued that the correspondence between the economic law 
o f  equilibrium and the 'law of energy' l i m i t e d
At the mechanical isotopy level, there is a slight 
terminological shift in the application of this law to 
finite quantities (law of energy) and in the application 
of this law to infinite quantities (law of virtual 
velocity). This shift does not occur in the economic 
isotopy.
Consequently, the correspondence between the expressions
Ot dy yof the equation / / at the economic and at0 ,)^ dx X
the mechanical level is not a perfect substitution 
process. We shall now analyse this limitation in the 
above case (c) in particular.
Jevons definitely maintains that is a
ratio of infinitesimal distances. He does not identify 
dv-7- with a differential coefficient, nor with a virtual t/.rj
velocity coefficient, or to use his terminology. ÈLdx I S
18;
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not an "abstract number" (1879, p.90). However from a
contemporary standpoint, the physical and trigonometric
laws he uses involve such abstract numbers.21 At the
economic isotopy level on the contrary, even though
Jevons (1871b, p.93) claims that "the ratio of exchange 
dy']-7- is really a differential coefficient", he expounds dx J
his economic theory in such a way that at first glance,
it does not seem to use differentials nor infinitesimals.
For example, he confirms criticisms addressed to him that
he does not use the integration process associated with
differentials (1879, p.110). He also heavily stresses
both implicitly and explicitly that the use of
infinitesimals can be avoided (1879, respectively p.114
and pp.106-108). In addition, he uses finite increments
of quantities of goods exchanged when he first expounds
the symbolic treatment of the theory of exchange (1879,
pp.106-107) in such a way that the introduction in the
subsequent passage (1879, pp.107-108) of /dx/ and /dy/ is
not convincing at first. It seems that /Ax/ and /Ay/,
which stand for finite quantities throughout the text,
could be used just as well. No new element is added to
the equilibrium principle used in the passage where /Ax/
and /Ay/ are used, when it is applied in the passage
where /dx/ and /dy/ are used. Consequently, it can be
dyconsidered that Oy dx is the generalisation of the
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(j)jf Ayequation —  = —  (which Jevons states in words only) to <t>y Ax
infinite quantities, on an exclusively symbolic basts.
Following this interpretation, it can be argued that the
formalism of differential calculus is redundant and that
it only aims at making the law of exchange literally look
like the law of mechanics. To summarize this argument,
it could be pointed out that Jevons does not consider 
dythat / -7- / in an indivisible expression or a singular dx
concept, but that it is the compound of /dx/ and /dy/.
In this connection, it can be argued that there is no
dyproper economic concept corresponding to that of dx in
the mechanical isotopy (i.e. that of velocity).
However, there is also evidence that Jevons 
(1879, pp.106-108) used two mathematical properties of a 
"utility function" which first are not consistent with 
the definition he gives of utility, and secondly, are two 
mathematical features defining the idea of the 
differential of a function according to today's 
standards. On these grounds, it can be argued that the 
mathematical entity occurring in this extract is the 
differential of the utility function. These properties 
are (a) that it is linear with respèct to the second 
variable; (b) that according to Jevons, the (total) 
utility U of a good is not separable from the exchange of 
a finite quantity x of this good. Consequently, in the 
following quotation, the two occurrences of /utility/ do 
not refer to the same function.
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y"Now the increment of beef, Ay, is —  times
X
as great as the increment of corn, Ax, so that, in order that their utilities shall be equal,ythe degree of utility of beef must be ^  times
as great as the degree of utility of corn." (Jevons, 1879, p.107).
If it were the same function, in order to be correct,
Jevons’ reasoning would imply that the utility function
is linear with respect to scalar multiplication. It
would also imply that this function is not dependent on
the fixed quantity exchanged. /U(Ax)/ would indeed refer
both to the utility of an increment Ax in the exchange of
X and also the utility of the exchange of Ax) .f-
Similarly, we consider that (a-x) . dy = ViY* dx is
an equality between differentials: given the initial
endowments and zero of the individual 1 in the two good
exchanged, given his utility functions Qj and for each
good, the equilibrium of exchange occurs for the
quantities x and y of these goods such that daQ^ (x) = dgvy % (y) 
where duf(t) is the value at point t of the
differential of f at u.^^
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
 ^ However, Zylberberg(1990) and Zouboulakis (1993) suggest that as 
far as France is concerned the case did not differ from the British.
2 According to R.D. Collison-Black (1970), Jevons received Walras' 
Principes d'une Théorie Mathématique de l'Échange in 1874. The 
latter helped the former with the compilation of the bibliography on 
mathematical economics. (Jevons, 1879, Preface to the second 
edition). ,
2 R. KôneKamp (1972) reports that Jevons wrote a 'notice of a 
general mathematical theory of political economy'in 1862. She 
probably means the drafts of Jevons' (1866) article. R. Kdnekamp 
adds that in 1857, Jevons was to write on 'Formal Economics', a 
study of which there is no trace.
 ^ He mentions that in the literature, utility either means
numerical ratio, mental state or mass of commodities. Value either 
means value in exchange or in use.
 ^ This view is identical to G. Boole's belief that the Algebraic 
Calculus can be applied to disentangling theological controversies. 
He applied it indeed to the analysis of Clarke and Spinoza's work,
(cf. An Investigation into the Laws of Thought, on Which are Founded 
the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities. Dover 
Publication, 1854).
® In this view, Universal Arithmetic does not recognise essentially
negative quantities. This explains why in the second edition of the
Theory of Political Economy, he adds comments on the appearance of 
negative values in Economic Calculus.
These formula are commonly used in contemporary binary logic and 
also in mathematics as in integration theory and probability theory, 
'a' and 'b ' stand for propositions. '1-a' is the negation of the 
proposition 'a'; it is also written '-a' in contemporary logic. The 
negation operator '-' is defined by the truth-table:
a 0 1
“ia 1 0
'a + b ' stands for proposition ' a or b ' (inclusive); 
written 'a v b' in contemporary formal logic. The '+' 
defined by the truth-table:
it is also 
operator is
b'
Consequently the two formula do not have the same truth-table.
In the first formula, 'a and b' can not be true at the same 
time, whereas it is possible in the second formula.
® This machine was constructed in 1869 and in 1962 it was displayed 
at the History of Science Museum in Oxford according to W. Mays 
(Mays, 1962).
 ^ Cf. Jevons' own words (Jevons, 1879) and J. Passemore (1966, 
p.130).
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The political argument in favour of the use of Mathematics in 
Economics may appear today as a response to thé challenge facing 
Economics at a time when other social sciences began to be 
institutionalised and to compete with Economics (cf. chapter 3, 
section 1 ).
 ^^ It seems that one of the main subject matter discussed by 
philosophers in the last two decades of the 19thC. in connection to 
Economic science was precisely this discrepancy (cf. The Monlst, 
vol.l to 6 and also chapter 8, section 1§4).
Some details on these authors can be found in Theocharis(1993) 
and in Theocharis. 1988. 'C. Courtois: an early contributor to
cost-benefit analysis', History of Political Economy, 20, pp.265- 
273.
However, Von Thünen's writings as well as their translation into 
French occur in the bibliography on mathematical economics which 
Jevons (1879, Appendix I, pp.301-310) attached to the second edition 
of the Theory of Political Economy.
For a. retrospective mathematical analysis of this aspect of 
Jevons' thought see Reid (1972).
 ^^  The criticism could be addressed to us that the 'economic 
isotopy' ought to depend on 19th c. vernacular English categories 
instead of 20th c. categories. However, the linguistic analysis 
which this definition would imply is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. This limitation is not as great a lacuna as it may seem at 
first sight. The first reason is that, the economic expressions we 
are concerned with belong both to the 19th c. and 20th c. economic 
lexica since in particular, the corpus of Neo-classical economics to 
which this text belongs, is a general feature of 20th c. economics 
(cf. Chapter 2, Section 1). The second reason is that even though 
we do not study 19th c. economic lexica, we replace 19th c. 
economics into 19th c. context (cf. Chapter 3, Chapter 4).
 ^^  The criticism could also be addressed to us that 19 th c. 
mathematical categories ought to be used to define the 'mathematical 
isotopy ' . The same answers hold here as that provided about the 
'economic isotopy' (cf. previous note). First, the use of 19th c. 
categories is out of the scope of this thesis; and secondly 20th c. 
mathematical categories are grounded on 19th c. mathematics (cf. 
Joseph et al (1994)). In addition, we believe that, generally
speaking, the reading of mathematical texts is de facto
anachronistic since it relies significantly on the knowledge of 
contemporary mathematics.
Contrary to what is the case in the other text we analyse (cf. 
Chapter 6) it seems impossible to define a 'theoretical isotopy' 
that differs from the general semiotic function of the text.
18 Furthermore, it is considered in the History of Science that the 
bridging-in of connections between Geometry in particular and 
Physics is a defining feature of classical mechanics. This 
connection consisted both in considering physical space as a 
Euclidean space and in considering constructions and mechanical 
devices as providing solutions to geometrical problems (cf. Blanche, 
1969; Grosholz, 1991; Holland, 1991). In addition, in Antiquity,
according to Lefebre (1995) the analysis of the motions of the
planets was often carried out on the pattern of the analysis of
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THE CONSOLIDATION OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS: THE CASE OF DEBREU
The Consolidation of Mathematical
Economics: The Case of Debreu
"Rappelez-vous tout simplement qu'entre les hommes il n'existe que deux relations: la logique ou la guerre. Demandez' toujours des preuves, la preuve est la politesse élémentaire qu'on se doit. Si l'on refuse, souvenez-vous, que vous êtes attaqués, et qu'on va vous faire obéir par tous les moyens. Vous serez pris par la douceur ou par le charme de n'importe quoi, vous serez passionnés par la passion d'un autre.
P .  Valéry, Monsier Teste quoted
fro m  F. Rivenc, Introduction à la Locriaue. 1989.
"'Operations research' was born of the conditions of modern warfare; timidly undertaken in the First World War, it was widely developed in the second. The utilization of enormous means, and the manifestly economic character of the key factors of war, gave rise to the idea of a scientific treatment of military operations, which would provide commanders with the elements needed for rational decisions. It wasoriginally in a very abstract and in large measure still speculative form that operational problems were approached. During the Great War a British officer, Lanchester. studied the advantages of the concentration of forces, on a very summary mathematical model of the modern battle where a 'rate of exchange’ measuring the relations of the average enemy losses appears as a unique parameter. In such an attempt one could see only the episodic and otherwise rough application of habits of scientific thought to the complex phenomena where man isinvolved. What is more/ the on-going practice ofengineers has no doubt always involved attempts toformulate problems of this type. But until the Second World War, this was only a side-issue of knowledge: operation research developed and assembled a body of methods and knowledge from what had previously been only sporadic practices, stimulating the formation ofspecialities, learned societies, journals . . . and consumers. The development of operations research certainly poses a psycho-sociological problem whose data are closely tied to technical progress and to theeconomic and social conditions of our time."
Granger Pensée Formelle et Sciences de l'Homme 1960, translated by Alexander Rosenberg.
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INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we are concerned with Debreu's 
Theory of Value from the external history perspective as 
well as from the semiotic perspective. In the first 
section a picture is given of how mathematical economics 
was viewed in the 1950s. This picture is based on the 
economic literature of that period. In the second 
section, definitions of 'axiomatisation', 'formalisation' 
and 'mathematization' are provided in a semiotic 
perspective in an attempt to substantiate the criticism 
of mathematical economic theory raised in the 1950s and 
still addressed today i.e. that mathematical formalism is 
'empty'. The third section focuses exclusively on the 
Theory of Value. A genealogical presentation of its 
concepts and of its methods is given as well as a 
theoretical exegesis using semiotic concepts.
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SECTION 1: POST-WORLD WAR TWO VISION OF
MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 
SECTION 1@1. ACCEPTANCE
In contrast to the marginalist revolution (cf
Chapter 5, Chapter 6 ) and to the pre-1950s in France the
activity of mathematical economics in the post-World War 
Two has become widespread. More economists and 
scientists in general are familiar with it and interested 
in it, than was the case in the 19th c. and at the 
beginning of the 20th c. Evidence of this familiarity 
and this interest, can be found in Allais (1949).
According to Allais (1949, p.63, note 1) a study was
carried out by M. Frechet in connection with the results 
of an international study published in the journal of the 
Institut International de Statistique in 1946. This 
international survey was conducted into the international 
scientific milieu. Its aim was to bring out the 
potential achievements, and the limitations of the use, 
of mathematics in the study of economic and social 
phenomena.
Further evidence that scientists were familiar with 
mathematical economics is that some mathematical theses 
presented at this time dealt with economic problems. 
This is true of André Nataf's thesis published in 1954 on 
the problems of aggregation in econometrics.% The 
examining committee, consisted of mathematicians, M. 
Frechet and A. Lichnerowicz amongst others. At the time
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of the marginalist revolution mathematicians were also 
aware of mathematical economics. However, Zylberberg 
(1990) shows that as far as French mathematicians are 
concerned, they displayed little interest in its 
development.
After the World War Two era, not only were mathematicians 
interested in the social sciences in general but social 
scientists were using Mathematics as well. To illustrate 
this statement, on June, 24th 1959, the first Stanford
Symposium on mathematical methods used in the social
sciences was held.3 The sciences involved were
economics, management science and psychology.
At that time, it was not clear whether
economics and the social sciences had developed 
mathematics of their own or whether they were using the 
mathematics used in physics.
On the one hand, Koopmans (1957) held the view that since 
the mid-1930s the mathematics used in the social sciences 
had separated from the mathematics used in physics. He 
mentioned two mathematical concepts of the social 
sciences that have no equivalent in physics: the concept
of preferences, in utility theory; and the concept of a 
strategic game. 'The development of mathematics specific 
to the social sciences is also what Morgenstern and Von 
Neumann were aiming to do (Morgenstern et al, 1944) . On
the other hand, Sebba (1953)'s report on the state of 
mathematical economics qualifies Koopmans’ (1957)
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assessment. Sebba (1953) similarly pinpoints the 1920s 
and the 1930s as a critical period in the history of the 
mathematization of economics. He states that
mathematization concerns a small part of economic theory 
but that it has generated "new thought" about economic 
theorising. Sebba (1953) identifies this new thought as 
an attempt to make models in economics on the pattern of 
"physical world models". In particular, he remarks that 
the view that economic science ought to be predictive 
developed together with the mathematization of economics. 
Predictiveness, he continues, is a feature of the 
assessment of knowledge in the natural sciences. One can 
retrospectively identify this new thought in economic 
literature, as in Morgenstern et al (1944), as well as in
the historiography and the methodology of economic 
thought, as in Friday (1950). (cf Chapter 5, Section 2, 
® 1 ; Part III) .
Koopmans (1957), identifies the mathematical 
tools used in economics in the 1950s. He mentions 
diagrams, which have long been used in economics, and are 
still heavily used. In addition, he remarks that from 
the mid-l930s, the analysis of the • variations of 
functions and linear programming as well as topology, 
symbolic logic and game theory have been used. At that 
time, mathematics was conceived both as a conceptual help 
to conduct reasoning as a device for clarifying and 
defining concepts, as in Koopmans (1957) and Morgenstern
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et al (1944), and as an empirical observational
technique, as in the econometric tradition. It is not 
clear whether Mays (1962, p.233) is right when he remarks 
that : "(...)there would seem to be a tendency in modern
economics to concentrate more on descriptive statistics, 
trying to disentangle economic tendencies without the aid 
of deductive models". Other authors such as Sebba (1953) 
consider, indeed, that the development of mathematical 
economics (as in econometrics) makes the difference 
between emprico-descriptive economics and conceptual- 
theoretical economics superfluous. In this connection he 
remarks that :
"The new theory is driving towards full mathematization, not because of the advantages of mathematical over literary presentation, but because mathematization is the proper form of purely quantitative theory. It is driving towards predictiveness, not because of the supposed usefulness of economic prediction, but because a non-predictive quantitative science is non-verifiable. It is driving towards rigor and abstractness, not because it wants to escape logical and historical fallacies, but because rigor and abstractness are the essence of mathematical structures and the source of their explanatory power. In short, the new theory is what it is because it understands the true nature of a quantitative science and accepts what inevitably follows." (Sebba, 1953, p.263)
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8ECTTON 1«2: ASSESSMENT
Even though mathematical economics was accepted 
amongst scientists by the 1950s, it was also critically 
assessed. Koopmans (1957, p.172) refers to: "The lively
round of discussion of the role of mathematics in
economics that we have witnessed in the last ten years". 
He makes reference to relevant discussions of this in 
economic journals (Koopmans, 1957, note l, p.172). His 
argument is amplified by the following additional, and 
independent, evidence which validates his view on the
reception of mathematical economics in the post-World War 
Two historical context.
One issue at stake in these debates is the "empirical 
foundation" of economic theories This is also referred
to as the 'realism' of economic theories. General
Equilibrium analysis was an important target in the
discussion of mathematical economics as Shackle's (1958) 
criticism shows. He condemned this theory mainly for not 
being useful, in a pragmatic sense, and for leaving out 
the dynamic character of economic phenomena. According 
to Ahmed (1993), the renewal of interest in general 
equilibrium analysis occurred in the 1930s and 1940s,
that is, prior to the 1950s discussions we are concerned 
with. As we shall now see many epistemological views 
were involved in this discussion as was the case in 
previous centuries in the debate about the conflict
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between mathematical economics and human freedom (cf. 
Chapters , section 2 ® 2 . chapter 3 , n o t e 6 ’ /•
Friedman (1952) is well known for having 
contributed to this discussion, and his position in this 
debate, as many authors in the methodology of economics 
literature have pointed out (e.g. Caldwell, 1982) is not 
settled. For example, there is a contrast between his 
advocacy of anti-realism in the article entitled "The 
Methodology of Positive Economics" (Friedman, 1952) and 
his criticism of Oskar Lange's mathematical hypotheses. 
He proceeds from the grounds that Lange's hypotheses are 
not realistic in the article entitled "Lange on Price 
Flexibility and Employment: a Methodological Criticism"
(Friedman, 1953a). Yet in the first article Friedman 
maintains the view, when he discusses the theory of the 
firm, that assumptions in economic theory about the 
motivation of economic agents could be 'unrealistic'. By 
this, he meant that assumed motivation could differ from 
actual motivation . In the second article, he argues 
that formalised assumptions ought to be 'realistic' in 
the sense of corresponding to what we have called 
economic 'communal sense' (cf. Cheix 1996, Section 4 ). 
On the one hand, he considers that, an hypothesis, which 
he identifies with a theory, is a "conceptual world" so 
that there seems to be nothing in Friedman's view against 
the idea that mathematics can provide an admissible 
economic theory. On the other hand, he strongly
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criticises Lange's "abstract economic world" in the
following terms: "The theory [proposed by Lange]
provides formal models of imaginary worlds, not 
generalisation about the real world." (Friedman, 1953a).
There are two aspects in Friedman's apparently 
contradictory views on the realism of economic
hypotheses. One is the epistemological view that
economic 'communal sense' (cf. Cheix 1996, Section 4 )
supplies economic theory with both its concepts and its 
validation. It provides the theory with its concepts 
and assumption, according to Friedman in that it
considers a theory to consist of a kind of Mendeleiev's 
nomenclature for economic phenomena. Economic communal 
sense also provides the theory with its validation since 
one of Friedman's arguments for supporting the 
antirealist view is that if economic agents do not use it 
in economic life, they won't "succeed". In this
connection, Gutierrez (1966) remarks that Friedman's 
argument is ad hoc and that it is not a logical
argument .^
The other aspect of Friedman's view on the cognitive 
status of economic hypothesis has been explored in
rational expectation analysis since then, and it can be 
considered in two ways. Either it bears the following 
meta-theoretical epistemological interpretation: to
assert a theory about human behaviour involves asserting 
that knowledge of the theory implies behaving according
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to the theory. Or the other interpretation of his view 
concerns gnosiolocfy and praxeology, rather than
methodology. This interpretation would be that knowledge 
of the means to achieve an end and, having the intention 
to achieve this end, implies the use of this means.
'Realism’, in Sebba’s (1953) conception, 
conveys two meanings. One can be expressed in terms of 
the  actual use of theories in econom ic  actions . In this connection, 
Sebba considers that the mathematical theory of 
programming such as Leontieff's, provides a more 
realistic view of the firm than the traditional theory of 
the firm because it has been actually used in 
international economic life.
In its second sense, realism of a theory means that it is 
comprehensive, and not that it is pragmatically used. In 
this connection, Sebba considers that game theory is more 
realist than other theories because it accounts for the 
relations of power between economic agents which other 
theories leave out.
As for Morgenstern et al (1944) and Von
Neumann, it seems that in their view the "empirical 
foundation" of mathematical economics refers either to 
reliable statistical data, or, when it refers to axioms, 
to being in harmony with communal sense. The same idea 
is expressed in Shackle (1958, p.91):
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"(...) our premises must bear some recognisable likeness 
to our impressions of the world which we wish to explain, 
the world which our theory is about."
Koopmans (1957) explains what he terms the 
"empirical void" of mathematical economics by pointing 
out that its lack of empirical foundation arises in part 
from one feature of mathematics, namely that mathematical 
symbols have no natural meaning. Consequently, to say 
that mathematical economic formalism is empirically void 
is just to say that it is formal.
I n  A E R ( 1 9 5 3 )  i t  w a s  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  a t  t h a t  t i m e  t h e r e  
were two answers to the lack of empirical foundations for 
mathematical formalism in economics. One was that 
logico-mathematical existence theorems provide formalism 
with some content.5 The other, which we would identify 
today as Popper's falsification criterion, is to show
with an example that the theory can be proved wrong. T h e
d e b a t e  a b o u t  t h e  r e a l i s m  o f  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r i e s  i s  s t i l l  l i v e l y  t o d a y  (  c f .  
c h a p t e r  2 .  n o t e  1 1 ) .
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SECTION 2: LOGICAL STRUCTURES OF THEORIES
SECTION 2®lt.AXIOMATISATION AND FORMALISATION
In epistemological terms 'axiomatisation' 
applies to a sustained development of knowledge, or in 
equivalent descriptive terms, it applies to a piece of 
discourse. The defining feature of axiomatised discourse 
is that it contains explicit information about the 
logical status of the statements it uses. In other 
words, axiomatisation consists in compartmentalising the 
statements in a text. These statements may be identified 
as postulates, hypotheses, definitions, theorems or 
results. Inferential rules are those of intuitive logic, 
that is, they are left unspecified. The identification 
of the logical status of statements may be expressed 
using the means which grammar naturally provides or, 
using special statements which may be called 'meta­
statements' in common language. Alternatively, it may be 
expressed by other signs which may be simply 
typographical. Axiomatisation does not necessarily imply 
the use of mathematical or logical formalism. However, 
if one has specific views on the foundations of 
mathematics, axiomatisation may imply the use of 
mathematical formalism. For example, if one considers 
that mathematical inference is the same as that of 
intuitive logic, and if one considers that intuitive 
logical categories are revealed in mathematical 
categories, then one can hold the view that
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axiomatisation is essentially mathematical. in
particular, following this line of thought, mathematical 
proofs and results are valid in axiomatic systems. We 
shall call this kind of axiomatisation ’mathematical 
axiomatisation', This view on axiomatisation is that of 
Debreu in the Theory of Value.
As opposed to the axiomatisation of a piece of 
reasoning, its formalisation necessarily requires that 
two different semiotic systems be involved. In
axiomatisation, signs are needed to identify the logical 
status of statements, but it is not necessary that they 
form a logical system with specific inference rules. It 
is usually considered that formalisation consists of 
interpreting a piece of reasoning expressed with specific 
symbols governed by specific rules for constructing texts 
and specific inference rules, namely the formal 
structure. To this is applied another symbolic system, 
namely 'interpretation', which we shall call instead the 
'object-system' to avoid confusing it with the linguistic 
acceptation of 'interpretation'. However, in this thesis 
we shall take up an even broader definition of 
formalisation.
Here, formalisation is regarded as the interpretation of 
a piece of reasoning expressed in one semiotic system by 
another semiotic system. With this definition, it is 
meaningful to regard the formal structure as defined 
previously as a formalisation of the object-theory and
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also to regard the object-theory as a formalisation of 
the formal structure. This unorthodox view aims at 
pointing out that formal structures are constructed first 
and foremost in an ad hoc fashion in relation to one 
particular object-system. In this sense, the formal 
structure is an interpretation of this object-system.
For example, Spinoza's Ethics provides an 
example of non-formal and non-mathematical axiomatised 
discourse, and Boole's algebraic reading of Spinoza's 
text (cf. Chapter 6, note 5) provides an example of a 
formal and mathematical analysis. The definition of 
axiomatisation and formalisation we adopt in this thesis 
is compatible with Stigum's (1990) view on William Nassau 
Senior's Outline of the Science of Political Economy 
(1836). Stigum (1990) considers that Senior's book is 
the first to introduce the axiomatic method in economics. 
At the same time, however, he points out that Senior was 
opposed to the idea that economics was a formal science. 
A third illustration of our definition of axiomatisation 
and formalisation is Debreu's Theory of Value. We shall 
identify it as a formalisation of general equilibrium 
analysis within the mathematical system. It goes beyond 
mere axiomatisation in that it uSes mathematics, 
especially topology, as a system of inference. It does 
so in the sense that a topological proof is considered to 
provide valid economic proof of the existence of general 
equilibrium.
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Finally, Mahieu (1989) provides a formalisation of 
Sraffa's axiomatised theory of value in orthodox, non­
contradictory, homogenous deductive logic as well as in 
deontic logic.
It is worth recalling at this stage that by 
mathematics, we mean a particular semiotic system amongst 
other systems which has rules of inference and signs that 
do not belong to common language, amongst other systems. 
By rules,w e  d o  n o t  m e a n  ’ r u l e s  of thought' as in a Bolean 
perspective on Algebraic Calculus, nor the logical 
foundation of mathematics, as in the perspective of 
Debreu. Instead, 'rules' are to be understood in a 
historical and pragmatic sense. The mathematical rules 
of inference we are referring to concern the pragmatic 
handling of mathematical symbols. We consider this 
handling to be regulated inasmuch as historically, one 
preoccupation of mathematics has been with, the 
definition and expression of these r u l e s . 6
Given this view on mathematics, we consider that 
mathematical formalisation is a particular case of 
formalisation.
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SECTION 2@2: AXIOMATIC AND FORMAL EMPTINESS; GENERAL
POINTS
From the outset, it is clear that neither 
axiomatised discourses nor formalised discourses as they 
have been defined previously (Chapter 7, Section 2@1) 
'say something about the real world’. Instead, they 'say 
something about knowledge'. In semiotic terms, they are 
concerned with saying something about a system of 
expression of the continuum, rather than with saying 
something about this continuum itself.? Let us
illustrate this view with the following interpretation of 
the Euclidean, axiomatisation of Geometry. Before the 
development of non-Euclidean geometries. Geometry was 
considered, it seems, as 'saying something' about 
physical space and about its properties as they were 
perceived visually by a normal human being. In the 
Elements however, Euclid's message does not concern 
physical space. Instead it concerns its geometrical 
representation. He identifies geometrical objects such 
as points and lines. He also identifies which properties 
of these objects are dependent on their being taken as 
representation of physical space and which properties are 
not dependent on this representation.
To the extent that they refer to knowledge, axiomatised 
and formalised discourses can be considered to be void. 
This is a drawback only if one considers that knowledge 
of knowledge, knowledge of the limitations of knowledge,
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and knowledge of its ‘subjectivity, cannot contribute to 
"knowledge of the phenomena". What is at stake in this 
first kind of void is a definition of knowledge. This is 
why we identify it as a gnosiological problem.
The other kind of void we shall now identify in 
formalised or axiomatised discourses does n o t . involve a 
theory of knowledge. Instead it concerns the
idiosyncratic conditions necessary for a text to have a 
meaning. More specifically, it concerns the knowledge, 
or the cultural experience, which helps the reader for 
understanding a text. In this case, axiomatised 
discourses are said to be void in the sense that the 
discourse which is axiomatised is void; It also occurs 
when formalised discourses are said to be void, in the 
sense that the object-system is void. For example, a 
blind person may find that the geometry of Euclid is void 
as well as previous geometrical texts because this person 
is lacking the visual experience upon which this geometry 
is based. Similarly, equation systems used in formal 
general economic equilibrium analysis may seem void to an 
individual belonging to a community with a non-market and 
non-monetary economy. This is so, not so much because 
this person might be ignorant of ' the mathematics 
involved, but because the ideas of money, of exchange, of 
market, or even of an economy itself does not have an 
obvious counterpart in this person's cultural system.
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The lack of meaning caused by the lack of idiosyncratic 
or cultural conditions for understanding a text can also 
be identified in formalised discourses at another level. 
For example, formal theories in mathematical logic (and 
this would apply to Bourbaki's system) may seem void to a 
person who is not used to doing mathematics. Similarly, 
mathematical formalisations of economic theories were 
considered to be void by some economists in the 19th c ., 
and at the beginning of the 20th c ., because the 
economists terming this view were not familiar with 
mathematics.
The appearance of such an idiosyncratic and cultural void 
is not connected to axiomatisation, nor to formalisation 
as such. In addition, it ^oes not concern the nature of 
science as we approach it "elsewhere (cf. Chei>k \ 1996
first and third landmarks). We consider indeed that 
science is a particular cultural phenomenon. We take for 
granted that scientific discourses have a function and a 
meaning which we do not challenge but which are explicit. 
The appearance of this void is an idiosyncratic or a 
micro-cultural problem rather than a cultural historical 
problem. It is for this reason that we shall not expand 
upon it further.
A third kind of void can be identified which is 
a distinctive feature of formalisation. Inasmuch as 
formalisation involves two semiotic systems with two 
kinds of rules of inference and two symbolic systems,
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formalisation may lead to statements with no meaning.
Let us clear up a potential misunderstanding which may be 
caused by our own definition of formal system. From a 
popular point of view, formalisation involves a formal 
syntactic system and an interpretation of this system, as 
well as correspondence rules between the two systems,
which are thought of as rules of substitution. From this 
perspective, these rules are conceived to be a kind of 
code (cf Eco, 1984, Chapter 5). However, we consider
that these correspondence rules are not merely 
substitution rules, so far as reasonings are performed in 
one system or the other, and to the extent that as these 
systems are actually used in scientific practice. 
Another way to express this idea is to say that however 
fixed is the correspondence between the terms of the 
systems and the two sets of rules of inference, 
conducting a line of reasoning in one system does not 
guarantee that the interpretation in the other system of 
the conclusion of the reasoning is straightforward. In 
addition, following our subject-matter (cf. Chapter 2), 
we are interested in the interaction of the two systems. 
After this clarification we shall give historical 
examples of the occurrence of this kind of void in
science.
One example is the crisis amongst mathematicians over the 
emergence of irrational numbers. It can be considered, 
retrospectively, as the result of attempts to construct
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formalisation of geometrical figures and magnitudes 
within the Pythagorean numerical system, or conversely to 
formalise the latter within the former. The
correspondence rule between the two systems is broken as 
a result of reasoning about the diagonal of the square 
and the finding that the statement 'the magnitude of the 
diagonal' has no meaning.®
2 1 2
The Consolidation of Mathematical
Economics: The Case of Debreu
SECTION 2®3:_________AXIOMATIC AND FORMAL EMPTINESS;
MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
We may be open to the criticism that by insisting 
on the third kind of void in formalisation mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, we miss the point of 
formalisation. It is indeed generally admitted that the 
function of formalisation is to separate the form and the 
content of a discourse and to ensure its consistency.
It is true that sometimes economists interpret 
the formal system, that is mathematical signs, in two 
ways. Sometimes they interpret it in a context- 
independent manner, which we shall call algorithmic, so 
as to obtain a result or a proof.® Sometimes economists 
interpret mathematical signs in a context-dependent 
manner, which is sometimes referred to in the literature 
by the phrase "economic meaning". This phrase refers to 
different situations, such as when mathematical signs 
stand for economic-theoretical notions or relations, or 
statistically estimated (actually or potentially), 
economic parameters. It also refers to the fact that 
their interpretation of mathematical results is 
constrained by methodological rules. For example, the 
criterion of rejection of a mathematical inequality on 
the grounds that it is refuted by standard statistical 
testing is an example of such a constraint.
Consider now the second system of signs which constitutes 
mathematical economics, namely vernacular language.
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Economists either consider that they are interpreting it 
in a layman's or general common-sense manner, or they 
consider that they are interpreting it within the context 
of a particular economic theory. The seminal game 
theorists, for instance, consider that mathematical 
models are based on general common sense, natural 
relationships or as Morgenstern writes later on "what we 
believe to be common sense". (Morgenstern et al, 1944,
p. 6). By contrast, Friedman considers that the semantic 
support of mathematical economics is economic knowledge 
which could be described as a picture of the economy, so 
that it is theoretical and empirical. In most cases, the 
referential semantics of vernacular languages in economic 
theory is implicitly or explicitly "common sense". This 
sometimes refers to a kind of "intuition" that economists 
have. At other times it refers to something like an 
empirical "fact" or "evidence" which refers to 
everybody's presupposed experience of economic life. 
Finally, it sometimes refers to introspective or 
scientific psychology.
It is true that the historical trend towards 
the mathematization of economic knowledge has resulted in 
a disjunction of different levels of reasoning. This 
applies to the epistemological view of the interpretation 
of mathematical formalism that Debreu developed alongside 
his work on economic theory. Debreu (1986) considers 
that the mathematical form and the economic content of
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economic theory can be considered separately. It seems 
that Debreu has adhered to the view that such a 
separation holds in cases where mathematical symbolism is 
used to represent concepts or to express relations. As 
the following quotation suggests however, it seems that 
he does not consider that this separation holds in cases 
where mathematical symbolism plays the algorithmic 
function of constructing a proof: "In extreme cases the
proof of an economic proposition becomes so simple that 
it can dispense with mathematical symbols." (Debreu, 
1986, p.1267, emphasis added).
The type of proof he offers to illustrate such an extreme 
case is a proof by contradiction and not a direct proof. 
Debreu also does not believe that the separation holds in 
the process of discovery. On the contrary, he emphasises 
the historical correlations between the construction of 
mathematical proofs and the building up of economic 
models. Debreu's view that the mathematical form and the 
economic content of mathematical economics are connected 
can be explained by his view on the relationship he 
establishes between axiomatic, mathematical formalism on 
the one hand, and logic on the other hand (cf. Chapter 6 , 
Section 2@1).
The interweaving of the economic content and 
the mathematical form is not solely a connection 
established a posteriori nor a connection established by
economists when they reflect on their work. It can be
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identified in economic texts themselves. As such it is a 
matter for epistemology and methodology as we have 
defined it (Cheix 4996) • Further we believe that one 
reason for the methodological debates opposing realist 
and anti-realist viewa on mathematical formalism is that 
such formalism can be alternatively or simultaneously 
interpreted in these two ways (cf Chapter 0 Section 
1@2) . We shall now illustrate this idea with examples 
in the history of the interpretation of numbers in 
economic theory.
The way some economists have used negative 
numbers in their theoretical reasoning suggests that the 
requirement that "economic meaning" should not to be 
divorced from mathematical computations, seems to be an 
important methodological feature of the practice of
mathematical economics.
For example, according to Mahieu (1989) even Sraffa, who 
is committed to a formal and logical view about economic 
theory, takes the trouble to study the question whether 
he ought to admit negative numbers into his theory or 
not. The same question is also addressed by Tinbergen 
(1933a) in an article published in 1933. In this 
article, he is concerned with using the symbolism of the 
theory of oscillations in order to study trade cycles. 
After putting his analysis into the form of equations and 
solving them, he is concerned with selecting some
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solutions and eliminating others. Tinbergen (1933a, 
p.39, our translation) writes:
"In combining solutions (...) [of a linear equation] , one can get solutions that are real numbers, which is a necessary condition for a solution to have an economic meaning."
Because he is concerned with defining static demand
functions, he consequently expunges the subset of mere
complex solutions from the set of mathematically
admissible solutions in order to get the economically
admi s s ible one s .
Economists seem to encounter problems not only in 
interpreting imaginary numbers, but in interpreting other 
kinds of numbers as well. In the second edition of the 
Theory of Political Economy. Jevons devotes a long 
paragraph (pp.137-145) to paraphrasing the utility 
equation of exchange in order to check the consistency of 
the interpretation of negative and zero values of utility 
functions as disutility. In this case, the definition of 
disutility seems to be ad hoc to ensure that no
inconsistency occurs in the interpretation of the basic 
equation of exchange. For Jevons* reasoning to be 
consistent, one must apparently assume that two ideas are 
implied when he writes that a good has disutility. that 
its utility is negative and that it is given out in the 
exchange by the person to whom it is disutility.
According to Debreu (1959, note 1, p.35) who, 
in his theory considers that prices might be negative, 
the first theoreticians who used negative prices were
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K.J. Arrow and T.C. Koopmans in two articles written in 
1951. The first is concerned with welfare economics, and 
the second with allocation problems. As far as the 
representation of prices is concerned, Ahmed (1993) 
suggests that in the history of general equilibrium 
systems of equations, the choice of the mathematical set 
of possible prices and the economic meaning of prices 
have been connected. According to Ahmed (1993), some 
economists in the 1930s pointed out that the Walrasian 
equation system did not always have solutions. It seems
that this led another economist, Schlesinger to modify 
the system in the following way;
"Proofs of the theory of existence of equilibrium, by counting equations, led to the recognition that the special cases of negative or zero prices had to be barred from theequation system. This was recognized by Schlesinger(...) " (Ahmed, 1993, p.197).
"Schlesinger's main objection againstWalras and Cassel was that they did notdistinguish in their models between "scarce" and "free" factors of production. Theyconsidered only the "scarce" factors.Schlesinger, in contrast, recognized that there are free inputs, like air, sunshine andsometimes water. To him, in order to have ameaningful solution to this system of equations, both free and scarce factors have to be considered. Thus, his equation system incorporated the notion that the supply offactors of production must be greater than or equal to the demand for the factors. If strict inequality holds for a particular factor, then the price of that factor is zero. If equality holds for a particular factor, then the price of the factor is positive or zero." (Ahmed, 1993, p.82).
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However, in the 19th c.. De Morgan (1862) had already 
pointed out that the signs of numbers indicates only an 
algebraic relation. They have only a relative meaning, 
and a positive number is not more "real" than a negative 
number. Similarly a maximisation problem can be 
considered as an equivalent minimization problem.
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SECTION 3. AXIOMATIC AND MATHEMATICAL FORMALISM 
IN THE THEORY OF VALUE
SECTION 3@1! GENEALOGICAL PRESENTATION
The approach adopted by Gerard Debreu (1959) in
his book the Theory of value; an Axiomatic Analysis of
Economic Equilibrium can be considered to be 
representative of the 20thc. process of axiomatisation of 
the theory of general equilibrium. It was published in 
1959 but, according to the author (Debreu, 1959, p.xi), 
its contents had been communicated earlier in lectures at 
the University of Chicago (from the spring of 1953 
onwards) , at Yale University, as well as in a doctoral 
thesis presented in 1956 in Paris. Debreu locates his 
work within the tradition of the School of Lausanne,
which he associates with the figures of Walras and 
Pareto. The reason he gives for doing so is that he is 
dealing with a concept that is central to this tradition 
viz the concept of simultaneous equilibrium in all 
markets. As the subtitle of the work mentioned 
previously shows, Debreu is explicitly concerned with the 
axiomatization of the theory and expects that it will 
help to clarify the economic notion of equilibrium.
In the light of books dealing with the history of 
economic equilibrium analysis such as, for instance,
those of Granger (1955, esp. Première Partie; "Un concept 
économique: l'Equilibre" pp.23-165), Perrot (1992) and
Bruna Ingrao and Giorgio Israel's The Invisible Hand:
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Economic Equilibrium in the History of Science {cf 
Backhouse 1994b), one might find arguments to contest the 
appropriateness of choosing Debreu as being 
representative of the axiomatisation of the theory of 
general equilibrium.lO For this reason, we now present
the reader with evidence that can be used to challenge 
our choice, from both an external and internal historical 
perspective.
It is true that in earlier centuries, 
economists had already attempted to clarify the idea of 
equilibrium, as we shall now see.i^ Perrot (1992) gives 
examples of such attempts in the French I8th c. tradition 
in economics. They are Turgot (1727-1781; 1759-1770 and 
1753-1754) as well as the engineers Claude François 
Joseph d'Auxiron (1728-1778; 1766 and Achille Nicolas
Isnard (7-1802 ; 1781). We now turn to their ideas of
equilibrium . Our sources of information on these 
authors are the two articles by Perrot mentioned in the 
previous note and also Granger (1955, "L'Équilibre en 
Science Économique", pp.65-87).L2
Turgot got the idea of economic equilibrium from reading 
of Hume's Political Discourses (1752) and Josiah Tucker's 
Reflections on the Expediency of a Law for The 
Naturalisation of Foreign Protestants (1751 and 1752) . 
Turgot applies patterns of reasoning used in other 
sciences at his time to the study of the economy. In his 
earlier writings on this subject, the comparisons have a
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demonstrative power for the author because he believed 
the scientific laws of his time to be universal. He also 
believed that reality is unified, and that knowledge is 
produced by constructing analogies. Later, his beliefs 
underwent changes. Turgot gave up the idea that 
equilibrium had explanatory power in economics, and 
devoted himself to political decision-making instead of 
to economic science.
Subsequently, d'Auxiron and Isnard explored this 
comparison, which suggested to them for the first time a 
theoretical approach to economic phenomena in terms of 
equilibrium.
D'Auxiron, who adhered to a Hobbesian view of the nature 
of society, considered an isolated state of barter, the 
workings of which he described as interactions, 
D'Auxiron's method of theorising was as follows. He 
started with a simple theoretical framework, and applies 
to it deductive reasoning. He then studies whether the 
results he had obtained could be generalised, and he 
explored the extent to which his theoretical framework 
could be enhanced.
Isnard's theory dealt with "abstract" economic relations 
between goods in two ways. First, he did not consider 
that goods belonged to a particular individual; and 
secondly, he represented relations between goods with 
algebraic equations.i* He first considered an economy in 
which there was no currency (i.e. a barter economy).
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Within this economy, goods had relative values which were 
in inverse ratio to the quantities exchanged. Isnard 
showed how exchanges were interrelated, and put forward 
two views that became important to the historical 
development of mathematical economics. The first was 
that definitions of values for goods depend upon a system 
of equations, such that the number of equations must be 
the same as the number of goods. The second was that for 
such a system of equations one good must be continuously 
divisible. Then he introduces currency into his 
analysis, an innovation which was not used at that time. 
After pointing out that any good may serve as a unit for 
measuring the value of other goods, he defines a currency 
as any good which is actually used to measure the others, 
and which might serve as a security.
For these three authors, a theory is a rational 
representation of reality, the value of which is its 
ability to give a coherent account of apparently 
unrelated facts. The authors do not claim that it is out 
of the question for these relations be grounded in 
statistics, though they actually do not provide the 
reader with empirical verification. To conclude these 
remarks about the history of the concept of economic 
equilibrium, let us just mention that Granger (1955) 
provides evidence of even earlier occurrences of it in 
the History of Economic Thought from Aristotle onwards.
2 2 3
The Consolidation of Mathematical
Economics: The Case of Debreu
Because of their search for rigour and
abstraction and because they are using alphanumeric 
symbols, it is right, as Perrot does, to consider these 
last two theories to be axiomatic endeavours. What then 
is the difference between Debreu and their own 
endeavours?
It could be said that Debreu is concerned with a central 
idea, that of "equilibrium", which is already 
theoretical, so that, in building on it, he is concerned 
with equilibrium analysis; whereas the pre-19th c.
authors were building up, first and foremost, an economic 
theory, and in doing so introduced the idea of
equilibrium into economics.
Even though we content ourselves with such an answer, it 
ought to be pointed out that it is not completely 
satisfactory, and that what we are faced with here is a 
historiographical issue. Why, for instance, could one 
not consider that in the 17th c. and the 18th c . , the
writings and the practices of the leaders of the states, 
of businessmen and tradesmen contained elements of 
economics theorising? Why not consider the fact that the 
idea of equilibrium was introduced even earlier by people 
doing accountancy? Why not consider, similarly, that 
Turgot, Isnard and d ’Auxion got the idea of an economic 
equilibrium from accountants? It is not impossible that 
there are historical grounds for this. If Perrot is 
right, the first time Turgot uses the idea of equilibrium
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is about a flow of money from one country to another. 
Then, if "to be in equilibrium" a phrase used by Turgot 
was also a term applied to accounts in the pre-18th c. 
France, then one could give credence to this idea.
Because they demand rigour and order in 
reasoning, and because they use representations available 
in other disciplines in their day, such diverse authors 
have something in common. However, an issue that is 
arguable is whether these characteristics are evidence of 
a scientific or a mathematical method, as opposed to just 
a demand for meaning and cogency. Similarly, and if, as
Bicquilley (1804) suggests, there existed a written 
tradition to transmit knowledge in accountancy, then it 
is hard to say whether it would be more natural to 
consider that Isnard, d'Auxiron etc..., as opposed to 
accountants, are contributors to economic theory.
■ Regarding the 20 th c, the same criticism could be made of 
the choice of Debreu's Theory of Value as the 
representative of the axiomatisation of general 
equilibrium theory. Historical elements of an argument 
for this criticism can be found in the thesis by Ahmed 
(1993), on which we rely below unless otherwise 
specified.
Ahmed (1993) considers that the mathematicians 
and statisticians Abraham Wald (1902-1950) and John Von 
Neumann (1903-1957) were the first authors to use the 
axiomatic approach in their ' analysis of general
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equilibrium in the 1930s. By axiomatic approach Ahmed 
(1993) means, it seems, the historical combination of the 
logico-mathematical ideas developed at the Mathematical 
Colloquium of the University of Vienna and the 
epistemological- ideas developed at the meetings of the 
Vienna Circle in the»1930s. There is historical evidence 
for 8 cross-fertilisation of these ideas, in general, 
since the audiences of the two meetings overlapped. For 
example, Karl Menger (1902) - the son of Carl Menger
(1840-1921) who is the founder of the Viennese School of 
Economics , who organised the Mathematical Colloquium and 
Oskar Morgenstern (1902-1977) attended both meetings and 
had a particular interest in economics. In all 
probability this combination has influenced the 
development of mathematical economics since:
"It was at Monger's Colloquium where the works of mathematical economics were presented by mathematicians and discussed by an audience of mathematicians. It appears that it was a big step forward towards an unprecedented development of mathematical formalism in economics. Many of the papers in general equilibrium theory in the 1930s were presented at Menger's Colloquium. It was Menger himself who invited the economist Schlesinger in 1931 to present a modified version of the Walras- Casselian system of equations and it was at this seminar that Wald's existence proof was presented. This may have been possible because of Menger's own interest in the problem of general equilibrium. It was also at this Colloquium that von Neumann, in 1937, presented his paper on the equilibrium of a growing economy, and also where for the first time the problem of existence was solved by applying Brouwer's fixed point theorem." (Ahmed, 1993, p.77) .15
226
The Consolidation of Mathematical
Economics: The Case of Debreu
Ahmed (1993) then mentions the fundamental contribution 
of Koopmans to the axiomatisation of the analysis of the 
production process in the early 1950*s.
Similarly, there are proofs of the existence of 
general equilibrium prior to that of Debreu in 1959. 
There is no proof of existence of general equilibrium in 
the works of Leon Walras (1834-1910), Vilfredo Pareto 
(1845-1923), Leon Cassel (1864-1944), Piero Sraffa (1898- 
1983), nor in those of Karl Schlesinger (1889-1938) and 
Hicks (1904-1989), neither according to the mathematical 
standard of their historical era, nor according to 
today's standards. However, these authors contributed to 
the development of the theory to a great extent. As for 
Walras and his followers, they considered no more than 
the equality of the number of equations with the number 
of unknown in the system, which is inadequate, as a proof 
of existence. The first existence proof according to 
contemporary standards was provided by Wald, His 
rigorous proof was set out at the Mathematical Colloquium 
already mentioned, in the 1 9 3 0 s . T h e  system of 
equations to which this proof was applied is derived from 
Walras in the version that Gustav Cassel (1864-1944) made
popular and most importantly in the version by Schlesinger 
discussed in an insightful manner:
"The first Wald proof of the existence of equilibrium required that there be a single good and no production choice. It required an assumption akin to the (aggregate) weak axiom of revealed preference." (Ahmed, 1993, p.198)
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Whereas Wald is not known for having introduced a 
particular mathematical tool into the theory of general 
equilibrium and into the body of theorems , Von Neumann is 
known for his use of topology and for having generalised 
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem in his proof of existence 
of general equilibrium.
If we analyze the genealogy of Debreu's Theory 
of Value, our choice might be contested, not only from a 
general historical perspective, but also from a 
biographical point of view. Before the publication of
this book, Debreu collaborated with K.J. Arrow in the
analysis of General Equilibrium. This collaboration 
resulted in the publication in 1954 of a paper, first
read in 1952, at a meeting of the Econometric Society. 
This contained what is now termed the 'Arrow-Debreu 
model'. According to Ahmed (1993, p.166) this
paper contains;
"the first theorem o f •existence of general economic equilibrium formulated without Wald- type restrictive hypotheses (...). Together with the theorem, we have the first rigorousmathematical formalization, with considerablegenerality, of the fundamental concepts of the theory developed by Walras so many yearsbefore."
Although there were a number of precursors of 
Debreu's theory, it is possible to consider, as Ahmed 
(1993) does, that the method and the content of the
Theory of Value differ from similar analyses of general 
equilibrium which preceded it. These differences are
228
The Consolidation of Mathematical
Economics; The Case of Debreu
important with respect to the topics we are interested, 
in and with respect to the criteria we choose for 
selecting theoretical pieces (cf Che (xl 996 ;
c h a p t e r  2 ) .
One difference is that relatively new mathematical 
techniques are introduced in the 1959 work which coincide
with both the introduction by Debreu of the idea of 
'excess demand' and with the proof of the existence of 
the general equilibrium point. The use of these 
mathematical techniques, namely algebra, topology and 
convex analysis in economics was indeed not new. 
According to Ahmed (1993), Von Neumann had introduced 
topological analysis, fixed point theorems and convex 
analysis into theoretical economics earlier on. But 
since we are interested in how concepts, proofs and tools 
change in connection to one another, this theory as it is 
perceived by historiography is an example adequate to our 
study.
Another difference between Debreu's theory and earlier 
approaches to the same subject is their epistemological 
foundations. Ahmed (1993) holds the view that there is a 
difference between Debreu's view on axiomatics and that 
of Wald and Morgenstern which refers to the difference 
between axiomatics developed by Hilbert and axiomatics as 
the Nicolas Bourbaki group conceived it. This difference 
is that:
"The characteristic peculiar to 'Bourbakism' was that of pushing the Hilbertian
229
The Consolidation of Mathematical
Economics: The Case of Debreu
axiomatic approach to its extreme consequences, particularly with reference to the relationship between mathematics and the empirical sciences." (Ahmed, 1993, p.lll)^.
Let us now compare the history of mathematics 
with their use in economics. It is explained below 
(Chapter 6 , section 3@2) why it is hard to identify the 
mathematical tools that are important for the Theory of 
Value■ It is consequently hard to reconstruct the 
genealogy of the mathematical tools of the theory. 
However, the development of topology, of convex analysis 
and that of fixed point theorems are relevant. Convex 
analysis developed in the 19th c. and was probably based 
originally on geometrical analysis. The development of 
topology and fixed point theorems took place later, from 
the end of the 19th c. to the 1950s, even though the 
mathematical problems they were answering had been set 
earlier.
So far as fixed point theorems are concerned, H e r r e m a n ' s 
(1996b) bibliography suggests that the study of fixed 
points in the mathematical community began in 1885 with 
an article by Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) entitled ’Sur 
les coubres defines par des équations différentielles' in 
the Journal _de_Mathématiaues Pures et Appliquées. Then 
there is a gap in this bibliography until the 1910s. 
Brouwer published a series of articles on the subject 
from 1910 to 1921. It seems that by the beginning of the 
1940s, the major aspects of the topic had been studied. 
The publication of the proof of Kakutani's theorem was
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published in 1941 in an article entitled 'A 
Generalisation of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem', in the 
Duke Mathematical Journal. However, its significance for 
economics was not immediately realised.
Consequently, so far as the connection between the 
history of mathematics and the history of mathematical 
economics is concerned, it seems that the development of 
the mathematical tools preceded their use in economics by 
a time interval that we would estimate as being
(approximately) up to thirty years. Border (1985) 
implies that in the period post-1950s, the refining of 
the mathematical tools, and their subsequent use in 
economic theory, tended to take place with a smaller time 
lag.
As far as the genealogy of axiomatic theories
is concerned, Ahmed (1993)'s inquiry suggests not only 
that the axiomatisation of mathematics, of economic 
theory and the logical study of axiomatised systems 
underwent simultaneously comparable developments in the 
first half of the 20th c. and especially in the 1930s,
but in addition, that evidence exists of historical
connections between the contributors to these 
developments in different scientific fields and their 
connection to the Vienna Circle.
231
The Consolidation of Mathematical
Economics: The Case of Debreu
SE C T IO N  3® 2 t D E S C R IP T IO N
The first chapter of the Theory of value 
(Debreu, 1959, pp.1-27) is devoted to presenting,for the 
benefit of non-mathematicians, the mathematical objects, 
notions and results that are used later in the book. 
They are given without proofs but mathematical and 
economic examples are attached. The notions belong to 
set theory, topology and algebra. Debreu emphasizes the 
fact that such tools are uncommon in mathematical 
economics since differential calculus is usually used 
instead. (Debreu, 1959, p.x) . To the first subfield 
(set theory) belong theorems and concepts concerning 
ordering, the difference between a function and a 
correspondence (also called a multi-valued function) and 
that of a set. The difference between a function and a 
correspondence is, according to Debreu himself, of 
particular importance to economic interpretation. The 
topological notions involved are those of : 
connectedness; compactedness and semi-continuity of a 
correspondence; and continuity of a function. The major 
algebraic notion involved is that of convexity. The 
topological ’ and algebraic definitions and results are 
given only for particular spaces, namely finite Cartesian 
products of the real line ( R^) considered as real vector 
spaces, with the standard norm-sup metric topology.
As we shall now see, it is hard to list the mathematical 
results, either mentioned or omitted in this first 
chapter, that are important with regard to the role they
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play in yielding the economic results, even from a 
mathematical point of view.18
This is so firstly, because the author does not 
report proofs and does not always refer to his sources. 
In order to extract the mathematical arguments on which 
the theory and its mathematical results are based, one 
ought to be able to trace back these proofs from the 
bibliographical references. Secondly, retrospectively 
and from a mathematical point of view - there is a 
discrepancy between the level of generality of some of 
the mathematical notions used in the first chapter and in 
proofs of the theory, on the one hand, the mathematical
spaces to which they are applied (typically R’"} , on the
other. A consequence of this discrepancy is that it is 
not clear whether the proofs of the mathematical results 
that are important for this chapter, rely mostly on 
general non-metric topological properties, or whether 
they rely on properties of the real numbers. In other
words, it is not an easy matter to identify the level of
topological generality which is sufficient to derive the 
mathematical results of the theory. For example, because 
of the topological properties of R, in which the 
connected subparts are identified with intervals, and, 
further, because there is a characterisation of the 
compact subsets of R^ - as the closed and bounded sets, 
one can construct topological arguments referring only to
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the form of R-intervals, without using set-theoretic 
topological concepts in their whole generality.
Similarly, since only finite Cartesian products of
topological spaces or subspaces are considered, most of
the proofs of the theorems useful for Debreu*s theory 
generalize easily, compared to the infinite case, from
R to R^. It is true that a theorem about sets in R^
may be considered to be more important than the 
corresponding theorem for m=l, because it is more 
general. However, since frequently the proof about
properties of R^ are straightforwardly deduced from both 
the particular case of R and the axiomatic definition of 
a finite product of sets, the particular case could just 
as. well be considered as more important than the general. 
The purpose of the above remarks is to suggest the 
difficulty of determining "the important underlying 
mathematics for the theory", and of identifying in detail
constraints imposed on the economic content of the 
reasoning by the mathematics deployed by Debreu. 
Conversely, in giving an account of the mathematics, it 
seems impossible to avoid adopting an anachronistic point 
of view and, so to speak, to "forget" the state of 
mathematics today (cf Chapter l, section4, second landmark').
To conclude the matter sharply, we would say that there 
are just two notions of mathematics that are important 
for Debreu's formalisation of equilibrium analysis, 
compactness and convexity, as opposed to r e s u l t s . S o
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far as both the main interpretation of the theory and the 
proof of existence are concerned (e.g. of equilibrium in 
case of the private ownership economy) the mathematical 
theorems which Debreu appeals to are basic indeed.
Because of these exegetical problems, we limit our task 
here to reporting on what Debreu considers to be 
important. From this perspective, there are two 
important mathematical results for his theory: 
Minkowski’s theorem on separating hyperplanes,• and either 
Brouwer's or Kakutani's theorem, on fixed points for 
functions or correspondences. In the latter case, it 
depends on which proof is more central.20 The relevant
theorems are quoted by Debreu in the following form
(Debreu, 1959, pp.25-26):
Minkowski's theorem ;Let K be a convex subset of and 2 a point of R^. There is a hyperplane H through z and bounding for K if and only if z is not interior to K.
Brouwer's theorem:If S is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of R^, and if f is a continuous function from S to S, then f has a fixed point.
Kakutani's theorem:
If S is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of R^, 
and if (p is an upper semi continuous correspondence 
from S to S such that for all x eS the set (p(x) is 
convex (non-empty), then cp has a fixed point.
T h e  a x i o m a t i c  f e a t u r e s  o f  D e b r e u  ' s  t h e o r e t i c a l
developments are as following. The first is an explicit 
terminological segmentation that follows different lines.
The first line is that the language used to 
express the theory is clearly divided into terminologies
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which are mathematical theoretical and economic
theoretical, respectively. This segmentation is made 
clearer by their being explained in different chapters. 
Both terminologies are theoretical in the sense that they 
result from an analysis of mathematical and economic 
•realities' or, to avoid using an ontological line of 
reasoning, in the sense that they differ from their 
common usage in natural languages. This is a difference 
that Debreu goes out of his way to mention and he
emphasizes it by using a specific typography to designate 
economic theory stricto-sensus. The second line of
terminological segmentation is this opposition between 
theoretical and non-theoretical terminology. According 
to the introductory philosophical landmarks (cf Cheix
1996 section 4, fourth landmark) it is a scientific 
feature. One example of it is the concept of a 
commodity. A singular commodity is defined as a point in 
a space that bears a temporal dimension, so that a good 
considered at two different times is formally two
different commodities.
There are limits to the first division between 
economics and mathematics for at least two reasons.
First, there is a correspondence between these 
two theoretical terminological realms. And it is of this 
that Debreu's axiomatization of economic theory 
ultimately consists. Sometimes, the economic
interpretation of mathematical symbols amounts to
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duplicating a single mathematical object by two different 
economic objects. For example, a given real vector, 
whether numerical or algebraically written, may denote 
the action of an economic agent or a system of price. 
Sometimes the difference between two economic concepts 
(e.g. producer, consumer) that are instances of a more 
general concept (e.g. economic agent) is defined by a 
mathematical property (e.g. by definition of a producer, 
his input e R ”, output e R+, and the converse 
convention is used for a consumer).
Sometimes the economic interpretation results in 
specifying mathematically the structure that is being 
considered. For example, individual consumption and 
production sets are generally contained in a subset of 
R^ with a "relatively small number of dimensions" 
because inputs and outputs involve a small number of 
commodities. Similarly, it might be considered that it 
follows from the economic demand that an economic agent 
is an optimizing agent, and that the preference relation 
on consumption sets have particular properties. These 
properties allow one to define partitions with special 
topological properties, which in turn enable one to 
define a function (utility) for consumers to maximize. A 
third example of the influence of the economic on the 
choice of specific mathematics is the mathematical 
condition (d) (cf. pp. 39-40) on the structure of the 
production set. This is given an economic origin both
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formal (in the theory, a commodity is dated) and 
intuitive (production takes time). A fourth example is 
provided by the use of correspondences. Debreu (1959, 
1.8k, p.19, 1.8a p.17, 1.3h p.6) asserts that it plays a 
particular role on the economic side of the theory. This 
is true indeed, since it is mostly used to represent 
possible economic actions, which implies the idea of
economic choice. Not only is the idea of a
correspondence important with respect to the economic 
interpretation of the theory, but it is equally important 
from a purely mathematical point of view. It is clear 
from a note that Debreu (1959, note 1 p. 27) considers 
that a function and a correspondence are two different 
types of mathematical objects. This is confirmed by the 
conceptual difference between the idea of continuity he 
defines for a function on and the one that he defines 
for a correspondence on R^. In the first case, the 
topology involved is metric; it is the standard norm sup
topology on R^, both on the set of variables and on the
set of image-objects. In the second case, there is no 
topology on the images because Debreu does not consider 
the collection of the image-objects as a topological 
space. To have a homogeneous metric definition of
continuity for functions and correspondences one needs to 
have a topology on P(R^) - the set of subsets of R^, and 
a distance between sets. This is not trivial. Today, 
Hausdorff distances and spaces might provide one way in
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which mathematicians would consider this problem and some 
other approaches may be found in game theory.21 Still, 
the existence of such a distance is not obvious, since it 
may give birth to paradoxes concerning the power of the 
continuum.
Secondly, one could support the view that the 
economics and the mathematics of Debreu's theory are not 
separated because the mathematics used are chosen so as 
to get a proof of the key existence theorem. It is true 
that Debreu is concerned with eliciting the properties of 
an economic idea, that of equilibrium, which was 
suggested to him, by the tradition of Cournot 
(1801-1877), Walras (1834-1910) and Pareto (1845-1923) as 
a mathematical problem. Eliciting these properties does 
not involve a straightforward "translation" of economic 
ideas into mathematical concepts or symbols. It requires 
seeking the deductive cogency of equilibrium analysis,
through a redefinition of basic economic concepts, 
involving a selection of adequate mathematical concepts, 
and the adoption of the logical rigor of mathematics. In 
this sense, the axiomatized theory itself, and not just 
the existence of proof of the equilibrium, can be 
considered as a construct that validates equilibrium 
analysis by identifying its hypotheses and their links
with the results. In this respect, it is scientific.
One could argue, along the following lines, that these
proofs may be conducted without this economic meaning, on
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a pure mathematical-symbolic basis. Were it the case, 
then one could support either the view that the economic
meaning is redundant or that the economic meaning
attached to the mathematical symbols bears the particular
epistemological function of giving the mathematical 
symbols some content; and that without some kind of
content or another, no reasoning can be performed on 
mathematical symbols.
Let us turn now to a second axiomatic feature 
of Debreu's theory: the use of symbolism and formalism
in t h e  economic theory.
The symbolism involved is mathematical, by which we mean 
the use of alphanumerical symbols in expressions 
containing operators such as "Z", " + ", "e", "U", "x^ i"
etc. . . The use of this symbolism is not restricted to 
the mathematical chapter and occurs, along with geometric 
diagrams, in the rest of the book. Even though Debreu 
uses concepts and reasonings belonging to first order 
logic (e.g. in his definition of the empty set), he does 
not use the corresponding symbolism which is used today 
such as the universal and existential quantifiers and 
which was known in 1959.22 The reason may be that he is
concerned with mathematical symbolism only inasmuch as it 
is a means for formalizing economic notions. This
consists in identifying, at the end of each section, the 
economic-theoretical notions or hypotheses that have been
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explored with mathematical notions so as to build a 
proposition that can be mathematically treated. In a 
first analysis, such a proposition is formal, not because 
it is mathematical, but because it can be used for 
different " [economic] interpretations of the [economic] 
theory", to use Debreu*s own words. This means that the 
economic-theoretical notions and hypotheses that are 
formally expressed have been thoroughly selected. Let us 
exemplify this comment with the input and output notions. 
Today, these notions are economic-theoretical notions. 
Arguably, in 1959 they were also, since canonical 
mathematical and non-mathematical studies on the subject, 
by Leontief and Georgescu Roegen (whom Debreu mentions in 
the acknowledgements) had already been published by 1937. 
In the latter tradition, these are formally expressed, 
whereas they are not in Debreu's theory (cf Debreu, 1959,
p.30) .
These notions are not in themselves formal in Debreu but 
are used in his formal definition of consumers and 
producers.
A third explicit axiomatic feature of Debreu's 
economic theory is that it is g e n e r a l .  23 What Debreu
means by general is closely related to
formalism as the following quotation shows.
" It [the dichotomy between the logical side of the theory and its interpretations] also makes possible immediate extensions of that analysis without modification of the theory by simple reinterpretations of concepts; this is
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are used in his formal definition of consumers and 
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repeatedly illustrated below, most strikingly perhaps by Chapter 7 on uncertainty" (Debreu, 1959, Preface, p.x).
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SECTION 3@3. SEMIOTIC ANALYSIS
We shall now be concerned with describing the 
connection between the mathematical side and the economic 
side of Debreu's theory as it occurs in the mere reading 
of the text. For this purpose we shall use the semiotic 
approach defined above (chapter 2, section ). We shall 
attempt t o  identify isotopies that appear in the 
Theory of Value and also at studying the relationships 
between these isotopies, with particular emphasis on the 
fifth chapter. This chapter, which is devoted to the
study of economic equilibrium, is particularly important 
for the semiotic analysis for two reasons. Firstly, in 
the specific semiotic system of Economics (cf. chapter 2, 
section 2), the Theory of Value is associated with (cf. 
Ahmed, 1993) the proof of existence of equilibrium in 
terms of the concept of excess demand, which both appear 
in this chapter (chapter 6, section 2/ section 3 @1,
@2) . Hence this chapter contains elements that are
considered to be 'problem-solving' within the community 
of economists. Secondly, it is important from a general 
semiotic point of view, because we consider that the main 
role of proofs in a text is that of establishing a
'semiotic function' (cf. chapter 2 , section 2).
Generally speaking, proofs strengthen the connection 
between the expressions of a text and their content by 
increasing the perceived truthfulness of the theorem 
which they prove. This role is even more important in 
axiomatized systems since to a great extent,p r o o f s  define 
the content both of axioms and definitions of the system.
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The first isotopy we shall identify is the 
•theoretical isotopy'. It is created by the redundance 
of the use of a particular typography, namely italics, in 
part of the text. It is an isotopy intended by Debreu 
(1959) since he explains that the theory proper is stated 
in italics so as to separate it altogether from other 
matters, including from its justification, and also from 
the heuristic discourse about the theory. In order to 
enable the reader to identify this isotopy, it is enough 
that he can visually recognize different typographical 
patterns and that he understands Debreu's 
meta-theoretical instructions on how to read his theory. 
The second isotopy is the 'notational isotopy’. We shall 
give an ostensive, but (for reasons of space) less than 
comprehensive definition of the notations displayed. The 
following are notations: / K  ^/; /E/; /i = i,...,n/; /w/;
/S/; /((Xi), (yj))/; /£«', = »/; /6i/; /Ynfi = {o}/;
1
/(Xi)/; /z - x-y-m/ ; / < . Notations are a particular
subclass of the set of expressions; they contain
typographical designs that do not belong to the vernacular 
alphabet, or else they are isolated letters with no
obvious grammatical function. One can identify a 
notational isotopy because Debreu's use of notations is 
very 'regular' in the sense of being consistently applied. 
Not only are the same notations used throughout the text, 
but also a close connection is established between some
of them and other expressions. For example expressions
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containing the letter 'x' (e.g. /X/; /X^/; /x^/) are
associated with the concept of the consumer throughout 
the text, and expressions containing the letter 'y ' are 
always associated with the concept of the producer. 
Consequently, this regularity results in the idea of the 
consumer being part of [ X ], [ X^ ], [ x^ ] and the idea
of the producer being part of [ Y ], [ Yi ] , t Yi ) • The
identification of the notational isotopy does not require 
skills on the part of the reader other than those of 
reading and identifying definitions.
The third isotopy may be called the 'economic isotopy'. 
It is defined by the repeated utilization of expressions 
belonging to economic vocabulary in vernacular 
contemporary English language. Examples of such
expressions are /consumer/, /producer/, /market/, 
/input/, /labor/, /exchange/, /output/, /international 
trade/, /economy/, /demand/, /price/, /supply/. 
Linguistic abilities in English are enough for 
recognising the economic isotopy. Whereas it might be 
the case that the recognition of the theoretical isotopy 
involves mainly the exercise of grammatical and visual 
faculties, the recognition of the economic isotopy 
requires another sort of linguistic ability, namely the 
recognition of linguistic categories. There is indeed an 
economic linguistic category in vernacular English.
The fourth isotopy shall be called the 'mathematical 
isotopy'. It is defined by the repeated utilization of
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notations and words to which Debreu deliberately
attributes a mathematical content in his chapter one. In 
principle, the recognition of this isotopy requires no 
more than linguistic abilities. However, they are not of 
the sort required in identifying the 'economic isotopy', 
but of the sort required in identifying the 'notational' 
and the 'theoretical' isotopies. Because there is a
mathematical chapter in Debreu's text, there is indeed no 
need to assume that there is a mathematical linguistic 
category as a prerequisite for recognising the 
mathematical isotopy.
Whereas the first two isotopies concern the 
level of the expression of the text, the last two concern 
the level of the content of the expressions.
The economics and the mathematics of the Theory of Value
are not separated in the sense that the theoretical
isotopy does not contain any expressions that also 
contribute to defining the economic isotopy. The 
theoretical isotopy contains expressions such as /the 
number of consumers is a given positive integer/, /Given
an economy E , a consumption for the ith • consumer 
(respectively, a production for the jth producer) is 
attainable if it is the component corresponding to him 
of some attainable state./ In these expressions, 
/consumer/, /consumption/, /production/, /producer/, 
/economy/ are items that define the economic isotopy.
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We would argue that the criticism that the economic- 
theoretical isotopy would match better the intended 
theoretical structure of the Theory of Value than the 
economic isotopy we defined is not flawed. All the 
expressions that belong both to the theoretical isotopy 
and to our economic isotopy are economic theoretical 
expressions, that is, they are economic concepts 
explicitly defined by Debreu. In particular, /Input/, 
/output/, /international trade/, /transport/, /labor/, 
/exchange/, /international trade/ are some of the few 
expressions of the economic isotopy that do not belong 
to the economic theoretical isotopy. They neither
belong to the theoretical isosopy. We shall now see 
that even though this criticism appears to be fair, the 
opposition of an economic theoretical isotopy to 
mathematical isotopy proves less fruitful than do the 
isotopies we defined when it comes to understanding how 
the correspondence between the mathematics and the 
economics of the theory is established.
We shall now study the correspondence between 
the economic content of notational expressions and their 
mathematical content in connection with /x-y/.
At the notational isotopy level, x-y is the compound of 
/-/, /x/ and /y/.
As previously noted the difference at the
economic isotopy level, between /x/, /Xi/, /xi/ and /y/,
/Yi/, /yi/ corresponds to the difference between
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[consumer] and [producer]. Both belong to 'economic 
agent] , but the former is defined as an economic agent 
whose only output is labor and whose inputs are items 
which contribute to the physical survival of the 
individual (e.g.: food , clothes, housing...), whereas
there is no restriction on the nature of the input and 
the output of the producers. There is another difference 
between [consumer] and [producer] at the economic isotopy 
level. The theoretical isotopy associates [consumer] 
with [demand] and [producer] with [supply] . 
Consequently, at the economic isotopy level, [x-y] is a 
comparison between the demand the supply for goods and 
services. This economic content of /x-y/ is confirmed by 
the definition of a market equilibrium as a state of an 
economy where x-y - w=o, with w being the resources of 
an economy. [x-y-w=o], therefore is a non-monetary form 
of the traditional economic law of supply and demand. 
Following this line of analysis, the law of supply and 
demand is part of [-] in /x-y/.
The difference between /xj_/ and /y±/ at the 
economic isotopy level and at the notational isotopy 
level is echoed at the mathematical isotopy level thanks 
to the sign-convention concerning the representation of 
input and output (cf. supra). The sign-convention also 
enables us to identify a subspace of R® containing all 
the X, namely the subspace where the components of x  
corresponding to the non-labor commodities are positive.
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Consequently, at the mathematical isotopy level, the 
sign-convention sets the same difference between /xj_/
and /yi/ on the one hand and between /x/ and /y/ on the 
other also holds for the difference between /X/ and /Y/. 
However, the sign-convention does not enable us to 
consider [x-y] as the compound of [x] and [y] at the
mathematical isotopy level. We can identify [x-y] with 
[x- (y) ] and with \ \ since x =  f '  1
^ \ / This latter identification makes sign-
convention meaningless. Another way of formulating this 
point about the sing-convention is to say that it 
provides a unique mathematical "representation" for an
economy where producers do not produce any good - that 
is, they only produce different kinds of labor, and for 
an economy where the only economic agents are consumers. 
Not only does /-/ in /x-y/ make meaningless the sign-
correspondence between the economic isotopy level and the 
mathematical isotopy level as far as [x] and [y] are 
concerned. In addition, one may identify [-] in /-y/ at 
the mathematical isotopy level as that which annihilates 
the difference at the notational isotopy level between
/x/, /xi/ and /Y/. Debreu's theoretical definition of 
/x-y/ as the 'excess demand' lends weight to this prima 
facie reading of /x-y/. It has indeed been shown that at 
the economic isotopy level, /demand/ belongs to 
[consumer] and /offer/ belongs to [producer].
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1 "Just simply keep in mind that only two relationships exist 
between human beings; either logic or war. Always insist on being 
provided with evidence; evidence is the basic courtesy a human 
being owes to another human being. If somebody declines to provide 
you with evidence, remember that you are being attacked and that you 
will be compelled to obey by fair means or foul. You will be 
carried away by anything gentle and entrancing, you will have a 
passion for somebody e l s e ’s passion" (Our translation).
2 André Nataf. 1954. Thèses présentées à la Faculté des Sciences 
de l ’Université de Paris pour obtenir le grade de Docteur ês 
Sciences Mathématiques. Paris; Faulté des sciences de l'Université 
de Paris (série A, no.2657, no d ’ordre 3529). 60p. We are grateful 
to Bernard Bru of the Centre d'Analyse et de Mathématiques Sociales 
(CNRS, Paris) for mentioning this document to us and providing us 
with it.
 ^ cf. Arrow, Kenneth; Karlin, Samuel; Suppes, Patrick (eds). 
Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences: Proceedings of the
First Standford Symposium. Standford: Standford University Press
(Standford Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, 4). 365p.
 ^ Friedman's argument can be symbolized as follows. If m stands 
for the sentence "in real economic life, the firm maximizes profit", 
if s stands for "in real economic life, the firm survives", and if T 
refers to Friedman's theory, validation rules included, then his 
argument is:
if (non-m => non-S) then
Unless this may be formalized into an inference rule of T, this 
influence, as Gutierrez- (1966) notices, is accidental.
^ Thus, instead of discussing the role of "tâtonnement" in 
searching an equilibrium that one does not know, for certain, to 
exist, one can assert the existence of general equilibrium provided 
certain conditions on excess demand functions (e.g. homogeneity) are 
satisfied. We are grateful to Professor Reid for mentioning to us 
these examples. They show that one might have to make a distinction 
between the cognitive content and the mathematical content of 
mathematical formalism. In the case of discussion of "tâtonnement", 
the formal-mathematical definition of the equilibrium has a 
cognitive "economic" content (the horizon of economic actions) but 
not a proven mathematical content (its existence might not be proved 
mathematically). In the second case, it has a "full" mathematical 
content but because the hypothesis may be considered to be 
"unrealistic", one could argue that it lacks "economic" cognitive 
content. Further discussion of this delicate subject is beyond the 
scope of this thesis since it belongs to the philosophy of 
mathematics.
^It is not expected that the view on the relationships between 
mathematics, formalisation and axiomatisation we hold will be valid 
for Early Indian, Greek or Chinese mathematics since, these 
mathematics not always use a symbolic system different from the 
corresponding common language, from a. typographical point of view 
(cf our working definition of science, Cheix'^ISSg^.
^ Continuum is altogether a basic semiotic term and one whose 
definition raises unanswered fundamental metaphysical and
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gnosiological questions. According to Eco (1984, p.81), semiotics 
in its current state does not yet answer these questions but ought 
to do so in the future. It ought also both to confront itself with 
contemporary gnosiological theories and contribute to them. Eco 
1984) justifies using this concept still and postponing the
gnosiological problems it involves by considering that semiotic 
analysis has up to now been more fruitful than many philosophical 
debates. The 'continuum' is also called 'matter* and 'world'. Eco
(1984 , pp.60-61 and pp.79-81) describes it as being at the same
time "what signs are saying something about and that through which 
they speak" (our translation). He also describes it as "amorphous 
matter as a whole, or similarly the universe, prior to any semiotic 
system" (our translation). For example, spatial relationships are 
part of the continuum. A sign such as a diagram is a spatial 
relationship and it may also express tri-dimentional spatial 
relationships. Because the continuum is known only in so far as it 
is being expressed, and because in order to express oneself (e.g. 
cognitive contents), one uses parts of the continuum which are 
already structured by culture (e.g. tongue), the question can be 
asked whether the cognitive content of a sign (or a behaviour) is 
the same as its semantic content. These issues also meet issues 
about the existence and the status of linguistic universals (cf.
Eco, 1968, pp.390-392).
The issues which are raised in this note are not as disconnected 
from issues in the methodology of economics as they might seem at 
first sight. For example, one may use the view that cognitive 
contents (e.g. intentions and motivations of economic agents) are 
identical with semantic contents (e.g.economic theories) to justify 
Friedman's (1952) claim that the 'maximising agent theory is 
rightfully "anti-realist". Put under this light, questions can be 
asked such as : Is the agents' understanding of these actions more
"realist" than Friedman's understanding of the actions of economic 
agents?; to what extent does the knowledge of theories of individual 
and social behaviours (and the spreading in vernacular languages of 
terms coming from theories in the social sciences)influences these 
behaviours (and the individuals' perception of himself/herself as a 
social agent)? These are basic epistemological and gnosiological 
issues in the social sciences which we have mentioned already (cf. 
Cheix. 1 9 9 6 note 1 2  ; Chapter 3  note 1). They also often involve
praxeology. However it is out of the scope of this thesis to deal 
with them. _
® Such critical situations may appear when the two systems seem a 
priori close to one another, as it is the case with Sraffa's theory 
of value and formal logic. According to Mahieu (1989) in Saffra’s 
system, hypothesis and deductive steps are clearly identified so 
that this system seems predisposed to be formalised in that way. So 
Mahieu (1989) attempts at expressing Sraffa's system first in 
standard first and order logic with no quantifiers or predicates, 
countable universes, and unitary or binary predicates. He shows 
that some of the conclusions of Sraffa's reasoning can not be 
obtained as interpretations of the corresponding formal reasoning. 
•Similarly, he shows that formal reasoning leads to results that are 
meaningless in Sraffa's system. The same correspondence problem 
occurs in formalisations using quantified and deontic logic. For
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example, this is the case of Mahieu (1989)'s analysis of a text by
Arrow on social choice and of Sraffa's text.
9 The idea that reasoning is context-independent ought to be
distinguished from the idea that it is context-free. An algorithmic 
reasoning is context - independent in the sense that what matters is 
not how it is causally or empirically performed, but that results
are performed.
According to Perrot (1992) the idea of equilibrium in the French 
language belonged to aesthetics then it moved to politics at the 
turning point between the 17th c. and the 18th c. It then reached 
the psychological and economical sphere in the 16th c . . The term is 
used to describe either a matter of fact or norms, either imposed on 
something by an agent, or resulting from natural trends. It is in
this latter sense that the following economists use it. Granger
provides a detailed survey of the concept of equilibrium in
scientific thought from the ancient Greeks onwards (Granger, 1955,
"Spectre épistemologique de l'équilibre", pp.23-67).
(cf. especially: "Equilibre économique et déterminisme au XVIil
s ièc le .  Etude de cas." and "Premiers aspects de l'équilibre dans la 
pensée économique français" respectively pp.237-255 and 257-273). 
Reprints of original texts are included in these articles. Perrot 
(1992) being a reliable specialized historical source, and the
history of the different versions of the books mentioned being
complicated, we shall rely on his studies on the works of the 17thc.
and 18thc. authors. Consequently, we refer directly to his
excellent book for more information on authors such as d'Auxiron, 
Isnard and Turgot.
12 Further information on the history of the idea of equilibrium 
in economics can be found in Granger (1955)'s bibliography and 
Ingrao et al(1987, ch2 and ch3). Theocharis (1983, 1993) contain 
information on Isnard but not on d ’Auxiron and Turgot,
13 Later, in 1826 H. Von Thûnen published Per isolierte Staat in 
Beziehunq auf Landwirtschaft und Nationalôkomie. Berlin, 1st part. 
(Referenced in Perrot, 1992, p.263 n.15) which involves a similar 
kind of economic theorizing and which is referred to as an important 
stage in the history of mathematical economics (Stigler 1965a; 
Theocharis, 1993, 1983).
He uses symbols for goods, quantities and ratios.
Ahmed (1993)'s sources on this matter are Baumol and Goldfeld 
(1968) and Weintraub, 1983, "On the Existence of a Competitive 
Equilibrium: 1930-54", Journal of Economic Literature. 21, 1-39.
This information is confirmed in Dorfman, Robert; Samuelson, 
Paul A. ; Solow, Robert. 1958. Linear Programming and Economic 
Analysis. London/Toronto/New York: MacGraw-Hill. p.527, note 4
pp.366-367. In this latter book, the publication of the proof is
dated 1935 and 1936.
It is not completely clear what Ahmed means by this difference. 
However, it is likely that he refers to Debreu's view on the
connection between axiomatics, intuitive logic and mathematics which 
we mentioned earlier (cf Chapter 6, Section 2 @l). By contrast with
what we termed Debreu's 'mathematical axiomatisation view', Hibert
considered that an axiomatic system comprises an explicit formal
system of inferences. What Ahmed (1993) might meant by 'pushing the 
Hilbertian axiomatic approach to its extreme consequences’ is the
consideration of mathematics as the formal logical system cf
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inferences associated with, so to speak, the object-system of the 
empirical sciences.
It is very likely that to a mathematician such an explanatory 
detour to demonstrate how hard it is to be definite about what is 
the important mathematics and what is not, is unnecessary. It 
might, however, be of some interest to non-mathematicians.19 One can refer to Berger (1959, note 1, p. 114), one of
Debreu's mathematical references to be persuaded of their 
importance for the mathematics used by Debreu.
In the weak form of these theorems given by Berger (1959) in 
Chapter 6 , Brouwer's is explicitly a corollary of Kakutani's. In 
the generalized form used by Debreu and expressed in Berger (1959, 
chapters 8 and 9) , it is less clear. Deciding this question 
requires further mathematical investigation, which is beyond the 
scope of this study. Let us mention only that Border (1985) views 
Kakutani's theorem as the corollary of another theorem for whose 
proof Brouwer's theorem is used. In this case, Brouwer's theorem, 
rather than Kakunai's, is central.
We are grateful to Professor Reid for drawing our attention to the 
following historical remarks. Historically, Brouwer’s theorem was 
discussed before Kakutani's, e.g. by Von Neumann in his growth 
model, and by Wald in his discussion of general equilibrium. The 
latter had been used in 1958 in theoretical economics by Robert 
Solow, Paul Samuelson and Robert Dorfman in Linear Programming and 
Economic Analysis, which appeared in Debreu's (1959) bibliography.
Let (X, d) be a metric space such that sup (d(xy), x£X and yeY}
< CO , and let 9^ be the family of all closed subsets of X. For r>0
and Fey, let Vj.(F) = {x, dist (x,F)<r) where dist (x,F) = inf d%  6 F
(x,y). The Hausdorff distance 6  between F^t and F2 6  ^  is defined 
by:
A(Fi, F2 ) «= inf (r, FyCVr(F 2 ) and F2 CVj.(Fi)}.
(y. A) is a metric space whose topology is not determined by the
topology on X.
According to Marcel Guillaume (1994, p . 192) these quantifiers 
were introduced by R.S. Peirce.
A priori, the difference between the generality of a science 
theory and its formal aspect is not straightforward, even though it 
seems reasonable to believe, on the grounds of the history of 
science, that formalization has de fSiCto an essential role in 
scientific generalisation. A possible difference could be the
following. From a logical point of view, both the feature of being 
formal and that of being general involve a relationship between 
expressions and contents. They seem to differ, however, in that in
the case of formalism, two sign systems are involved, whereas only 
one is, if any, in the second case. Another way to express this 
difference is to say that the general-type of relation insists on an
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idencification process between two items, the expression and its 
content, and that it involves the idea of the "number" of contents 
of an expression, whereas the formal type of relation rather points 
to a correspondence between a system of expression and a system of 
the content.
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Summary and Conclusion of Part 2 
The second part of the thesis contributes to 
the 'external' history of mathematical economics and to 
methodological/epistemological analysis of mathematical 
formalism in the Neo-classical school of economic 
thought. The study of two seminal texts of this corpus, 
and the study of the historical context in which they 
were published, indicate that the epistemological status 
of mathematics in this theory changed from 1870 to 1959. 
In addition, these studies qualify the commonly held 
idea that mathematical formalism is unambiguous.
According to contemporary historiography and to 
historical events themselves, it is not clear whether 
the "marginalist revolution", by which is meant the 
simultaneous publication of Monger's Grundsatze der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre, Jevons' Theory of Political 
Economy and Walras' Eléments d'Économie Politique Pure 
is a revolution. Differential calculus, involving both 
marginal reasoning and the corresponding mathematical 
formalism, had indeed been introduced into economic 
analysis earlier (cf. chapter 5, section 3@1). This 
lack of specific features for defining the "marginalist 
revolution" has led historians to consider that this 
event is a sociological and institutional event rather 
than an event in the ’ internal ' history of economic 
thought. For example, Stigler (1964) suggests that 
mathematical economics developed from the end of the 
19thC. because economists had become trained in modern 
mathematics. This was the case for the two authors 
whose work we have surveyed, Jevons and Debreu. In 
connection with the British context, Stigler's (1964)
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sociological view on the marginalist revolution can be 
supported by Passmore's (1966, note 8, p.550) remark. 
Passmore points out that after Boole's discoveries, 
logic and economics were taught together in British 
universities. Regarding the French context, the 
importance of sociological causes for the development of 
mathematical economics in general is suggested by 
Perrot's (1992) view that because the academic milieu 
was disconnected from that of economists in the 19thC., 
the latter were not aware of statistical techniques 
developed by the former, which they might have found 
useful. In the historical literature on the subject, 
mathematical formalism is described as the "language 
barrier" which precluded the development of mathematical 
economics. Similarly, it might be considered that 
mathematics established a "privileged access" to the 
scientific community of economists.^
Putting aside sociological views on the 
marginalist revolution, the results of our investigation 
into the external history of mathematical economics 
suggest that this event is a version of the foundational 
crisis that affected mathematics at the end of the 
19thC. (cf. chapter 4, section 1). We showed that in 
the early 1870s, mathematical articles were published 
that mark the evolution that occurred in mathematics in 
the 19th c. and that laid the foundations of 20th c. 
mathematics. By the end of the 19thC., the
mathematical intuition based on a physico-
geometrical representation of space had given way to an
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intuition based on algebraic rules and on the handling 
of symbols. The analytical definition of the limit of a 
function and of a derivative contributed to modifying 
this intuition. Consequently, one could argue that by 
applying differential calculus to economic theory as a 
whole, Jevons echoed in economics the revolution which 
was taking place in mathematics at the same time. 
Firstly, he was strongly influenced by Boolean logic 
(cf. chapter 5, section 1). Secondly, he used the same 
mathematical symbolism as that which was used by 
mathematicians who were prominent figures of this 
revolution. Thirdly, Jevons gave an analytical 
definition of the derivative of a function. Fourthly, 
he made use of differential coefficients in a way that 
shows, retrospectively, that he considered them as 
algebraic operators (chapter 5, section 301). However, 
this view on the connection between the history of 
mathematics and the history of mathematical economics 
needs qualifying since Jevons' use of the " new" 
differential calculus is limited and it has other 
origins than theoretical mathematics alone. In 
addition, even though his views on the use of 
mathematics (especially statistics) are modern to a 
certain extent (cf. chapter 5, section 2), his use often 
remained tied to the "old" Euclidean geometrical 
tradition in mathematics.
Jevons' use of the "new" differential calculus 
is limited since it was shown that Jevons did not use
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differential calculus evenly in the various parts of 
his theory. In particular, he did not use differential 
formalism (cf. chapter 6, section 2@1)^ often; he used 
differential coefficients as algebraic operators in the 
Theory of Utility only; and in spite of his claims, he 
used the integration operation but only in connection 
with the computation of the rate of interests. On this 
latter ground, the view can be supported that Jevons' 
mathématisation also had an empirical/practical origin. 
This does not conflict with our results, namely that 
some evidence suggests that generally speaking, 
mathematical formalism used in economics has empirical 
and practical origins (cf. chapter 3, section 2@2). 
Another well known origin of Jevons' use of the 
formalism of differential calculus is theoretical 
physics (cf. chapter 5, section 3@2). When Jevons does 
not consider differential coefficients as algebraic 
operators, he uses the corresponding symbolism as a 
means of extending reasoning involving originally 
finite quantities to reasoning on infinite quantities. 
In this connection, it will be suggested below (cf. 
General Conclusion), that the use of mathematical 
symbols allowed Jevons to avoid considering in details 
any epistemological problems arising from such an 
extension of his reasoning.
Features of the Euclidean geometrical intuition remain 
in the Theory of Political Economy firstly in that it 
contains direct reference to Euclid. In addition, it
2 6 0
Summary and Conclusion
of Part Two
can be argued that both Jevons' claim that literary
economics already contains mathematical reasoning and
the deliberate lack of mathematical proof with symbols 
in his treatise (cf. chapter 6, section 1@2) are 
typical of the Greek tradition in mathematics.  ^
Gardies (1993) considers indeed that there are two
characteristic features of Greek mathematics compared
with other traditions. One feature is that it did not 
use many symbols or ideograms. The second is that not 
only were mathematical proofs expressed in vernacular 
language, but the inferential steps of reasoning relied 
on (and followed) the phonetic structure of the written 
discourse expressing the proof. By contrast, symbolic 
algebraic proofs also rely on the visual and 
typographic aspects of writing.
On these grounds, one can summarize Jevons' 
contribution to mathematical economics as follows and 
in doing so contribute to a non-sociological definition 
of the marginalist revolution. Retrospectively, Jevons 
may be characterised as having developed mathematics as 
a conceptual tool : he applied the symbolism of
differential calculus so as to unify at the same time 
reasoning in different subparts of economic theory into 
a unique "marginal reasoning" drawing together 
mathematical formalisms with different origins. In 
addition, he argued for the use of statistics as an 
empirical tool for heuristic purposes, as well as for 
validating the theory.
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The evolution of neo-classical mathematical
economic theory from Jevons' Theory qf Pp.l.
Economy to Debreu's Theory of Value concerns both the 
theory itself and how it was generally perceived. The 
use of mathematics in science, and in economics in 
particular, had become more widespread in the 1950s 
than was the case in the second half of the 19thC. It 
was also less controversial (cf. chapter 6, section 
l@l) . However, controversies concerned the assessment 
of mathematical economics, and especially the role of 
economic "reality" in assessing theories (cf. chapter 
6, section 1@2, chapter 6, section 2@3). It was 
considered that knowledge of economic "reality" was 
provided by econometrics, which developed in the first 
half of the 20thC. (cf. Morgan, 1990), or that 
"reality" referred to logico-mathematical possibility. 
Alternatively it was considered that "reality" referred 
to pragmatic and political decision-making. For his 
part, Debreu was concerned first and foremost with the 
logico-mathematical cogency of General Equilibrium 
theory. He achieved and proved this cogency using 
metric topology and axiomatics (cf. chapter 6, section 
3@2). These tools enabled Debreu to provide a non­
constructive proof of the existence of a General 
Equilibrium under certain specific conditions.
From a biographical standpoint, the developments in 
logic by the Bourbaki group and by the Vienna Circle 
had an influence on Debreu (cf. chapter 6, section 3@1;
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chapter 6, section 2@1) . Contrary to Jevons however, < 
Debreu considered that logic departed essentially from 
communal sense and vernacular language. This provides 
an explanation for their giving different status to 
symbolic-mathematical proofs in their theories. Debreu 
considers that they are essential for the logical 
validation of the theory. Jevons does not and 
considers that logical arguments are valid only if 
expressed in vernacular language. In addition, from an 
'internal' historical perspective, Debreu's
contribution to Equilibrium Analysis is identified with 
this application of logic, whereas Jevons' contribution 
is identified with the application of differential 
calculus.
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NOTES TO THE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF PART TWO
^ From this perspective, mathematics bears the same socio- 
linguistic status as Latin did in the French society of Descartes' 
time. At that time, literate publications were mostly written in 
Latin. Descartes often used vernacular French instead.
^ Briefly, mathematical symbolism refers to the use of 
typographic symbols commonly used in mathematics, whereas 
mathematical formalism refers to the use of both mathematical 
symbolism and rules for handling symbols.
^ However, Jevons admits mathematical proofs in the sense of 
statistical proofs (cf. chapter 5 ,  section 2 ) .
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PART THREE
MATHEMATICAL ECONOMIC MODELS
INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE
Introduction to Part Three
This third part deals with the second topic of 
the thesis, namely mathematical economic models. it 
intends to show that, even though epistemologists and 
methodologists agree with the view that mathematical 
models are an essential feature of the production of 
contemporary economic theories, it is difficult to 
identify precisely in which way they contribute to 
science. In order to bring these points into light, we 
shall attempt at defining mathematical economic models 
from different stanpoints.
We shall first give an ostensive definition of
what is called today mathematical economic models, and also 
of applied models (chapter 7 ). This is for the purpose of
clarity: when the views and the remarks held in this
thesis differ from the views of other methodologists, this 
definition enables the reader to identify whether it is a 
difference in interpreting and understanding scientific 
objects or whether it is a difference in the range of
objects that are been considered.
Then we are concerned with the historical origin 
of the term model in economic literature (Chapter 8 ). The 
bibliographical starting point of this inquiry is an 
unpublished article by Martin Zerner (1993). The first 
section displays the results of a backwards
chronological inquiry into the origins of the term. The 
methodology and the scope of the second section differ from 
those of the first, even though they both have the
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same subject-matter. The second section is not focused 
on the chronology but on the institutional context. We 
identify 'terminological sources' i.e. individuals or
institutions a) that were amongst the early users of the 
term in economics, and b)that are recognised now as 
having played a primal role in the circulation of the 
term within the community of economists. It goes without 
saying that because of its very nature this chapter has 
no claim to be comprehensive.
The next step in the apprehension of
mathematical economic models consists in extending the
scope of the previous analysis (Chapter 7 , Chapter 8 ) in
two ways: to non-mathematical models and to non economic 
models (Chapter 9 ). This is justified first by the 
methodology of the thesis which is concerned with 
external history. Secondly, it is justified by the 
nature of the available methodological and 
epistemological literature about scientific models. Most 
authors approach models either from a perpective 
concerned with science as a whole or with physics in 
particular, but not with economics specifically. In this 
respect, Hausman (1992), Van Parijs (1990) and Granger 
(1955) seem to be exceptions since they are strictly 
concerned with economics. Thirdly, the extension of the 
scope of the study to other sciences is justified by 
three features of contemporary economics. The first 
feature is that one possible origin of the use of the 
term in economics is its use in mathematical physics (cf.
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Chapters - ) . The second is the belief held by some 
economists, both in the past and at present, that 
economics is the paradigm of social sciences.
Consequently, as Van Parijs(1990) notices, the study of 
the methods used in economics is de facto a study in the 
methodology of other social sciences. The third feature 
is the view held by some economists that their 
mathematical structure is not essential to mathematical 
economic models. The first section is concerned with the 
question whether models are a defining feature of 20th c 
science in general, or whether they are specific to 
economics. The second section is devoted to analysing 
what models reveal of the epistemological structure of 
economic science.
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CHAPTER 7 
OSTENSIVE DEFINITION
Ostensive Definition
"Du remède à la confusion qui naît dans nos pensées 
et dans nos discours de la confusion des mots ; ou il 
est parlé de la nécessité et de l'utilité de définir 
les noms dout on se sert, et de la différence de la 
définition des choses d'avec la définition des 
noms." ’
Antoine Arnauld, Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou l'Art
de Penser. I, 12 (1662).
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SECTION 1: OSTENSIVE DEFINITION
The argument below refers to items that are 
named mathematical economic models today, either in 
economic textbooks or in specialised economic 
literature. The motive for the selection of these 
models is to exemplify the fact that they appear in 
most subparts of economics regardless of the
principles adopted for subdividing the discipline.^ 
A widely held view is that the use of 
mathematical models is a characteristic of neo­
classical economics. However, they are not specific 
to a particular school of economic thought. Models 
derived from the Debreu-Arrow model are usually 
referred to as being examples of the 'microeconomic 
neo-classical equilibrium model' (cf. Guerrien, 1992) 
The equilibria concerned may be general or partial 
equilibria, the economic environment concerned is 
either certain or uncertain and the "competition" is 
either perfect or imperfect. The mathematical 
structure related to this object is the finite 
dimensional real vector space with its dual space. 
It is represented either with algebraic symbolism or 
geometrically. The mathematics in use are general 
set theory (cf. Debreu, 1986) differential calculus 
and topology, linear algebra (convex set
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analysis included), measure theory and non standard 
analysis (cf, Debreu 1986). Probabilities are also used 
in these models in the neo-classical vein. For example, 
this is the case for the asset pricing models in
financial economics Debreu terms these 'theories', 
'models' in Guerrien's (1992) terminology. He considers 
that they are 'true' instances or interpretations of 
mathematical formal structures. In this respect, they 
are not only models in the popular sense of
representations of the economy, but also in a sense
similar to that used in the corpus of mathematical 
logic. The mathematics is considered to be the form of 
the models. This form allows characteristic features of 
the models to be deductively obtained with mathematical 
arguments and symbolism. In this case, it is considered 
that mathematics validates the model by endowing its 
statements with necessity. There are some cases where 
it is considered that the necessity of statements is 
independent of the symbolic system (vernacular 
language/mathematical symbolism) in which these 
statement are argued for. One such case is a proof by 
contradiction mentioned by Debreu (1986). There are
applications of these models such as computable general 
equilibrium models which are used in international 
economic institutions (cf. Debreu, 1986).
2 7 3
Ostensive Definition
There are examples of mathematical economic 
models in the Western Marxian school of thought as 
w e l l /  There are first Marxian microeconomic models/ 
Some of them have been built recently by American 
authors such as John Roemer (cf. Guerrien, 1992). 
Roemer's model deals with the determination of 
prices. Just as the neo-classical model deduces the 
characteristics of a state of equilibrium from a 
price system, Roemer similarly deduces class 
exploitation. In this sense, his model is
explanatory. In addition, there are Marxian
macroeconomic models. One example is Farjoun et al 
(1983)'s analysis. The authors refer to this
analysis as 'mathematical modelling' and label what
they are building as a 'probabilistic model'. They 
are using both probabilistic and statistical analysis 
to reframe the basic theoretical concepts of 
political economy expressed in input-output models. 
Basically, their approach consists in turning 
economic laws into probabilistic distribution laws. 
The assessment of whether the mathematization of the 
propositions of specific schools of thought alters 
these propositions is an important and unsettled
issue for the methodology of economics . On the 
one hand it is striking that in the two Marxian 
examples, the mathematization of the theory is on a 
par with its passing over schools of thought
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barriers. In this connection, Guerrien (1992) is
doubtful about Roemer's analysis being Marxian at 
all, and Farjoun et al (1983) themselves point out
that the results of their model are of relevance for 
economics in general. On the other hand, Guerrien 
writes that the mathematization of neo-classical 
theory has a merely pedagogical role and that it does 
not have the role of generalizing the theory. 
Similarly, authors differ in assessing whether the 
mathematics is an essential feature of the model or 
not. Guerrien (1992) holds the view that it is not,
whereas Debreu (1959, 1986, 1991) holds the view that
it i s .
We have just illustrated the point that 
mathematical economic models are not specific to a 
particular School of Economic Thought. Let us now 
indicate that they are not specific to other sub­
divisions of economic knowledge, such as the level of 
abstraction of a theory, theoretical knowledge as 
opposed to practical knowledge, large scale theories 
or small scale theories.
In abstract economic theory, apart from the 
Debreu-Arrow model already mentioned, there are also 
game theoretical models. The latter compete with the 
former, first, because they have the same theoretical 
status, the same level of generality and also the
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same axiomatic form. Second, they are both concerned 
with equilibria.* Important contributors to game- 
theoretical models are John von Neumann (1903-1957), 
Oskar Morgenstern (1902-1977) who contributed to the 
analysis of co-operative games in particular, and 
John F . Nash who suggested considering co-operative 
games as special case of non co-operative games. In 
the same way as there are less abstract models of the 
Debreu-Arrow general equilibrium model involving 
specific production and utility functions, there are 
also less abstract models of, say, probabilistic one 
player games, with a specific probability 
distribution.
According to Franklin (1993, pp.517-518), there are 
applied models of axiomatic game theoretical ones, 
just as there are applied models of the general 
equilibrium model. For example, Schwartz (1978) 
refers to the Wharton School's model of 1967, which 
has been applied 'to give account o f  statistical 
data for the US economy collected between 1948 and 
1964. In particular, this model identifies recession 
patterns as sets of sub-optimal equilibria.
Similarly, models are not scale-specific: there are
general models of the economy and also models for 
specific markets such as financial markets. 
Consequently, the size of the empirical extension of
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a model in itself does not justify its being called a 
'model'.
The mathematical economic models that have some 
connection with the economy are not scale-specific in 
a geographical or thematic sense (a particular 
region, the market for a specific commodity...). 
Finally, the diversity of examples already mentioned 
is sufficient to show that mathematical economic 
models are not using a unique mathematical technique. 
The use of some branches of mathematics, such as 
differential calculus or linear algebra, does not 
seem to be controversial. The use of others, such as 
probability calculus, is. This was true when
Haavelmo (1944) published one of the earliest 
econometric models, and both Farjoun et al (1983) and 
Davidson (1991) suggest that it is still true today.^ 
It is also hard to identify methodological 
and epistemological features of mathematical economic 
models so as to define the difference between models 
and, say, theories, hypothesis or conjectures. Even 
within the sub-group of models called 'error-
correcting' models, which, to use Morgan's (1990,
pp.192-258) terms, aim to bridge the "data-theory 
gap", models have different functions. For example, 
some of them estimate the bias of statistical 
computational methods such as regression analysis,
resulting from these computations being
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performed on one particular set of data. We consider 
that these models are part and parcel of statistical 
analysis and it may be considered that their function 
is merely methodological. Others aim at accounting 
for inconsistencies between the theory and 
statistical data, such as "errors-irr-variables" models 
(cf. Morgan, 1990). These models have an
epistemological function since in order both to 
identify a "data-theory gap" and to assess what does 
explain it and what does not, one must have an 
opinion about the cognitive status of a theory. It 
is difficult to identify methodological and 
epistemological features defining models first 
because given a particular model, it may be difficult 
to identify its cognitive status. For example Boland 
et al (1986) criticise the Debreu-Arrow model on the 
grounds that few economics articles which are 
concerned with empirical inquiry make use of it. 
This criticism might be misleading since Debreu, at 
least in the Theory of Value is concerned with the 
logical cogency of an analytical framework rather 
than with its explanatory power. Second, it is also 
difficult because the same models may play different 
roles. In addition, as Morton (1990, pp.257-261; 
1993, esp. 671-673) and Hausman (1992, pp.70-82) 
notice, 'model' and 'theory' often stand for one 
another in economic literature.
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SECTION 2: COMMENTS
In the previous section, the multi-dimensional 
diversity of mathematical economic models has been
brought into light. We shall now make further comments 
on the particular aspect of this diversity, namely on 
applied mathematical models. After Israel (1996) and 
Franklin (1993), whose scopes of analysis are wider than 
ours, we shall point out the ambiguity of the phrase 
'applied mathematics' as applied to mathematical
economics in particular. Then the claim that the
conceptual cluster mathematics/formal is not ideal to 
account for contemporary mathematical economics is 
explained (cf. chapter 2, Section 2).
There are at least three ways in which 
mathematical economic models are said to be applied. In 
the first accepted use of the phrase, mathematical 
models are applied because they are specific to a 
particular economic reality (a particular nation, a 
particular market, a particular sociological
group...). This accepted use encompasses 
Bergstrom's(1967) definition of a "model" as follows: 
"Any set of assumptions that approximately
describes an economy or a sector of an economy can be
called an economic model", and also applies to models
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constructed to account for time-series. In this 
first accepted use, the function of the models is to 
reach something that is relevant to a particular 
economic situation, by contrast with something 
relevant to the economic phenomena in general. Let 
us give further examples. Guitton's (in [5], 
"Science Economique") definition of positive 
econometric models is a straightforward example of 
this first accepted use of "application". He draws a 
distinction between models in positive econometrics 
("économétrie positive") and models in rational 
econometrics "économétrie rationnelle"). Positive 
models are generally linear or non linear sets of 
equations with parameters estimated from statistical 
data. They differ from rational models, whose 
"statistics are derived from understanding as opposed 
to reality" (our translation). Examples we can give 
of "positive models" are the models used by civil 
servants described by Tinbergen (1967) after having 
been laden with national statistical data. There are 
'general rational models’, that correspond to these 
applied models namely those expounded by Tinbergen 
(1967)which are not nation-specific. However, there 
being a correspondence between an applied model and a 
more general epistemological framework is not a 
defining feature of 'applied' models in this sense. 
The second sense in which mathematical economic
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models are said to be applied is when they are used 
for specific practical purposes. By practical 
purposes, we mean actions purporting to transform the 
outside world and to physically organise it. The 
realms of such applied models are; national 
governmental policy-making; and conjectural analysis 
for individual firms, planning, accountancy, trade. 
'Applied' models in the second sense may be 'applied' 
in the first sense as well, but this is not
necessary. For example, it may be a quality for a 
model aiming at modifying consumers' behaviour to be 
consistent with people's representation of the 
economy instead of with statistical data on 
consumption. Conversely an applied model in the
first sense may not be 'applied' in the second sense, 
that is practically used. In this case, applied is 
more or less opposed to 'theoretical' or 
'causationless' models.
A third accepted use occurs, amongst other things, 
when one is considering the history of model- 
building. A model, whether abstract or not, might 
have been built for a particular phenomenon and may
later be 'applied' to something else, that had not
been thought of beforehand. This something 'else' 
might be a different discipline, a different subfield 
of the same discipline as the original, a different 
phenomenon, within the same discipline or not,
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or a different historical era. An example of such an 
accepted use can be found in the material explored by 
Hausman (1992, pp71-72). For example, MacKay's
scoring model for multiathlon sporting events is an 
applied version of Arrow's model.* MacKay interprets 
Arrow's axioms for economic individual preference 
orderings as axioms for scoring athletes in a 
competition. Another example of the same accepted 
use occurs when one speaks about mathematical 
economics as applied mathematics in the following 
manner. Mathematics that is, mathematical theorems 
and definitions rather than mathematical signs alone 
(i.e. mathematical formalism rather than mathematical 
symbolism) provides ready-made logical tools that are 
either interpreted in economic terms or used as 
computing devices in economic discourse.
One could argue that our example about 
consumers' behaviour (cf. definition of the second 
accepted use of 'applied') does not truly illustrate 
the difference between particular 'applied' models 
and practical 'applied' models. This remark is even 
more accurate if addressed to models of behaviour in 
financial markets. They are 'applied' (practical) 
models used for economic decision-making. In 
addition it is often considered that the agents' 
representations of the market are inserted in the 
models in the guise of anticipation variables or
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probability distributions. It is true that these two 
senses of 'applied' both refer, to a certain extent, 
to what Israel (1996, note 1, p.207) calls the 
vernacular accepted use of 'applied mathematics', 
namely the use of mathematics in empirical contexts. 
This use of 'applied mathematics' is vernacular, 
according to Israel (1996) because its appearance is 
not an important event in the history of science. 
However, these two first sense of applied are 
different from a philosophical point of view because 
the first refers to epistemology and the second to 
praxeology. We shall also retain the first sense of 
'applied' (particular) mathematical models as a way 
to draw attention to an aspect of the use of 
mathematics in contemporary science.
Assuming that what we are surveying at present is a 
scientific practice, then to appleal to the existence 
of applied (particular) mathematical models may 
appear to be debunking the widespread Aristotelian 
idea that science deals with generality. In 
addition, as it was noted above (Chapter 2, Section 
2) 'mathematics' usually connotes 'formal', which 
often connotes 'generality' as opposed to 'the 
particular' as well as a 'gap' between 'the formal ' 
and 'the particular'. Franklin's (1993) study as 
well as those of Israel (1996), Morgan (1990) and 
Morton (1990) indicate concerns that
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mathematical models do not entirely conform to these 
connotations. For example, Israel (1996) holds the 
view that a defining feature of 20th c. science is 
that mathematics are used to study particular aspects 
of phenomena as opposed to aspects they share with 
one another, such as their conformity to general 
laws. Franklin (1993) who is a mathematician, 
attempts to draw the attention of philosophers to the 
aspect of the 'Formal Sciences' (including game 
theory, control theroy, network analysis etc) .^  He 
holds the views, first, that these sciences cannot be 
described as an 'idealisation from' or as 
'applications to' reality. He also holds the view 
that in these sciences there is often no 'difference' 
between the mathematical necessity of the theories 
and the practical certainty of observations. Morton 
(1990) considers that the role of mathematical models 
in contemporary science is to bridge the 'gap' 
between general scientific theories, and particular 
observations. Morgan (1990) shows that this is true 
so far as econometrics is concerned. Morton (1990) 
also holds the view that this gap-filling role of 
models has similarities with the role of folk 
psychology. Hence he suggests that this role might 
be psychological rather than scientific.
The reader might rightly consider that 
given the evident relevance of the above
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remarks to the subject-matter of this thesis, they could 
be explored further. They are indeed the concern of an 
epistemology which is connected to the approach embraced 
in this thesis, but are still out of its scope 
Nevertheless it is hoped that these remarks are of 
assistance in showing how epistemological questions 
emerge out of the descriptive study of scientific 
methods or techniques.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
 ^ "On how to remedy the lack of sharpness in our thoughts that 
is caused by the ambiguity of words; it is discussed whether 
it is necessary and useful to define the names which are used, 
and the definition of a thing is contrasted with the definition 
of a term." (Our translation).
‘ We are all grateful to Professor Reid for drawing our
attention to the fact that one subpart of economics, namely 
institutional economics generally eschews mathematics.
 ^ We are very grateful to Professor Reid for mentioning to us t h i s  e x a m p l e .
* Because we are interested in the relationship between 
mathematical tools and economic content in economic theory, it 
is a matter of interest to us to investigate the Marxist East 
E u r o p e a n  mathematical economics in order to compare it to the 
Western Marxian tradition and to the neo-classical tradition. 
Both mathematics and economics are important academic subjects 
in the former Soviet countries, but the economy in which they 
developed and to which they apply is not a market economy. 
However, this investigation is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
We are grateful to Professor Reid for mentioning to us the 
following references related to the analytical treatment of 
Marxian economics: the French economists Benassy and Bonnetti, 
the Italian Pasinetti and the German Scheffold, the Russian 
Dimitriev and also Sraffa.
Hausman (1992 p.49 note 59) mentions the following authors: 
H. Morishima, Marx's Economics; A Dual Theory of Value and 
G r o w t h , (Cambridge: C.U.P. 1973); I. Steedman and P. Sweezy 
(eds), The V a l u e .Controversy (London: New Left Books 1981); J.
Roemer, Analytical Foundations of Marxian Economics (Cambridge; 
C.U.P. 1981)
* It could be argued that these two analyses do not entirely 
compete since Arrow et al (1952, pp.272-274), hold the view 
that games with finitely many players are a special case of 
their 'abstract economy'. They complete however, in the sense 
that historically, Arrow-Debreu models have been concerned with 
defining a uniform concept of equilibrium and with explaining 
the derivation of empirical data from equilibrium points (cf.
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Benetti, 1995), whereas game theoretical frameworks are rather 
concerned with defining different concepts of equilibrium so as 
to have a taxonomy of various empirical situations.
’ In this connection, it is worth noting that the use of 
probability calculus in economic theory in the 20th c . s u c c e e d s  
the mathematical axiomatisation of the theory provided by 
Kolmogorov f r o m  t h e  l a t e  1 9 2 0 s  t o  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 3 0 s ,  a n d  p r e c e d e s  t h e  E n g l i s h  p u b l i c a t i o n  i n  1 9 5 0  o f  h i s  F o u n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  T h e o r y  o f  P r o b a b i l i t i e s .
* MacKay A. 1980, Arrow's Theorem; The Paradox of Social. Choi'b_e_, 
A  Case Study in the Philosophy of Economics. New Heaven; Yale 
University Press, referenced in Hausman(1992).
’ By 'Formal Sciences', Franklin (1993) means operation 
research control theory, the body of techniques used to find 
emerging patterns in large sets of statistical data (e.g. 
descriptive statistics, signal processing), network analysis, 
tame theory, theoretical computer science, artificial 
intelligence, statistical mechanics, fluid mechanics. We are 
grateful to Adam Morton of the Philosophy Department of the 
University of Bristol (UK) for drawing our attention to this 
a rticle.
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HISTORICAL DEFINITION
Historical Definition
"Folly speaks: [...] What difference is there, do you
think, between those in Plato's cave who can only marvel 
at the shadows and images of various objects, provided 
they are content and don't know what they miss, and the 
philosopher who has emerged from the cave and sees the 
real things?"
Erasmus, Praise of Folly. XLV (written between 1509 and
1522).
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SECTION 1: CHRONOLOGY OF THE ORIGINS IN
ECONOMIC LITERATURE'
SECTION 181; 1936
According to Zerner (1993), the term 'model'
first occurs in economic articles’ titles in 1936 in an 
isolated context.
This remark is confirmed by our survey of tables of 
contents as well as a reading of articles of the first
four volumes of the journal Econometrics.^  'Model' first
appears in an English article by Victor Edelberg entitled 
"An Econometric Model of Production and Distribution" 
(Edelberg, 1936)^. In the core of the text, the word is 
scarcely used and it is used to assess the author's 
input-output theory of production. It designates an 
equation entailed from others. According to Edelberg,
this theory is statistically useful but is not a good 
model for production.
The occurrence of the word Zerner reports next 
is also dated 1936. It appears in a presentation by 
Tinbergen to the Vereenigung voor Staathuishondkunde. 
From the analysis of Zerner's references, the term seems 
to be Dutch. In 1937, Tinbergen defines it in the 
following way:
"Before enumerating the equations adopted 
to describe Dutch economic life, I must stress 
the necessity for simplification.
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Mathematical treatment is a powerful tool; it 
is, however, only applicable if the number of
elements in the system is not too large.
Subjects, commodities and markets have, 
therefore, to be combined in large groups, the 
whole community has to be schematized to a 
'model' before anything fruitful can be done. 
This process of schematization is, of course, 
more or less arbitrary. It could, of course, 
be done in a way other than has been here 
attempted. In a sense this is the 'art' of
economic research, depending partly on the 
attitude in which the approach is mad e .
The word does not appear in an article by Tinbergen
published in 1933 (Tinbergen, 1933a) . For the present
teiminological survey and it is important to know whether
this article is a translation or not. This article,
published in French, contains anglicisms such as
'component réel', 'component imaginaire' (emphases
added). It could therefore by a translation of an
earlier article written in English or Danish which could
contain the word 'model'. However, it is likely that it
is not a translation since according to Alain Desrosieres
to whom personally we are grateful for this piece of
information, Tinbergen was fluent in French (cf. also
Desrosieres, 1994, p.3 note 1)^. In addition, according
to Desrosieres (1994, p.19), Tinbergen wrote a book in
French in 1938 entitled Les Fondements Mathématiques de
iâ Stebilisetiph sây Mouvement des Affaires, which
strongly suggests that he was able to write an article in
French in 1937.
After having reviewed the author's works, Zerner
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remarks that 'model', in Tinbergen's terminology, is 
restricted as a rule to cases where the coefficients of 
the equations are statistically determinated. Not only 
is his use specific but also it is scarce. The economic 
context, identified by Desrosieres (1994), is that of 
Dutch macroeconomic policy which aimed to relieve the 
1930s Depression. Our inquiry in Chapters, Section 2 
partly confirms Zerner's view.
292
Historical Definition 
SECTION 1@ 2: 193?
Thanks to Morgan (1990, p.81) we notice the
next occurrence of the word in an English article by 
Eugen Slutsky in 1937. This article is a revision by
Slutsky of the English translation by Eugene Prostov of a 
1927 article Slutsky wrote in Russian on business
cycles .^
"Any concrete instance of an experimentally 
obtained chance series we shall regard as a 
model of empirical processes which are
structurally similar to it. As the basis of
the present investigation we take three models 
of purely random series and call them the
first, second, and third basic series. These
series are based on the results obtained by the
People's Commissariats of Finance in drawing 
the numbers of a government lottery loan. For
the first basic series, we used the last digits 
of the numbers drawn; for the second basic 
series, we substituted 0 for each even digit 
and 1 for each odd digit; the third basic
series was obtained in the same way as the
second, but from another set of numbers drawn."
(Slutsky, 1937, p.108).
At first sight, it seems that Slutsky is concerned with 
finding a well defined mathematical function which
matches statistical data on business cycles, as Tinbergen 
(1933a) does in the tradition of Econometrics. We
suggest that, in addition, and in the second section of
the article in particular (pp.107-114), Slutsky is
addressing not only a technical economic problem, but 
also the general epistemological status of
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mathematical accounts of random events, necessary events 
and events produced by a known or unknown cause. What 
supports this suggestion is that it is striking that in 
this section, (esp. pp.107-108; note 7 p.108; note 14 
p.114), Slutsky is extremely careful about the terms he 
employs and about their origin.^ Slutsky is concerned 
with showing that a simple mathematical treatment of what 
he calls an "incoherent" or "random" chance series 
generates a "coherent" series. By "incoherent" series, 
he means series with no connection between the terms of 
the series, and by "coherent" series, he means series 
with a connection between the terms. Slutsky implicitly 
asserts that mathematical computation first may provide 
unstructured (random) series with a structure and 
secondly, that it provides a way of analysing different 
empirical events within the same symbolic framework.
The concept of model used in this article is 
not totally clear even though it is well defined. Whilst 
the aim of the article is clearly to show that the 
mathematical treatment of random processes can generate 
mathematically regular patterns, and despite Slutsky's 
attempt to develop a clear terminology, some details of 
this article remain obscure. For example, the random 
series on which the whole article relies is based on "the 
results obtained by the People's Commissariate of Finance 
drawing the numbers of a government lottery loan"
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(Slutsky, 1937, p.108). There is no detail on how this 
series has been drawn. Most certainly, these numbers were 
drawn at random, but it might also be that the 
Commissariate of Finance used a mathematical computation 
to draw these numbers, so that this series might be 
"random" only in a limited sense.
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SECTION 1®3: 1944
Thanks to Morgan (1990, p.245) and Zerner 
(1993, p. 5) we notice the next occurrence in Trygve 
Haavelmo (1911-) . In 1944 he defines a model as an a 
priori form of knowledge:
"Theoretical models are necessary tools in 
an attempt to understand and 'explain' events 
in real life. In fact even a simple
description and classification of real 
phenomena would probably not be possible or 
feasible without viewing the reality through 
the framework of some scheme conceived a 
priori." (Haavelmo, 1944, p.l).
they
"will have an economic meaning only when 
associated with a design of actual experiments 
that describes - and indicates how to measure - 
a system of 'true' variables (or objects) X^, 
X2 , ..., X^ that are to be identified with the
corresponding variables in the theory...
The model thereby becomes an a priori 
hypothesis about real phenomena, stating that 
every system of values that we might observe of 
the 'true' variables will be one that belongs 
to the set of value-systems that is admissible 
within the model. The idea behind this is, one 
could say, that Nature has a way of selecting 
joint value-systems of the 'true' variables 
such that these systems are as if the selection 
had been made by the rule defining our 
theoretical model. Hypotheses in the above 
sense are thus the joint implications - and the 
only testable implications, as far as 
obseirvations are concerned - of a theory and a 
design of experiments." (Haavelmo, 1944, p.8).
According to Zerner, 1944 is a landmark
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in the history of the word. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, 
dated 1944, originated contemporary usage of the term.
"At this stage, the reader will observe a 
great similarity with the everyday concept of 
games. We think that this similarity is very 
essential; indeed that it is more than that. 
For economic and social problems the games 
fulfill - or should fulfill - the same function 
that various geometrico-mathematical models 
have successfully performed in the physical 
sciences. Such models are theoretical
constructs with a precise, exhaustive and not 
too complicated definition; and they must be 
similar to reality in those respects which are 
essential in the investigation at hand. To 
recapitulate in detail: The definition must be
precise and exhaustive in order to make a 
mathematical treatment possible. The construct 
must not be unduly complicated, so that the 
mathematical treatment can be brought beyond 
the mere formalism to the point where it yields 
complete numerical results. Similarity to 
reality is needed to make the operation 
significant. And this similarity must usually 
be restricted to a few traits deemed 
"essential" pro tempore - since otherwise the 
above requirements would conflict with each 
other.
(1) E.g. Newton's description of the solar 
system by a small number of 'masspoints'. 
These points attract each other and move like 
the stars, while the enormous wealth of the 
other physical features of the planets has been 
left out of account." (Author's footnote)*
The connection between model-building and theorizing in
Physics is also unambiguously asserted by Morgenstern
(1944, note 8 p.21) : "We do not want to give the
misleading impression of attempting here a complete
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picture of the formation of mathematical models i.e. of 
physical theories."
From then on, the use generalises in economics according 
to Zerner so that the period after 1944 goes beyond the 
scope of this section.
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SECTION 1@4: IN SEARCH OF EARLIER OCCURRENCES IN
ECONOMIC LITERATURE
One reason for selecting early issues (1890- 
1896) of the periodical The Monist as a potential source 
of information on the origin of the term 'mathematical 
economic model ' is that it was concerned with bringing 
science and its methodology into all areas of human 
thought, implying a synthetic view of science. This 
suggests that issues related to economics were within the 
scope of the journal. A second reason is that if, as 
historians and philosophers of science tend to suggest, 
and as we shall see later (cf. Chapter 9 ) mathematical 
-model-building is a general feature of 20th c. scientific 
theorizing one might find in the unitary views on science 
expressed in The Monist roots of this contemporary common 
scientific practice. The third reason is related to 
emerging contemporary knowledge of the history of 
mathematical modelling. Israel (1996, p.19) holds the 
view that :
"In fact, the phrases "mathematical models" 
and "applied mathematics" began to be used 
exactly when a crisis hit the mechanist view on 
science and especially the idea that science 
provided a united approach to Nature" (our 
translation).
Since Ernst Mach is known as one of the first scientists 
to have challenged the methodology of classical 
mechanics, and since he was a regular contributor to
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the periodical, it is a potential source of information 
for our inquiry. Books that are landmarks in the history 
of mathematical economics and in neo-classical economics 
in particular such as Jevons' Theory of Political Economy 
and Marshall's Principles had already been published by 
the 1890's. Hence it can be considered that by that time, 
the knowledge they contained had reached an academic 
milieu wider than that of economists. Consequently, if 
economic mathematical model building is historically 
connected to the neo-classical tradition and to the 
development of mathematical economics, evidence for this 
might be found in the periodical. After describing the
place of economics in the issues, we shall describe the
place of the concept of model herein.
A suryey of the table of contents and of some
articles of the first six issues of The Monist (1890-96)
reveals that Economics was not an important subject- 
matter. The subjects dealt with were the 'science of 
human mind', in a broad sense, such as psychology, 
ethics, anthropology and religion, as well as the 
physical and mathematical sciences.
The only article which focused on an economic topic 
occured in the 1893-94 issue (4, pp.533-544): 'Philosophy
and Industrial Life' by J. Clark Murray. The author does 
not refer to 'Economics' but to 'Economical science' 
instead. In this article, he is concerned with
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showing that Economics and Ethics are connected to one 
another. He considers that since morality is dependent 
on human economic conditions, there is no such thing as 
purely economic actions. The author does not use the 
term 'model', nor similar terms, nor does he comment on 
the use of mathematics in what he calls "economical 
science".
In addition to this article, there are a few articles 
dealing with the economy as a secondary topic in the 
1890-91 and the 1891-92 issues. These articles are 
presented as dealing with theories of the evolution of 
species.* Therein, the evolution of economic systems is 
considered as a component of Evolution in general. 
Similarly, there are not many reviews of books on 
economic and related subjects in the issues under survey. 
However they are more abundant than articles per se on 
this subject. Such book reviews first appear in the 
first issue under the heading 'social philosophy'.^* The 
next similar book reviews appear in the third issue. 
In the last three issues, that is, from 1893 onwards, 
their numbers i n c r e a s e . T h e  main question the authors 
are concerned with is how to combine the economic 
organization of society with both the progress of the 
human species and justice; and the tone of their analysis 
is critical of the state of society of their time. 
Articles and book reviews dealing with topics that are 
the concern of other Social Sciences such as
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Anthropology or Sociology occur more often in the 
periodical and earlier than economic topics. The
theoretical framework which is used to approach social
and economic phenomena is that of the sciences of life 
and not the framework of Mechanics. Society is
identified to 'a social organism'. The conceptual 
framework used in Mechanics is indeed discussed in the 
periodical, but only in connection with individual 
psychology.
The articles and the book reviews pertaining to Social 
Science referred to above do not make mention of the term 
'model' nor of similar ideas. The term 'model' does not 
occur in the table of contents either. There are
articles concerned with Mathematics. They focus on the 
analysis of the subdivision of the subject into highly
specialised sub-disciplines rather than on the use of
mathematics in other disciplines. Israel (1996, pp.311- 
312) provides a treatment of this which explains that 
even though there were articles in the periodical on 
Mathematics, Economics and on the methodology of 
classical Mechanics, there were no articles on the 
Mathématisation of Economics. Israel holds the view that 
the mathématisation of theoretical biology in the 19th c. 
is less important than the mathématisation of theoretical 
economics. Since the approach to Economics that prevails 
in the periodical is a biological approach to the economy 
it is therefore not surprising that the
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mathematical nature of economic science is not discussed 
in the articles and book reviews on economics published 
in the periodical.
One article concerned with the philosophy of perception 
however, shows concerns that are familiar to those 
expressed in contemporary epistemological and 
methodological literature about scientific mathematical 
models. This is an article by Paul Carus and Ernst Mach 
(Carus et al, 1890} entitled "Some Questions of Psych- 
Physics. A Discussion." In this article, the
relationship between both the awareness and the possible 
material cause of a feeling, and the representation of 
this feeling are analysed. The first section in 
particular, focuses on the link, termed "parallelism" in 
the article, between abstract representations of reality 
and what allegedly they represent. It is argued along 
the line of what would be termed today an instrumentalist 
view on scientific theories, that: "In a certain sense
all words and concepts are tools for dealing with the 
realities they represent. But some words are tools in a 
special sense. They have been invented for acquiring a 
proper representation." (The Monist. 1, p.410 emphasis 
added). This quotation insists on the essential 
normative feature of language and of cognitive frameworks 
which have been mentioned above (cf. Chapter 2 , note 12). 
Even though this quotation originally applies to
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issues in the philosophy of mind, it can be read in 
connection with the topic of this chapter, mathematical 
economic models. These models can indeed be considered 
as the conceptual tools which are considered today as the 
proper, i.e. socially admitted, scientific
representations of reality. This understanding of 
contemporary scientific model-building, which is that of 
Morton (1990, 1993), tends to emphasize its gnosiological 
features rather than its epistemological features, (cf. 
Cheix1996 , Section 1).
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SECTION 2 ; ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES
SECTION 281; TIKBERGEN (1903-1994)“
The first terminological source is Jan 
Tinbergen. He is considered as a terminological source 
because it is clear from Desrosieres (1994, p.4) that he 
played an institutional role in Economics and Political 
Economy. He indeed worked for the League of Nations and 
the United Nations, and was also the Director of the 
Central Planning Bureau at The Hague. In addition, he 
was awarded the first Nobel Prize in Economics with 
Ragnar Frisch in 1969. In his early writings and 
possibly up till 1944-45 Tinbergen's use of the word 
model is generally restricted to that which Zerner (1993) 
identifies as characteristic of Tinbergen's work (cf. 
Chapters , Section 1), but in addition he uses it in a 
different context in his later work.
In the first usage which is to be found in 
Tinbergen (1945), Bos et al (1962), Tinbergen (1964, 
1967), it qualifies a class of representations of "real" 
economic relations with a cognitive function. For 
Tinbergen the representations are not mathematical in 
essence but the cognitive functions they are involved in 
are essentially mathematical.
Zerner's quotation of Tinbergen seems to indicate that 
the common characteristic of these models is that
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they involve simplifications of economic reality; they 
are not mathematical in essence, but rather present 
conditions for using a mathematically "powerful" 
treatment, which cannot be applied to too large a set of 
data.
In this context, "model" bears the same meaning as 
"theoretical scheme" in Tinbergen's (1935) article on 
business cycle where the connotation is economic- 
theoretical scheme. It expresses relationships between 
economic variables which influence business cycles. 
Tinbergen's idea is that once these relationships are 
expressed with mathematical equations defining implicit 
functions, one can derive mathematical characteristics of 
the functions and obtain the amplitude of the business 
cycles over time. Depending on how well the function is 
specified, Tinbergen writes that the economic theory 
whose scheme has been mathematized is "non-mathematical", 
"semi-mathematical" or "fully mathematical". The example 
he gives of a non-mathematical theory is Hayek's.^* 
Tinbergen assesses Hayek's "literary" (his emphasis) 
theory in the following way:
"An attempt at a mathematical "translation" 
[of Hayek's theory] leads the reader to many 
unsolved questions. This is not to deny that 
many original and valuable suggestions are made 
and, by stating the various assumptions and 
relations with mathematical precision, one may 
contribute to a better understanding of the 
unsolved problems" (Tinbergen, 1935, p.264),
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Keynes' Treatise on Money is an example he gives of a 
semi-mathematical theory. Even though the mathematical 
relationships between economic variables at a given point 
in time are more straightforwardly obtainable than in 
Hayek's case, the intertemporal relationships between 
these variables leave the ultimate function unspecified. 
Examples of fully mathematical theories are Kalecki's, 
Frisch's and others, as well as his own. Not only are 
the theoretical schemes they are using mathematical 
schemes but they also fall within the set of functional 
relationships that can be mathematically treated so as to 
get qualitative characteristics of the functions they 
involve.
In later writings, the definition of models in 
the first sense is worked out in more detail and thereby 
altered. The mathematics definitely become an essential 
feature of a model itself. In addition, they are 
presented in connection to their political use, which was 
not the case in earlier writings. An entire book is 
devoted to their presentation (Bos et al, 1962) and in 
another book a chapter is dedicated to their taxonomy and 
history ("Scientific planning", in Tinbergen 1967, 
pp.218-233).
In the books under survey (Tinbergen 1945, 1964; 1967;
Bos et al 1962) the models are considered as conceptual
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designs for implementing the phenomenon of economic 
growth.
They are theoretical instruments for economists either to 
explore economic reality, and build up causal relations, 
or to forecast future economic trends, as they are in 
earlier writings. They are "instruments" for economic 
observation, just as telescopes are for astronomy, and 
barometers are for meteorology. Further, they are 
theoretical, because they result from economic science 
just as optical instruments are the result of the history 
of science: they are sharpened as the theory progresses.
Such a sharpening occurs throughout Tinbergen's work 
itself. A model is, however, not theoretical in the 
sense that it would reflect the view of a particular 
economic "theory" or school of thought. This view 
already occurs in Tinbergen's earlier writings:
"In this connection it is important to 
remember that "different theories", in the 
economic sense of the word, may often lead to 
the same mathematical formulas, the only 
difference being in the economic sense of some 
of the constants." (Tinbergen, 1935, p.302).
Besides being instruments for economists, models are
instruments for political decision-making as well and for
framing economic policies. To turn to Tinbergen's words,
they are a "hard core of programming" (Bos et ai, 1962,
p.4). For example, the models in Mathematical Models for
E_c_onomic Growth are aimed at civil servants for the
practical purpose of planning economic
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development, either in the short or long term, at a macro 
or at a micro level, in Western or Eastern, or in
developed or underdeveloped countries.
The difference between the economic and the political 
instruments is merely teleological:
"It is not entirely satisfactory that these 
models [econometric and decision making ones] 
should be called by a different name, since 
they may in principle remain exactly the same 
as before, that is to say, they may include the 
same equations.(...) [But] a different role is 
assigned to the variables (Tinbergen, 1967, 
p.229) .
Models in the first sense have a formal side 
and a content. This distinction appears not only in
later writings of Tinbergen but also in earlier writings 
as well (cf. previous quotation of Tinbergen, 1935) .
The formal side of the design, which is mathematical, 
consists of equations (linear or not linear) whose 
coefficients are indeterminate or are statistically 
estimated :
"A model consists of a number of elements, 
now to be considered from the formal side only. 
The economic contents will be discussed in Sec. 
1.5. A model consists of (1) a list of 
variables, to be subdivided into known and 
unknown or exogenous and endogenous variables in 
the analytical sense used above,- and (2) a list 
of relationships or equations specifying the 
links of any type that exist between the 
variables, to be subdivided into definitions, 
balance equations, technological and
institutional equations, and behavior
equations. Each equation represents a set
3 0 9
Historical Definition
of links or reactions with a causal direction, 
sometimes symbolized by arrows directed toward 
the variable affected. The links represented in 
one equation are those meeting in one variable 
at one point of time and together responsible 
for the size that variable will take at that 
time. In each equation, therefore, those 
variables occur which influence the variable in 
which the links meet. There are other elements 
too in the equations, representing a third 
element of the model; (3) coefficients. They 
describe the intensity with which one variable 
affects, through one particular link, another 
variable. (Additive constants will be
considered coefficients too.) They are typical 
of what is sometimes called the structure of the 
mechanism or organism.
The elements of a hypothetical ideal model 
of society can be used to analyse the process of 
planning and the coordinating task of the macro­
economist in it." (Bos et al, 1962 p.6)^^
In programming, the mathematical and abstract feature is
essential. It is first a tool for checking that "no
inconsistencies creep into the system of figures which
ultimately constitute the plan" (Bos et al, 1962, p.5,
emphasis added). Then, it combined knowledge into a
manageable, though sophisticated object that helps to
handle interdependent variables:
"It [the ideal co-ordination method] is 
essentially of a mathematical or, if that term 
is preferred, of a logical character. The 
complete operation, in all details, of an 
economy and the human beings populating it can 
be described by a mathematical model of a much 
more complicated and sophisticated nature than 
anything we know in reality. To deny this is 
equivalent to denying the possibility of the 
scientific treatment of the operation
of society. It does not imply the
310
Historical Definition
assumption of determinacy in the old sense, 
since we have the tool of stochastic variables, 
representing - in physics as well as economics, 
to cite only two examples - those elements of 
"freedom" sometimes invoked against the 
assumption of determinacy. The essence of a 
model is precisely that of an orderly and, in a 
sense, complete administration of knowledge. It 
is for this reason that the model supplies us 
with the tools of coordination." (Bos et al, 
1962, pp.5-6, emphasis added).
In addition, the design has an economic content which
corresponds to the schematized picture of the economic
phenomenon which is referred to as "model" in Zerner's
early quotation of Tinbergen . Such a scheme is
grounded partly on the economist's intuition to which
Tinbergen refers to now and again and partly on communal
economic sense (cf. Chapter 4  , n o t e  2 ). By
intuition, the author means a judgement motivated by
economic theoretical evidence and statistical data about
what is relevant and what is not relevant to the analysis
of a particular economic reality. For example, in
Mathematical Models for Economic Growth, the economic
contents of the models that aim at picturing the material
side of the process of development (the phenomenon of
production) consist of the following (Bos and Tinbergen,
1962, pp.10-14). The first type of economic content
consists of selected economic phenomena integrated into
the model (e.g. IsdDour, capital, land, investment,
prices, intertemporal/interfactorial/international and
substitutions of final products). These phenomena
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are theoretical economic notions. The second type 
consists of assumptions about relationships between 
economic phenomena (e.g. proportionality between inputs 
and outputs, importance of capital/output ratio in 
investment, comparative length of investments processes) 
and assumptions about the variations of these variables 
over time (e.g. the quantity of land in constant over 
time) . The third type is meta-theoretical and
methodological. It consists first of justifications of 
mathematical assumptions (e.g. prices of products "can be 
conveniently put equal to one, meaning that value figures 
and volume figures are identical", Bos and Tinbergen 
(1962, p.12), thanks to economic history arguments and 
assumptions on the nature of development. Secondly, the 
third type consists in the enumeration of cases in which 
the previous assumptions are appropriate (e.g. the 
assumptions on prices holds if the world-market dominates 
the regional-market of the product and if its 
transportation costs are low).
Considered as economists' theoretical 
instruments, Tinbergen's mathematical/economic models 
bear similarities with mathematical equations used in 
mechanics. Such similarities are most obvious in 
Tinbergen's early writings on business cycles (Tinbergen 
1933a, 1935) even though the author does not specifically 
refer to "models" therein. For example, Tinbergen
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explicitly uses the symbolism, the methods and the 
mathematical treatments used in studies of mechanical 
oscillations. The interrelation between these mechanical 
and economic studies does not reflect a merely 
biographical feature of Tinbergen's work. It is true 
that according to Zerner (1993, p.4), Tinbergen studied 
physics before he studied economics and that his doctoral 
thesis was devoted to minimum problems in physics and in 
economics. In addition, according to Desrosieres (1994, 
note 12, p.18), Paul Ehrenfest, one of the originators of 
quantum mechanics, influenced Tinbergen. But it is also 
true that theoretical approaches to business cycles using 
the formalism and the methods of the study of mechanical 
oscillations were commonplace in the 1930s and in 
Econometrica articles in particular. Further, the 
influence of physics seemed to fade away in Tinbergen's 
later writings. These are the reasons why we venture to 
say that similarities between Tinbergen's practice of 
economics and those of contemporaries or previous 
practices of physics does not hinge on a philosophy of 
science view about the achievements of physics compared 
with that of economics as is the case in Jevons' writings 
(cf. Chapter 5 ). Tinbergen's practice of economics 
rather hinges on the acknowledgement of the role of 
mathematics in building, testing and applying knowledge. 
His view seems to be that mathematics imposes various
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controls on knowledge which constitute its scientific 
feature.
We first recorded the second usage of the term 
model in the 1945 translation of International Economic 
Co-operation in the following sentence: "The best kind
of planning is that in which free trade is taken as a 
model” (Tinbergen, 1945, p.21). This judgement is 
presented as the result of the appraisal of, what would 
be called today, different institutional economic systems 
for achieving the goals of international relations. 
These goals are to produce as much as possible at a 
regular pace, to allocate production, justly through 
persons, classes and nations, to guarantee freedom and to 
restrict both national and international conflicts. It 
is important to recall the pre-war shutting down of 
national economies, the post-war reconstruction context 
and the cold war to understand Tinbergen’s advocacy. In 
his terminology, free trade is contrasted with free 
competition, which is exemplified by the Japanese case. 
In his sense, free competition refers to unscrupulous and 
ruthless trading, and free trade refers to harmonious 
exchanges. Free trade is not associated with financial 
profit maximising in the private sector nor with economic 
deregulation. On the contrary, it is a regulation 
process which does not exclude state intervention. The 
sole alternative to this "principle for the
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regulation of trade relations" is socialisation, which is 
equated with less liberty at every level of social order, 
and rejected for this reason. An additional point he 
puts forward in favour of free trade is that there is 
imperfect competition in world trade in terms of the 
elasticity of national shares in world trade. This 
imperfection is not justified by structural economic 
features of national economies but by an economically 
non-competitive distribution of wealth within national 
economies. This argument seems to be aiming at playing 
down critics of his who would point out that the
regulated free trade he promotes is synonymous with the 
hindrance of natural-competitive actual trade.
This second usage must be read in parallel with 
Tinbergen's later view that welfare economics should be 
considered as the foundation of planning. By this he
means that the criterion for choosing between global 
plans must be of the utilitarian kind, deployed to choose 
between social orders,- even though the link between 
personal and social utility is ill-defined (Tinbergen, 
1967).
The first usage of the term "model" by
Tinbergen is constant throughout his work it seems. This 
concept of a model can be traced back to 1933 . It
refers to economic problems expressed with equations to 
which mathematical treatment is applicable.
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The formal mathematical aspect is part and parcel of the 
model which bears a heuristic and a methodological role, 
but is also closely related with "literary" economic 
theory. This close interrelation is due to the cognitive 
power of implicit functional relationships whose literary 
expression can be symbolised in a way that is at once 
mathematically meaningful. Because they involve natural 
numbers and because economic data are numbers, 
deductively obtained functional relationships can be 
controlled with empirical evidence. Conversely,
empirical evidence suggests mathematical relationships. 
The second usage is part of the terminology of welfare 
economics and we record its occurrence in 1945. By 
contrast with the first usage, this one does not appear 
in early writings. For example, it does not appear in an 
article published in 1933 in which Tinbergen (1933b) uses 
welfare economic concepts such as ophelimity and 
expectations but he used them solely insofar as they help 
to give a mathematical account of data. In this sense, 
"model" refers to a norm or reference for the agency of 
world trade or of national economics and it is a guide 
for political and economic actions at a national and 
international level.
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SE C T IO N  2 @ 2 t  THE COWLES CO M M ISSIO N^
Another terminological source is the Cowles 
Commission for Research in Economics. The origins of the 
information on the Cowles Commission that follow are 
Morgan (1990, p.55, note 11), Desrosieres (1994), the 
epigraph to the Cowles Foundation Monographs in Debreu 
(1959) as well as Armatte (1994, pp.870-871) and 
reference books. It was set up in 1932 and founded by 
Alfred Cowles at Colorado Springs. It was intended to 
develop econometrics in conjunction with the Econometric 
Society formed in 1929, and the journal Econometrica 
which was launched in 1933. It moved to Chicago in 1939 
and was affiliated with the University of Chicago until 
1955. Because the research staff of the Commission was 
appointed at the University of Yale, the Cowles 
Foundation superseded the Commission in 1955.
In a 1953 publication, Milton Friedman defines 
the specific meaning of the term 'model' in the 
Commission's terminology. At that time, Tjailing 
Koopmans (1910-1985) had been the director of the Cowles 
Commission since 1948; he held this position until 1954 
and also from 1961 to 1967. The methodology promoted by 
the Commission to frame hypotheses
"Consistent with known evidence is divided 
into two substeps: first, the selection of a
class of admissible hypotheses from
317
Historical Definition
all possible hypotheses (the choice of a "model" 
in their terminology); second, the selection of 
one hypothesis from this class (the choice of a 
"structure") (...) As noted above, if one 
hypothesis is consistent with available 
evidence, an infinite number are. But, while 
this is true for the class of hypotheses as a 
whole, it may not be true of the subclass 
obtained in the first of the above two steps - 
the "model". It may be that the evidence to be 
used to select the final hypothesis from the 
subclass can be consistent with, at most, one 
hypothesis in it, in which case the "model" is 
said to be "identified"; otherwise it is said to 
be "unidentified" (Friedman, 1953, p.12 note 
11) .
'Model' is a descriptive-methodological term that refers 
here both to a priori schemes as in Haavelmo's 
terminology and to a pattern reflecting empirical data as 
in Slutsky's quotation. In this context, the term 
designates a particular scientific practice and also it 
defines a class of theoretical objects. Friedman 
concedes that this practice may have a heuristic value. 
Unlike the proponents of this practice, however, he 
denies it an appraising - methodological function 
inasmuch as the selection between alternative hypotheses 
"must be decided by some such arbitrary principle as 
Occam's razor" (Friedman, 1953, p.13). For its
proponents, who are considered here as a tradition, this 
practice lays a unique basis for assessing a hypothesis 
and comparing hypotheses. Since this assessment is 
grounded first and foremost on the theory of statistical 
inference originated by Haavelmo in the 1940s, we
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consider that the methodological view of the Cowles 
Commission reported by Friedman deals with the logical 
foundation of scientific knowledge. In the perspective 
of the Cowles Commission models are used to define the 
correspondence between theories and the empirical data.
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SECTION 2®3: VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN
It can be considered that Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's use of the term 'model' influenced 
economists as a whole since, according to Israel (1996, 
p.312), "The birth of modern mathematical economics (also 
in the 192 0s) was implied by the works of von Neumann, 
who was not an economist himself." (our translation). 
It is clear from their definition of 'model' (cf. Chapter 
8, Section 1@3) that it is a methodological term that 
describes a practice as in the Cowles Commission's 
terminology (cf. Chapters , Section 2@2) and that it does 
not designate an object as it does under Tinbergen's 
terminology (cf. Chapters, Section 2@1). This practice 
is the generalisation of theorizing in physics to science 
in general. In this terminology, models in physics and 
models in economics as similar in the sense that they 
play the same function in the two subjects. This 
similarity between models in physics and models in 
economics differs from this similarity in Tinbergen's 
terminology. In Tinbergen's case, it refers to the same 
kind of mathematical functions being used in the two 
subjects.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
 ^ It seems that the terms 'structure', 'structural' and 'schemes' 
were used in the economic literature before the term 'model' was 
used. For example, R. Frisch and F . Waugh in "Partial Time 
Regressions as Compared with Individual Trends" (Econometrica. 1,
pp.367-407) define a "structural relationship" as the a priori ideal 
and theoretical relationship that defines the subject-matter of 
empirical approximation. In this article, "structural
relationships" bear an essential methodological role for the authors 
in the sense that as they rightly point out, when economists compare 
different methods of approximation (which are referred to as 
"econometric theories" in the article), they implicitly postulate 
the existence of such a referential structure. According to Morgan 
(1990, p . 150) the term structure was later adopted via Haavelmo by 
the Cowles Commission (cf. also Chapter 8, Section 2); it is to be 
found in Slutsky (1937) as well. As for the term 'scheme', it 
occurs in 1933 as well in Tinbergen (1935) (cf. Chapter 8, Section 
2 ) .
In addition to the article referred to in this thesis, these 
articles are; in Volume one:
"Partial Time Regressions As Compared With Individual Trends" by 
Waugh and Frisch; "Editorial", by Frisch; "L'Utilité d'une Théorie 
Générale des Ensembles Renouvelés" by Divisia; "Time Series: Their
Analysis by Successive Smoothings" by Maverick; "Pseudo-Scientific 
Method in Economics" by Mayer.
* Victor Edelberg is not recorded in the New Palorave Dictionary of 
Economics. In Econometrica (1939, pp.89-91) he also wrote two 
abstracts on 'L'Hystérésis de la Demande' and 'Discussion of 
"L'Influence de la durée d'emploi sur la Productivité du Travail"'.
* This quotation is from Zerner (1993, p.4) . It is also quoted by 
Morgan (1990) but not in full. Its full reference however, is taken 
from the latter, it is : J. Tinbergen, An Econometric Approach to
Business CVcle Problems. Paris: Hermann et Cie, 1937, p.8.
 ^ Alain Desrosieres is conducting research for the Institut 
National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Paris.
The original article by Slutsky in unavailable in the major 
British and French libraries as well as in Parisian libraries 
specialised in Russian publications.
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In addition, it is worth noting that the style of this section 
and the philosophical concepts it deals with such as 'whole', 
'part', 'model', 'chance', 'process', are very similar to those of 
Aristotle in Phvsics. II, 3-6. In this section, Aristotle is 
concerned with defining what we mean by a 'cause' and how cause 
differs for 'randomness'. The connection we draw between these two 
authors is not a biographical conjecture about Slutsky's readings in 
philosophical literature but it is evidence that general 
epistemological questions occur throughout history at the occasion 
of technical scientific problems. This justifies retrospectively 
our claim (cf. Chapter l) that methodology is an unavoidable stage 
in an epistemological study and also our interdisciplinary approach 
to the reading of economic theoretical texts.
’ J. von Neumann, 0. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic 
Behaviour, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 3rd edition,
1953 p . 32, quoted from Zerner (1993, p . 5).
These articles are:
Joseph Le Conte, "The Factors of Evolution", The M o n i s t . 1, 1690-91, 
pp.321-335; Editor (Paul Carus), "The Continuity of Evolution", The 
M o nist. 2, 1891-92, pp.70-94.
The book reviewed is John S. Mackenzie, An Introduction to Social 
Philosophy (The M o n i s t . 1, 1890-91, pp.601-604).
The book reviewed is Gustav Engel, Die Philosophie und die 
Sociale Frage (The M onist. 3, 1892-93, pp.478-479) .
These books are: James Bonar, Philosophy and Political Economy
in Some of Their Historical Relations (The M o n i s t . 4, 1893-94,
pp.316-317); Emile Durkheim, De la Division du Travail Social. (The 
Mo n i s t , 4, 1893-94, pp.279-280); J. Shield Nicholson, Principles of
Political Economy (The M o nist. 4, 1893-94, pp.474-475); J. Novicow, 
Les Luttes entre Sociétés Humaines.._et leurs Phases Successives (The 
M û d I sjl, 4, 1893-94, pp.121-125); Th. Ziegler, La Question Sociale
est une Question Mor a l e . (The Mon i s t . 4, 1893-94, pp.447-448); J.
Novicow, Les.Gaspillages des Sociétés Modernes (The M o n i s t . 5, 1894- 
95, pp.439-440); Julien Pioger, La Vie Sociale. La Morale et le 
Progrès (The M o n i s t . 5, 1894-95, pp.436-437); G. Tarde, Logique
Sociale (The M onist. 5, 1894-95, pp.434-436).
It is reported (Sellekaerts, 1974) that the most comprehensive
bibliography on the author is collected by L.H. Klaassen, L.M. Koyck 
and H.J. Witteveen (eds.) in Selected pap e r s . Amsterdam: North
Holland, 1959. This bibliography can be supplemented by : J.B.D,.
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Derksen in De Economist. CVII, 1959, 798-799; by J.P. Pronk in De
Economist. CXVIll, 1970, 156-73; De Economist November 1994.
We are grateful to Professor Reid for suggesting to us that 
Tinbergen is probably referring to Hayek's Prices and. .Production 
published by Routledge in 1931.
Exogenous variables concern "phenomena of an extraeconomic 
character, that is, natural, psychological, technical, or 
institutional phenomena". It seems that Tinbergen considers that 
they are specific to the economy under consideration. Endogenous 
variables on the contrary, concern economic phenomena of a wider 
scale than that of the economy under consideration. (Tinbergen, 
1962, p . l ) .
J. Tinbergen, An Econometric Approach to Business Cvcle Problems, 
Paris; Hermann et cie, 1937, p.8 . (cf. supra Chapter Bisection 1) .
The history of the Cowles Commission is available, according to 
Morgan (1990) in the following. C.F. Christ, 1952, 'History of the 
Cowles Commission 1932-1952', in Economic Theory and Measurement. 
Chicago, Cowles Commission for Research in economics; C. Hildreth, 
1986, The Cowles Commission in Chicago. 1939-1955. Berlin, Springer- 
Verlag; R.J. Epstein, A History of Econometrics. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
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EPISTEMIC-COMPARATIVE DEFINITION
Epistemic-
Comparative Definition
"And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they 
have all one language/ and this they begin to do : and now 
nothing will be restrained from them, which they have 
imagined to do.
Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, 
that they may not understand one another's speech."
Holv Bible. Genesis, 11.
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SECTION 1: (MATHEMATICAL) MODELS IN
CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE
SECTION 1@1: AN INTER-DISCIPLINARY PHENOMENON
Nowadays, the use of models is not confined to 
the economic domain. It belongs to "hard" sciences such 
as logic, physics and biology and also to the social 
sciences as a whole. Philosophers (e.g. Morton, 1990, 
1993) together with scientists (e.g. Zerner, 1993, Klein, 
1991) and historians of science (e.g. Israel, 1996) 
notice this fact. According to Etienne Klein (1991) 
there are periods during which "a particular type of 
problem-setting and problem-solving prevails, so that 
approaches to knowledge are unified" (our translation) 
and this is the case for the 1990s. Hausman (1992, p. 81) 
remarks similarly that "The fact that theoretical 
economics is devoted to the exploration of models does 
not distinguish economics from other sciences. In 
theoretical work, all scientists attempt to exclude the 
complications of reality".
According to Badiou (1969) this way of conducting 
scientific inquiry was current in 1969. In all 
probability, it was also current practice at the 
beginning of the 195 0s since at that time, there were 
already attempts at classifying models (cf. Maldonado, 
1970, pp.139-140, note 37).^
This way of doing science is model building, which is
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often mathematical model-building. It originated before 
the 1960s (cf. Chapter 6 and Israel, 1996). Zerner
(1993) considers that, that from a terminological point 
of view, 'model* is more widely and more loosely used in 
the social sciences than in the physical, mathematical 
and logical sciences. So far as physics is concerned, 
this is suggested by Zerner's (1993) subject index 
inquiring into physics abstracts up to 1990, upon which 
we shall now report. Among applied mathematicians, the 
term appears in the 1960s but is not widespread in 
English-language journals until the mid-1970s. It is 
scarcely used in France, and when it is, it occurs at a 
later date.
Zerner (1993) mentions the use of 'model' in 
psychology in 1951, in sociology (1950-51), in demography 
in 1958 and in operational research in 1951. Badiou 
mentions its use in 1958 by Lévi-Strauss in Anthropologie 
Structurale. It also occurs in linguistics as it does in 
Muller (1979).
In post-war physics, the term is scarcely used. 
It can mean a simplification of a well determined theory 
for the purpose of approximation and practical use. This 
is the case in meteorology. The theory is supplemented 
with a series of models whose role is to approach real 
atmospheric conditions step by step. This usage of 
'model' in meteorology is confirmed by Morton (1993). 
Alternatively, it can refer to mathematically simple
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problems set up to study a physical phenomenon which is 
not well known and whose theoretical mathematical 
description is not easily manageable. This is the case 
in studies of turbulence phenomena, and such models are 
known as Burger's models. It is not expected that these 
models will be approximations of reality,* it is enough if 
they share some qualitative features with it. Later in 
the 1960s, field theory models provide example of such 
simplified theories. They differ from Bruger's however, 
because the corresponding theories are axiomatized, and 
they may function as a check on the models' consistency. 
In addition to these fields, models are used in life 
sciences. In palaeontology. Brunet-Lecomte et al (1992) 
refers to the 'Cox model', the 'model of the Red Queen' 
and to the 'Stationary model' . These models are 
theoretical hypotheses about the dominant causes of the 
extinction of species, or the evolution of species over 
time. They can be confronted with empirical data thanks 
to modern mathematical 'methods' like fractal analysis. 
Another usage of 'model* in this article by Brunet- 
Lecomte et al (1992) is that of a paradigm in the 
following sense. To illustrate, the radiation of the 
particular species of the Arvicolid family is considered 
today as a model for the studies of evolution. This is 
because of the good quality of the available data on this 
species. Hypotheses on evolution in general are framed 
from this case-study, tested on it and then tested on
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other data sets. This article is not an isolated case in 
biology. In his speech at the annual conference of the 
European Society for Philosophy and Psychology held in 
Paris in September 1904, the neurobiologist
J.P. Changeaux pointed out that in the life sciences in
general 'model* has such a double meaning, that of a 
theoretical hypothesis and that of a paradigm.
The term 'model* is used also in logic. Today, 
in accordance with the Carnap and Tarski tradition in 
logic, a model is an object that instantiates or realizes 
a formal structure called a theory. It belongs to a 
conceptual realm where one can distinguish between truth 
and falsehood. "An interpretation constitutes a model of 
the theory if and only if it makes all the sentences come 
out true." (Hausman, 1992, p.71; cf. also Krivine, 1989, 
Lassaigne, 1989) . We rely on Guillaume (1994) for the 
following historical information on this matter. The 
earliest occurrence of the term in the philosophical 
logic and mathematical logic literatures which Guillaume 
(1994) mentions is in an early article on game theory by 
Von Neumann published in 1925 in the Journal fur die
reine und angewandte Mathematik entitled *Eine
Axiomatisierung der Mengelehre’ . The German term 
'Modell* is used in 1929 by Zermelo in 'Ûber den Begriff 
der Definitheit in der Arithmetik' and in 1930 in 'Ûber 
Grenzzahlen and Mengenbereiche' both published in 
Fundamdenta Mathematicae, According to Guillaume
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(1994) , there are numerous occurrences of the term in 
these articles. By contrast, the next occurrence in 
Tarski's writings is a rarity. It occurs in a paragraph 
written in 1933 for the Logische Syntax der Sprache 
(1934) but included only in the English edition of the 
book (1937). However, until 1935, it does not occur in 
Tarski's writings concerned with meta-mathematics. In 
1935, Tarski uses it in Grundzuge des Svstemenkalkul. 
Tarski also uses it in 1937 in his address 'Sur la 
Méthode Deductive', at the 9th International Congress for 
Philosophy, in which he draws differences between 
realization, model and interpretation. Then Godel uses 
it in 1938 in 'The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and 
of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis' in the 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
U.S.A.
In short, it seems that by 1948, the term was still not 
widely used in titles in the literature of logic. As far 
as the genealogy of the concept of model is concerned, 
Guillaume(1994) considers that the modern logical concept 
of model originated from the separation between the 
science of formal languages, also called "symbolic 
algebra", and the interpretations of such formalisms in 
"applied sciences". This separation culminated in a 
report by George Peacock before the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science held in Cambridge in 1833. 
Then three notions of model developed fairly
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independently in geometry and axiomatics, in algebraic 
logic and in universal algebra. These three notions are 
definitely unified between 1945 and 1950 so as to result 
in the contemporary logical and modern concept of a 
model. It seems that 'model' has not always referred to 
a true structure, but that it has also referred to the 
weaker idea of a structure interpreting another 
structure. In addition, it seems that in the fields 
mentioned above it has never referred to an idealized 
structure.
Not only are objects called 'models' used in 
many sciences, but also the terminology regarding them in 
one science is not always consistent with the terminology 
in another science. The main inconsistency, which is 
often mentioned in the philosophical and methodological 
literature, is between the meaning of 'model' in Logic 
and its meaning in Economics. Hausman (1992, p. 71) 
remarks that: "This logician's notion of a "model" is
not what economists mean when they talk of models." It 
is true that at first, the common phrase 'mathematical 
model of the economy' seems paradoxical compared with the 
use of 'model' in 20th c. mathematical Logic. Granger 
(1994, p.245, note 1) remarks that this paradox occurs 
not only in connection with economics but also in 
connection with the social sciences as a whole. In the 
Social Sciences, 'model' refers to something abstract or 
formal, and to an idealization or a
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representation of the real economy. It is often
considered as a theory or a hypothesis which can either
be false or true. In Logic, a model is less abstract
than a theory. It is the reality to which the theory
applies and sometimes it is the object about which one 
theorizes. It also plays the role of assessing formal 
systems since according to Badiou (1969), models can be 
used as a criterion for selecting and comparing formal 
logical theories. For instance, if the formal logical 
structure does not apply to basic mathematical 
structures (e.g. the set of numbers N) then the formal 
structure is doubtful and the axioms undergo a revision. 
Therefore logical models are on the side of "the 
empirical" and they have a methodological role in meta­
mathematics. As Granger (1994, p.245, note 1) remarks, 
however, there is a similarity between these two 
contradictory definitions of models. In both cases, the 
model is involved in the representation of one system by 
another system.
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SECTION 1@2: A TOPIC DEALT WITH BY PHILOSOPHERS OF
SCIENCE
References to the terminological diversity 
surrounding models in science seem to be commonplace in 
the philosophy and methodology of science literature. In 
the methodology of economics literature, bibliographical 
references giving evidence of such an interest can be 
found in Hausman (1992) and Armatte (1995) . The features 
of mathematical economic models that have been brought 
into light previously (cf. Chapter V , Chapter 8 ) are
also, according to Hausman, (1992, p.80), features of
feconomic models in general: "(...) models in economics
serve many purposes and are of many kinds". According to 
Hausman (1992) some models are 'special case' models, 
that serve as crutches or pedagogical devices, and 
resemble the scale models used by engineers. Their 
methodological function is not unique either. The 
question as to whether they serve to test theories or 
whether they are "occasions for the acquisition of new 
perceptual beliefs" is controversial. This view on the 
methodological status of mathematical models is also 
Morton's (1990, 1993).
We shall now turn towards reporting some epistemological 
attempts at defining scientific models. The attempts we 
shall report upon are due to Hausman(1992), Badiou (1969) 
and Morton (1990, 1993). They are particularly relevant 
to this study because contrary to most philosophy
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of science studies, they are concerned exclusively or at 
least partially with Economics. The aim of these 
reports is not to review fully the literature on this 
subject. The aim, rather, is to explore whether models 
are as diverse in the philosophical literature as they 
are in the scientific literature.
Hausman (1992, esp. pp.70-82) identifies the 
major accepted use of the concepts of "theory" and 
"models" in the methodological and the philosophical 
literature, with a particular emphasis on the views that 
influenced him. These views include Suppes, Sneed and 
Stegmueller on the one hand, and Giere on the other.^ 
The first set of authors consider scientific theories to 
be predicates. In particular, "Suppes argues that 
scientific theories are set-theoretic predicates, because 
he hopes to provide set-theoretical formal restatements 
of scientific theories." (Hausman, 1992, p.74). Sneed 
attempted to fulfil Suppes' desiderata so far as 
economics is concerned.'* Giere considers that
"scientific theories are definitions of predicates 
themselves" (Hausman, 1992, p.74, emphasis added) and 
that they are but one part of science. The other part 
involves "proposing theoretical hypotheses, which assert 
that the new term is true of some actual system" 
(Hausman, 1992 p. 75) . The view can be held that the
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diversity of philosophical definitions only reflects the 
diversity of scientific terminology. The view can also 
be held that the plethora of philosophical definitions is 
the cause of many scientific terminological confusion, 
especially since philosophers often change the definition 
they give of a 'model' with time, as Giere does, 
according to Hausman (1992, p.75, note 3). Be this as it 
may, we consider that these conflicting attempts at 
defining the different kinds of theoretical structures 
are a sign that there is some work to be done by the 
epistemologist (cf. Chapter 9 , Section 202).
Hausman introduces his own work in connection 
to this context as follows:
"Although terminological changes court 
confusion, this one is worth the risks, for it 
brings the language of this abstract discussion 
of scientific theories into close accord with the usage of economists and avoids the paradoxical denial that scientific theories 
make claims about the world" (Hausman 1992, p.75, emphasis added).
So far as economics is concerned, Hausman solely 
considers neo-classical economics. However, because he 
is adapting positivists' concepts of the philosophy of 
science to economics, the definitions he gives of model 
and theory apply to a certain extent to science
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in general and not just to neo-classical economics.
Hausman's (1992, p. 75, note 4) work is not intended to
reflect what econometricians call models. To him, a 
'model' is either trivially true or it is neither true 
nor false; whereas a 'theory' is either true or false. 
According to his view, another difference between a 
'theory' and a 'model' is that a 'theory' is a set of 
lawlike assertions, that is, assertions of regularities 
in the appearance of phenomena, whereas the postulates 
defining a 'model' do not have a priori a specific form. 
A 'model' is a definition of a predicate which applies to 
a system. This definition consists of a set of 
postulates. The cognitive function of a model is to 
abbreviate properties of a system and to help 
understanding of this system. For example, a model of
agents' maximizing behaviour does not describe actual 
behaviours, nor is it a hypothesis about actual agents 
themselves. It is a definition of what it is to maximize 
behaviour. What connects models to actual behaviours is
what Hausman calls the 'closure of the postulate' of the 
'model'. A 'closure of a postulate' is an assertion that 
this postulate is true of a particular system. Finally, 
a 'theoretical hypothesis' is the assertion of the truth 
of some postulates that define the model.
Badiou's interpretation of the diversity of 
models in science is interesting for several reasons. 
First of all, even though a philosopher, he has a good
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knowledge of mathematical logic. Secondly, some of the 
results of his analysis of the state of the sciences 
coincides with Morton's later results, upon which we 
shall report shortly. Thirdly, he concerns himself with 
economic models (p.27). Badiou distinguishes three types 
of model . One he calls ideological, the other 
scientific and the third epistemological. He blames the 
notion of model defined by the positivists for being 
ideological (cf. Chapter 9 , Section 2). Badiou means by 
this that they make use of a scientific concept, namely 
that of a model as used in mathematical logic, in order 
to describe scientific practice, from the social sciences
to the mathematical and natural sciences. For Badiou, it
seems that epistemology is descriptive of scientific 
practice; and mathematical logic is such a practice. So 
far as economic models are concerned, Badiou (1969, p. 16, 
our translation) testifies that:
"(...) there is an increasing use of the so 
called "mathematical models" in economics
(...)"
and defines their function as follows:
"(..,) a model endows an economic policy 
with superficial coherence, it justifies it and 
overshadows both its origin and its logic"
Under this interpretation economic models are mostly
examples of ideological models. Scientific models are
logico-mathematical models (cf. Chapter 9 , Section 1@1).
They apply to mathematical structures, and they are
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the concern of the theory of models or of the theory of 
categories. It seems that Badiou holds the view that the 
diversity of models is the result of scientists holding 
(explicitly or implicitly) a realist/representationalist 
view on scientific theories. This view is that 
scientific theories are manageable and plausible images 
of "the world" as opposed to instruments for transforming 
it. He grounds his criticism on the analysis of what 
scientists and philosophers supporting this view consider 
to be features of a "good" model for a phenomenon: 
simplicity, comprehensiveness with regard to the 
phenomena concerned, and independence from other views on 
these phenomena, as well as independence from other 
phenomena, which we would call 'internal consistency'. 
According to this view, a consistent model, together with 
an interpretation connecting it with reality, has the 
main features of scientific knowledge. Badiou (1969) 
considers that this view on scientific theories is a 
variant of "common sense empiricism".
The scope of Morton's (1990, 1993) inquiry as
well as Badiou's (1969) is the philosophy of science. 
However, the range of models he is considering is 
narrower than those of Badiou. Morton is indeed 
referring to mathematical models exclusively and he only 
considers models in physics and economics. Morton 
considers, as Badiou does, that mathematical models are 
a feature of scientific practice, but he is
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concerned with extracting the features they share with
both common-sense representations and common-sense
explanations. In this respect, therefore, his analysis of
the diversity of models is grounded on the same
observation as Badiou's, namely that there are some
similarities between these scientific objects and common
sense. Morton's (1990, 1993) inquiry is two-sided and it
is essentially taxonomical. Morton's (1990) attempt to
define the types of imperfect explanations provided by
quantitative and qualitative mathematical models in
science is terminological and methodological. This
attempt consists indeed in defining a terminology
('width', 'depth', 'contrastive') in order to assess the
cognitive value of a scientific explanation. To consider
\explanations as 'contrastive' explanations is to consider 
them "as saying not why something happened but why it 
happened in one way rather than another" (Morton, 1993, 
p.265). For example, in connection with this thesis, 
Slutsky's (1937) model (cf. Chapters ), which represents 
time series mathematically, does not provide a 
'contrastive' explanation, since it does not say why the 
curve does not have another shape. According to Morton, 
'contrastive' explanations are the best type of 
explanations. The 'depth' of the explanation of a 
phenomenon refers to its contrastive force, that is, to 
the extent to which it explains why this phenomenon 
occurs rather than another. The 'width' of the
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explanation of a phenomenon refers to the extent to which 
it provides a comprehensive description of the 
phenomenon. Morton (1990, 1993) uses this terminology to 
assess, amongst other models, models of the preferences 
of economic agents, using utility functions. He 
considers that their 'width' is satisfactory, whereas 
their 'depth' is guasi-nonexistent. Further, according 
to Morton (1990), economists do not aim at 'contrastive' 
explanations. The methodological terminology Morton 
defines is as diverse as that of scientific mathematical 
models, but it provides a means of comparing the 
explanatory power of models.
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SECTION 2; MATHEMATICAL MODELS AND THE 
STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 
SECTION 2@1: INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WIDESPREAD USE OF
MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN ECONOMICS
We shall now report philosophical 
interpretations of the widespread use of mathematical 
models in economics. The first is the interpretation of 
the positivists. In the next subsection, we shall assess 
whether it is a sign of the unification of economic 
knowledge, and also whether it is a scientific feature.
The presentation of the interpretation of the 
widespread use of scientific models from a positivist 
point of view ife necessary because according to Hausman 
(1992) and Caldwell (1982) this tradition has strongly 
influenced 20th c. philosophy of science and also the 
methodology of economics. The presentation of logical 
positivism that follows mainly relies on the following 
sources; Piaget (1976), Hausman (1984 Editor's Preface 
Introduction; 1992, Introduction, chapter 5, Appendix 1), 
Neurath (1983), Nagel (1961) and Brandt et a l (1965). To 
these sources must be added the study of contemporary 
mathematical logic, which bears the marks of the logical 
works of Carnap and (since Carnap also shared their 
viewpoints) of the Vienna Circle (cf. Guillaume, 1994). 
The positivist philosophy we are presenting here, also 
referred to as 'neopositivism' if one
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wants to distinguish it from Auguste Comte's philosophy 
began in the 1920s and 1930s in Vienna and Berlin and 
became less influential from the mid-1970s onwards. It 
is conventional to call it 'logical positivism' when 
referring to its beginnings and to call it 'logical 
empiricism' in its 1950s American and more sophisticated 
version. The epistemology this tradition developed is 
scientific epistemology, by which is meant that they have 
been mostly and originally concerned with explaining 
scientific knowledge. According to Brandt et a l (1965, 
Introduction);
"The central task of epistemology is to 
provide a generalized critique of the grounds 
on which claims to knowledge are supported, by 
constructing a systematic account of the 
principles by which the truth of statements may 
be properly assessed, as well as of the 
rationale of these principles. A theory of 
knowledge so understood is indistinguishable 
from a theory of logic that is general enough 
to deal not only with the formal validity of 
arguments, but with the basis on which 
cognitive claims of any sort can be judged to 
be warranted, either as cases of knowledge or 
as instances of probable or reasonable belief. 
Accordingly epistemology is a normative 
discipline, in the sense that it provides 
standards for measuring the worth of cognitive 
claims, along with a systematic defense of the 
reasonableness of those standards. But it is 
in part also a descriptive discipline."
This tradition was influenced at the same time by the
physics of Einstein (1879-1955) , the development of
formal logic at the turning point between the 19th c. and
the 20th c ., the empiricism of Hume (1711-1776) and
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Mach (1838-1916) and finally Kant (1724-1804). 
Positivists consider that scientific knowledge has two 
sources, one is the empirical-experimental and the other 
is the formal logico-mathematical. Formal logico- 
mathematical judgements are tautological and have no 
truth or falsity value. Empirical judgements by 
contrast, are either true or false. A scientific theory 
consists in a set of syntactic propositions that may be 
expressed in first order logic, so as to appear as a set 
of propositions closed by deductions. Formal
axiomatization is therefore the ultimate form of 
scientific theories. In order for them to have cognitive 
content, which is identified it seems with having truth- 
value, they  ^ must be endowed with empirical 
interpretations called 'models'. The notion of model of 
the positivists seems to be identical with the 
logician's. According to Hausman (1992, p.75); "Note 
that this sense of "model" [Hausman's] is distinct from 
the logical positivist's notion. In their notion, a 
model is an interpretation of the sentences of a theory 
such that they all come out to be true." One of the aims 
of the positivists is to separate science from non 
science, for example from metaphysics, magical knowledge 
and theology. What is important for the present purpose 
is that positivists consider that the feature that 
distinguishes scientific theories from common sense is 
their being translatable into the logical-
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mathematical language. This language is considered to be 
the best for the purpose of interpersonal communication 
of objective facts. This translation is a task, and the 
unification of the sciences is its result.
From a positivist point of view therefore, the importance 
of mathematical models for contemporary science and for 
Economics in particular, is a testimony to the fact that 
the process of unifying sciences is at work. The fact 
that some models are not mathematized may be interpreted 
in this perspective as a call for further logico- 
mathematical translation. This perspective does not 
provide the means to explain why models, in a large 
sense, are so popular in science.
The multifarious usage of mathematical economic 
models within Economics can be put forward to support 
conflicting views on the methodology of economics. On 
the one hand, one may express the descriptive statement 
that economic practice is unified thanks to mathematics. 
One may point out that, to a certain extent, economic 
knowledge is unified in a stronger sense similar to the 
positivist's view on science. One can point out that 
axiomatized models such as the Debreu-Arrow model or the 
Morgenstern-Von Neumann-Nash model are generic models in 
the following sense. First, these models have a 
deductive structure to a certain extent. This is because 
they consist of hypotheses and axioms from which results 
and theorems are deduced. The deduction may be
344
Epistemic-
Comparative Definition
mathematical deduction, or it may rest on the semantics of
either Economics or of vernacular language. This
uncertainty about the nature of the deduction explains
why, as Mahieu 1989) has shown in the connection of other 
models, it is difficult to express the deductive structure 
formally (cf. Chapter 6, Section 202 note 8). However, 
it is not certain that this difficulty justifies the claim 
that these models do not have a deductive structure.
Assessing this matter fully is beyond the scope of the 
present work, since it requires deeper philosophical 
investigation than is required in this work. Secondly, 
these models serve as paradigms for other models (cf. 
Chapter 7). Finally, they provide general and formal 
definitions of the 'maximizing economic agent' which has 
been the core of economic theory for a long time, and 
remains so today (cf. Friedman, 1953, Van Parijs, 1990; 
Rosenberg, 1983). In addition, if one adheres to the 
contention about physics - which, as Zerner suggests, was 
made by Morgenstern and Von Neuman in 1944 (cf. Chapter 8, 
Section 103), namely that model-building is the core of 
scientific theorizing in physics; and also to the 
contention that physical theories are the paradigms of 
scientific theories, then one can infer that economics is 
a fully formed science.
On the other hand, one can focus on the 
fact that mathematical models are very different from one
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study to the other, and also from one school of thought
to the other, and consequently that the economic field is
not unified (cf. Chapter 7 , Chapter 8 In addition,
this lack of unification and of fixed meanings for
concepts may either be considered (as the positivists and
Jevons contended) to be a lack of features characteristic
of science, or (as Morin ,1982, would argue) to be a
proof of the dynamics of science:
"As a matter of fact, ideological and 
metaphysical conflicts, whether they be 
conscious or not, are a sine qua non of 
scientific dynamics (...). Under no
circumstances ought conflicts be eradicated 
because they are the very condition of the 
liveliness of science, which is a game 
regulated by empirical and logical rules." 
(Our translation).
Lakatos, according to Bailly et al. (1990), remarked in
Proofs and Refutation that such a lack of agreement also
occurred in mathematics. Edgar Morin (1982), whom we
conjecture to be influenced by Lakatos and Feyerabend
(1979), supports the view that it is a feature of science
in general. The views of Morin and Lakatos on the
creative role of diversity and debates in science seem to
imply a view on significance or meaning that is akin to
the Wittgensteinian (1958) view exposed in the
Philosophical Investigations. This view is that social
practice, whatever the angle from which it is approached
- from anthropology as Latour et al (1988) do, or from
linguistics as MacCloskey (cf. Backhouse, 1991a) does -
generates significance. This is to say, scientific
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methods and results are not important in themselves, or 
because they 'reveal reality'. They are significant in 
connection to the particular historical and sociological 
background. Meaning as social practice in this sense is
opposed to meaning as a reflection of 'truth' or
'reality .
By contrast, methodological diversity is 
sometimes considered to be a negative feature of economic 
knowledge. If one believes that the significance of
phrases is inversely proportional to their usage, one can 
argue, after Morton (1990, 1993), Zerner (1993) and
Badiou (1969) that the term 'mathematical economic model' 
does not refer to an epistemologically specific 
scientific practice. Instead, it is a rather general and 
misleading common-sense term. From a methodological 
point of view concerned with the appraisal of economic 
knowledge, it can be considered that this terminological 
looseness is an impediment to the advancement of 
knowledge. If one considers that the basic
methodological question to ask about a logically 
structured set of arguments is : "Does it play the role
for which it is designed?", and also if one considers 
that such roles vary from one subpart of economics to the 
other, then not having a terminology suitably for 
discriminating between mathematical economic models is a 
flaw. No general statement can indeed by stated about 
models. This flaw can be relieved by building a
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methodological terminology in a way which is explored by 
Adam Morton (1990, 1993) (cf. Chapter 9, Section 1@2),
or else it can be relieved by historical investigation 
into the causes of the looseness of the terminology, or 
else by the assessment of particular models. These last 
two ways are explored by Zerner (1993).
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SECTION 2@2; THE VAGUENESS OF THE CONCEPT OF MODEL; A 
RESULT OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY?
It was previously mentioned in passing (Chapter 
9 , Section 1@2) that the terminology used by 
philosophers to study scientific mathematical models was 
as confusing as the object to which they apply. An
example of how vagueness might result from philosophical 
inquiry is provided by Hausman's (1992) definition of 
models (cf. Chapter 9 , Section 1@2) . He begins with
pointing out that 'models' as defined by the positivists 
and by the logicians, does not match the usage of the
term by the economists. Then he uses logical and 
positivists' concepts to define a new concept of
theoretical mcdel which is in accordance with the 
practice of economists. At the same time, he leaves out 
one aspect of this practice, which is closer to the 
positivists' concept of model than the theoretical models 
he defines. This aspect is mathematical model-building 
in econometrics. Prima facie, it is close to the 
positivists' concept of model since it concerns the
relationship between theoretical and empirical 
investigation.
Consequently, one can ask the question whether the 
diversity we pointed out (Chapter 7 , Chapter 8 , Chapter 
9) is the result of our analysis and whether it is a 
phenomenon that deserves being studied.
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From the outset, let us point out that such 
question is not relevant to this thesis only, but to 
other epistemological/methodological enquiries as well. 
For example Otto Neurath (1935, p.115) in 1935 considered 
the question of whether the structure of science which 
positivists were attempting to build was a mere 
consequence of the methodology of "scientific philosophy" 
or whether it could be based on ontological foundations. 
His answer was that the unity of science had ontological 
foundations :
"As scientific people, we are prepared to 
check all our tenets by observation statements,
but also - far removed from every absolutism -
to alter the principles on which the checking
is based, when this seems necessary. But for 
our attempt at a common procedure uniformity is 
needed. Is this uniformity the logical
consequence of our program? It is not; I 
stress this again and again; I see it as a 
historical fact in a sociological sense."
Beyond this provisio , there are at least two 
questions deserving consideration. The first, is whether 
the difficulty in defining mathematical economic models 
is one that pertains to definitions in general or only to 
mathematical economic models. It seems indeed that 
mathematical models in economics and in science in 
general perfectly illustrate the Wittgenteinian idea of 
family resemblance (Wittgenstein, 1958) . Basically, the
idea is that there is nothing common to all such models
but only resemblances within subsets of . each
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object. These are not partitions of such designated 
objects, so attempts at defining them which seek to 
extract their essential features, are bound to fail. The 
second question is whether mathematical economic models 
and mathematics are essential features of contemporary 
economic knowledge or whether they simply denote a 
fashion. Further, statistical empirical studies such as 
those of Stigler (1965a), Anderson et a l (1986) and 
Leontief (1982) might be used to show that they are now 
falling into disuse.
The first question recalls a long debated 
philosophical issue about the correspondence between 
words, things and the rationale of definitions. Suffice 
it to say that we follow in Aristotle's wake, and more 
recently in that of Eco (1984, pp.12-13), in that we 
consider not only that the identity of things which bear 
the same name is a postulate, but also that making such 
identifications is a defining feature of philosophical 
inquiry. And we consider that the difficulty in defining 
mathematical economic models pertains to definitions in 
general. The question is not whether one ought to 
identify objects as we are doing here; but rather why one 
does want to do so, and what is the purpose of definition 
in this context. Our answer to that question, which is 
also an answer to the previous second question - that 
about the importance of mathematical economic
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models in contemporary economic knowledge, is that we 
conceive philosophy as dealing with what is important for 
the philosopher/methodologist's contemporaries, and that 
mathematical economic models assume great importance 
today for scientists as well as for the population in 
general. Because they are used for economic policy­
making, they are important for any individual belonging 
to the society to which such policies are applied. 
Because they are used by many scientists, they are an 
important input in the production of science today. 
Finally, mathematical economic models are discussed 
amongst philosophers, which is additional testimony to 
their importance, and indeed enough to convince us that 
they deserve to be looked at. Further, the fact that
authors in the 'Marxian tradition such as Badiou (1969) 
converge with the tradition of the positivists in 
acknowledging the widespread use of models in science is 
a case for believing that the diversity we expounded 
earlier (Chapter 8, Chapter 9, Chapter 9 ) is not merely
a result of our methodology and of our view on
philosophy.
We might be criticized by supporters of Kuhn's view on 
the grounds that mathematical economic models and the 
mathematical method are part of normal science today.®
Kuhn’s (1970, p.5) view on normal science is exemplified 
by the following quotation: "When examining normal
science in Sections III, IV, and V, we shall want
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finally to describe the research as a strenuous and 
devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes 
supplied by professional education".
Firstly, the difficulty with the Kuhnian concept of 
'normal science' is that it does not seem to be sharp 
enough to provide a distinction between the 20th century 
social phenomenon of "professionalisation" in the 
sciences and the psychological and epistemological 
phenomenon of the relationship between knowledge and 
change in individual belief. Both phenomena are studied 
by methodologists and philosophers with an interest in 
the widespread use of mathematics in Economics. But 
their methodology and their results are complementary, 
though different. For example, Stigler (1965a), Anderson 
et al (1986) and Leontief (1982) point out that many 
mathematical economists were first trained as physicists, 
in order to explain their using mathematics. By
contrast, Morton (1990, 1993) suggests a similarity
between the role of mathematical models in the production 
of contemporary scientific knowledge and the role of 
personal beliefs in acquiring a representation of the 
world coherent with one's experience. Both explanations 
refer to the use of mathematics as being a
(sociologically/gnosiologically) - normal feature of 
contemporary science. But they provide different
understandings of this feature, since Morton (1990, 1993)
implies that the use of mathematical models is a
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non-scientific feature of science, whereas sociological 
approaches do not necessarily imply this at all. This 
makes the idea of 'normal science' unclear. Secondly, 
it can be argued that the normal un-revolutionary 
science is worth considering. Further, the non- 
normative epistemological approach to science we embrace 
involves looking at how normal science is carried out at
present^. Whether the survey of one feature of
contemporary normal science, such as mathematical
models, is ultimately epistemologically fruitful, or 
whether, as Badiou (1969, p.17) suggests, "(...)
focusing on models generates an obstacle to the
epistemological inquiry" (...) and that; "This proves 
that models sit at the margins of the production of 
knowledge. The'rein at least one can not contest their 
role (our translation), this is a question which is left 
open in this thesis.
The answers we have just given yield two other 
questions pertaining to the methodology of our inquiry 
into mathematical economics. One is whether the view 
about philosophy we share with Aristotle and Eco on the 
role of philosophy (of. Supra) is compatible with our 
methodology (of. Chapter 2). In other words, is the 
'intra-scientific' epistemological approach to 
mathematical economics consistent with the view that 
philosophy has a unifying function? The other question 
is to what extent can one separate the study of 
mathematical economics from the general and historical
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phenomenon of the mathematization of the sciences which 
has been considered elsewhere (cf. chapter 4 Section 
202, chapter 6 Section 101, Chapter 9). and from the 
philosophical literature on the subject, or whether it 
is natural to consider the two topics together. 
Arguably, there is a risk that such an approach implies 
the vague idea that the sciences "naturally" tend to 
mathematize. We shall not be able to provide answer to 
thesequestions since they point to problems fundamental 
to philosophical inquiry in general that are not 
specific to our own particular study. Hence they go 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER . 9'
This note contains bibliographical references on this matter and 
in connection to computer science and linguistics in particular from 1953 onwards.
In a methodological thesis such as ours, this would indeed
require an extensive introduction to epistemological subjects, which
is beyond the scope of this work. However, because we hold the view 
that a methodological study may develop into an epistemological 
study (cf. Chapter 1), we give detailed bibliographical references 
on this subject. We are grateful to Professor Skorupski for drawing
our attention to the need to make this remark.
' Hausman's references are: P. Suppes, Introduction to Logic,
1957; J. Sneed, The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics, 1971; 
W. Stegmueller, The Structure and Dynamics of Theories, 1976 and The 
Structuralist View of Theories, 1979; and R. Giere, 1979 and 1982, 
Understanding Scientific Reasoning. The latter book contains 
accounts of the former literature.
' According tov Hausman (1992) Sneed's work is reported in E. 
Handler, 1980, "The Logical Structure of Modern Neoclassical Static 
Micro-economic Equilibrium Theory", Erkenntnis, 15; W. Stegmueller, 
W. Balzer, W. Spohn, 1982, Philosophy of Economics: Proceedings,
Munich, July 1981; D. Hands, 1979, "The Structuralist View of 
Economic Theories: The Case of General Equilibrium in Particular",
Economics and Philosophy, 1; W. Balzer, B. Hammings, 1989, 
Philosophy of Economics. Suppes' view probably influenced Debreus's 
view on economic theory (cf. chapter 7), because Suppes co-edited a 
book on the mathématisation of the social sciences with Arrow, who 
has also conducted research with Debreu (cf. chapter 7, note 3).
 ^ Earlier on. Clément Colson used the phrase "forme normale de la 
science" to designate common scientific practice (Cours d*Economie 
politique, 1924-1933, Livre 1, p . 143, quoted and referenced in 
Zylberberg, 1990) . The term tends to be pejorative or at least 
negative in K u h n ’s case, since he considers that normal science is a 
routine that hinders the development of research. This is not so, 
it seems, for Colson. According to Desrosieres (1994, p. 11) in 
1929, Clément Colson was Président du Conseil de la Statistique 
Générale de France; in addition, he was a Professor at the Ecole 
Polytechnique.
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Summary of Part Three
The third part approaches mathematical 
economics from a standpoint that differs from that of 
the second. Its aim is to contribute to our 
understanding of the concept of a 'mathematical
economic model'. The concept of a model is important, 
not only for the methodology of economics, but also for 
contemporary epistemology. This is because it refers to 
a defining feature of contemporary science, at the same 
time it being difficult to obtain a satisfactory
methodological or epistemological definition of it.
Chapter 7 illustrates what is today called a
mathematical model in economics for the purpose of
clarity; a l s o  to show that the concept of a model in
■economics is ambiguous from a methodological and 
\epistemological standpoint. It is shown that models are 
neither specific to a school of economic thought, nor 
to the level of abstraction or to the level of 
generalisation of a piece of knowledge. It also shows 
that nearly every sub-field of mathematics is used in 
these models.
Chapter 8 is concerned with the history of
the use of the term 'model' in economic literature.' It 
increases the information contained in Zerner(1993) on 
this topic.
The selected survey of issues of the 
scientific and critical periodical The Monist from 1890 
to 1896 does not reveal any occurrence of the term in 
economic literature. This may be because these
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particular issues do not contain many economic 
articles. However, an idea related to that of a 'model' 
does occur in an article by Paul Carus and Ernst Mach 
published in 1890 on the philosophy of mind. It is the 
idea of a "parallelism" between mental representations 
of reality and reality itself.
The first occurrences of the term 'model' in 
economics recorded by Zerner(1993) are dated 1936, and 
they concern econometrics. Edelberg(1936) uses the 
English term in An Econometric model for Production and 
Distribution. He neither defines it, nor uses it
widely. The term refers to an input-output equation
which represents reality. Tinbergen also uses the term 
in 1936, in a speech delivered probably in Dutch 
concerned with the Dutch economy from a macro-economic 
perspective. 'Most probably, the meaning of the term is
the same as that defined later by Tinbergen ( 1937 ) , in
an article in English, in which ''model' refers to the 
schematization of economic life required for the 
mathematization of an economy into a system of 
equations.
We recorded the next occurrence of the term in the 
English-reviewed version of a Russian article by 
Slutsky(1937) , published in 1937 and concerned with 
business cycles. Slutsky's definition of a model is not 
fully clear, but it definitely refers to the 
mathematical entity of a series. According to Slutsky, 
it means a mathematical representation (among others) 
of the structure of an empirical process. Different 
processes with the same structure may have the same
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mathematical representation.
Two occurrences of the English term are recorded in
1944. In a foundational and supplementary article on 
the methodology of econometrics, Haavelmo(1944) defines 
^^theoretical models" (our emphasis) as a priori 
schematizations of the economy. Models in this sense 
may not be mathematical. They have an economic meaning 
only if they are considered together with 
methodological and semantic instructions that connect 
them to quantified economic data. The second occurrence
is in the foundational book on game theory by
Morgenstern and Von Neumann(1944). The authors consider 
that an economic model is the same as a model in
physics. They define it as a theoretical construct 
similar to reality so far as the features relevant to 
the investigation are concerned.
Chapter 8 is also concerned with the 
"institutional sources" of the use of the term 'model' 
in economics (chapter 8, section 2). These sources were 
individuals and institutions who spread the use of the 
term in the community of economists because they were 
influential. Three early users of the term are also 
institutional sources: Tinbergen, Von Neumann and
Morgenstern. In addition, there is the Cowles 
Commission.
Tinbergen enriched and elaborated the meaning of the 
term. In his writings in the early 1930's, a 'model' 
(also referred to as a "theoretical scheme") is a 
simplification of the economy which is a prerequisite 
to the mathematization of economic theory. From the
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1930's, a 'model' (also referred to as a "theoretical
scheme") is a simplification of the economy which is a
prerequisite to the mathematization of economic theory.
From the 1930's to the 1960's, the meaning of the term
evolves and it refers to functional relationships of a
formal^mathematicdil nature exclusively, between symbolic
variables. These relationships represent structural
relationships between empirical variables. An economic
model refers to one possible "content" (or interpretation)
of the formal structure. Tinbergen's "economic model" may
be considered as a 'linguistic scheme', that is, a set of
statements whose syntactic system is mathematics and whose
semantic system is both economic statistical data and the
economic register of vernacular language. In his books
from 1945 onwards, Tinbergen elaborated the meaning of
'model' in two ways. First, 'model' refers not only to a
theoretical instrument but also to an instrument for 
\
political decision-making. Secondly, 'model' refers to an 
ideal economic setting, which is the aim of an economic 
policy.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern's interpretation of the term 
from 1944 onwards is the same as Tinbergen's in the sense 
that it is viewed as a theoretical and simplified 
representation of reality. However, their use differs from 
his in that they apply it in connection to game theory and 
in a general meta-scientific epistemological perspective
that takes physics as the example to follow.
In contrast, Tinbergen uses it in connection to 
econometrics, from an economic expert's point of view, and 
in order to describe the tools of economic science. 
In addition, in the game theorists' view, the economic
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content of the model refers to 'communal sense', 
whereas in Tinbergen's case, the content refers both to 
'communal sense' and to 'common sense', and hence the 
content includes physical, countable entities {cf 
chapter 4 , i vc t e  2 ) .
In the terminology of the Cowles Commission, which 
Friedman(1953) reports, the definition of a model is 
part and parcel of the definition of a validation 
protocol for hypotheses, which compares them to 
evidence. A model is a set of hypotheses compatible 
with (statistical) evidence. It is "identified" or not, 
depending on whether or not there is only one such 
hypothesis. This use is approximate to that of 
Haavelmo. It is also similar to the use of the term in 
logic {cf infra), in the sense that it equally refers 
to a true hypothesis.
In chapter 10, it is discussed whether models 
in general are a defining feature of contemporary 
science and philosophical views on this question are 
mentioned. First, it is shown that the term 'model' 
has become an acceptable term in many sciences such as 
social sciences, as well as in physics, from the 1960's 
onwards (cf. also chapter 7, section 101). In 
mathematical and linguistic logic, it is recorded in 
German as early as in the mid-1920's, although it only 
developing after the 1940's. In particular. Von 
Neumann and the members of the Vienna Circle are 
amongst the early users of the term. However, the use 
of the term 'model' in one science is not always
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consistent with its use in another science. One 
example of this inconsistency concerns logic and 
economics, where 'model' tends to refer to a general 
structure and also to theoretical, hypothetical and 
formal entities. In logic, it refers to a particular 
mathematical entity with a given structure, that makes 
some formal statements come true, ie it "realises" the 
formal structure.
Secondly, we refer to the philosophers Daniel Hausman,
Alain Badiou and Adam Morton because they share an
interest in both models and economics. They all agree
that models are a defining feature of contemporary
science and that the philosophical terminology
referring to them is inappropriate. Hausman (1992) is
concerned with adapting this terminology in order to 
\describe the use of models by economists. He defines a 
model as a manageable definition of a predicate 
applicable to actual economic systems. Badiou (1969) 
is concerned with assessing the scientific feature of a 
model. His conclusion is that models are scientific in 
logic only. He considers that in the other sciences, 
so-called models are not scientific, they are the 
epiphenomenon of the misleading epistemological view 
that science consists in the production of 
representations true to reality. Morton (1990, 1993)
insists on the similarities between models in science 
and mental frameworks in folk psychology. 
Consequently, he considers that the models used in 
science may not have any scientific features. This is
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the case if the explanations they provide lack "depth" 
or if it is not sufficiently "contrastive".
Finally, basic methodological issues about the question 
itself discussed in this chapter are approached.
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General Conclusion
We shall now take stock of the enquiries
carried out in this thesis. First, we shall expound 
the results concerning the first topic, that is the 
mathematization of economic theory achieved by Jevons
in his Theory of political Economy and also by Debreu
in his Theory of Value. Then the results concerning
the history of model building in economics will be 
presented to the reader. Finally, we will present the 
results of our experimental use of semiotic analysis.
In addition, possible applications of these results are 
proposed. For this purpose, we analyse some
methodological criticisms that have been or may be 
addressed to us before we suggest further research 
directions.
The first question addressed in reference to 
the first topic was whether or not the use of 
mathematics by Jevons and Debreu in these books can be 
counted as contributions to mathematics itself. At 
first glance, and with the methodological and 
epistemological proviso expressed in chapter S, chapter 
6 and below, it appears that they cannot. They are not 
contributions to mathematics in the sense that the 
formalism, the mathematical entities and the theorems 
these authors used had been defined, used and proved 
before. Also the mathematical symbolism they used is 
common according both to contemporary and historical 
standards. However, generally speaking, the time lag 
between the development of mathematical technique and
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their application in Economies is shorter in the 20th 
c. than in the 19th c. (cf. chapter 4,  chapter 5,  
chapter 6 , section 301, chapter 7 , note 7).
The second question was whether or not 
authors considered mathematics as a 'conceptual tool' 
or as an 'empirical tool' for constructing economic
theory. It has been shown that Jevons considered that
mathematics played both roles. He viewed mathematics 
as the science of numbers. He considered that positive 
numbers (e.g. statistical data) indicated reality, and 
that statistics were a means for the validation of 
economic hypotheses. He also held that they were
concerned with basic laws of thought, and hence of 
knowledge. Consequently, he considered mathematics at 
the same time as a component of what is empirical 
(economic reality) , and as a tool to put theories to 
the test of what is empirical. He also considered them 
as a 'conceptual tool' to explore theoretical
hypotheses. In the Theory of Value, Debreu only 
considered that mathematics is a 'conceptual tool'. 
They guarantee that the theory is rigorous and non­
contradictory. It may be wrongly considered that 
Debreu viewed mathematics as an 'empirical tool' in the 
sense of a tool that gives the essential features of 
what is empirical. This is because he introduces 
mathematical formalism in a way that may suggest that 
his theory rephrases 'communal sense' (cf. Cheix 1996 , 
section 4) and empirical knowledge in the sense of 
knowledge contained in vernacular language. It has 
been shown that some economists (e.g. Tinbergen) have
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considered mathematics in this way. However, Debreu's 
discourse in vernacular language is intentionally an 
heuristic and pedagogical device to put the theory 
within the reach of the reader, and it is not an 
account of economic knowledge.
The third question was whether or not in 
their mathematical theories the authors contrasted 
economic results with mathematical results. It is 
inappropriate to address the question in reference to 
Jevons' theory since it does not contain any 
mathematical proofs. Consequently, it does not contain 
mathematical results, only statements. In contrast to 
Jevons', Debreu's theory contains mathematical proofs. 
In this theory, an economic result may be defined in 
.accordance with Debreu's epistemological views as 
follows: it is'a particular semantic interpretation of 
a statement expressed with mathematical symbols and 
obtained in accordance with mathematical laws. 
Strictly speaking, there are no economic results as 
such, but economic interpretations of statements in the 
syntactic system of mathematics, and more precisely of 
set theory.
The fourth question concerned the arguments 
the authors put forward to promote the use of 
mathematics. It was shown that Jevons put forward many 
arguments. The main arguments are: a) That economic
reality is naturally countable; b) That symbolic 
mathematical statements express the laws of thought; 
and c) That scientific laws are universal, so that it 
is highly probable there are economic versions of
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mathematical laws proved in physics. So far as Debreu 
is concerned, he considered that the use of 
mathematical formalism guarantees that the theory is 
general and that it is non-contradictory.
• The connection between the mathematization of 
economic theory achieved by the neo-classics and 
mathematical model building is an issue upon which the 
thesis was also expected to shed some light.
In part three, the first appearance of the term 'model' 
in the community of economists is recorded in the mid- 
1930s in econometrics, business cycles and macro­
economics. The related idea of a 'scheme' and that of 
a simplified representation of reality may appear in 
.the late 1920s, and definitely does in the early 1930s. 
By the 1960s, 'the term 'model' is still used in these 
domains,also in game theory and in other sciences. In 
any case, the idea of a 'model' and that of a 'scheme' 
are connected to the mathematization of economic 
knowledge; it referred originally to the formulation of 
theories and later to their validation as well. There 
might be earlier occurrences of these terms in economic 
literature because such ideas occurred in scientific 
literature in the early 1890s. Having said that, the 
inquiries carried out in Part Two reveal that the term 
'model' hardly occurs in the works we surveyed of two 
neo-classical economists who contributed to the 
mathematization of economic theory. The term is 
recorded in an isolated context in Debreu(1959, chapter 
5, note 3, p 89), who uses it in connection with the
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history of equilibrium theory but who does not define 
it. By 'model', Debreu means a mathematical and formal 
version of economic equilibrium theory. Debreu also 
referred to the "interpretation" of a formal theory, 
which is similar to the idea of a model in logic and to 
what Tinbergen meant by the "economic content" of a 
mathematical model. With the methodological proviso 
formulated in this thesis, this suggests that the idea 
of a 'mathematical economic model' did not come from 
the neo-classical school of economic thought.
This conclusion would be used to assist the formulation 
of the hypothesis that at least two trends contributed 
equally to the mathematization of economic knowledge in 
the 20th c: the neo-classical school school and the
development of mathematcal model building in science. 
One could argue' that the neo-classical economists used 
mathematics to achieve the logical cogency of the 
theory and also to give it a formalized hypothetico- 
deductive form. By contrast, one could continue, the 
contributors to the other trend, such as
econometricians, used mathematics as they are
alledgedly used in the empirical sciences (such as 
biology and physics) and engineering. In these 
sciences, they are used to frame theories that can be 
compared with quantifiable evidence. If it were true, 
this hypothesis could be used as an argument against 
our methodology, and especially against our choice of 
neo-classical economists as the representatives of 
contemporary mathematical economics. It is true that 
this hypothesis is consistent with evidence (cf.
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Friday, 1949; Mirowski, 1989, 1991; Zerner, 1993;
chapter 1 ,  section 202; chapter 4 , section 201; chapter 
5 ;  chapter 8 ) , that the use of mathematics in physics 
and engineering influenced the mathematization of 
economics. However, the information contained in this 
thesis makes it clear that this hypothesis requires 
clarification. First, physics influences economics not 
only because it is an empirical science, but also 
because it is a theoretical science. For example, it 
is shown (cf. chapter 8} that the idea of a model used 
in econometric literature in the 1930s is similar to 
that of a 'parallelism' used by Mach Ernst (the 
physicist who challenged the mechanistic approach to 
science, cf. Israel, 1996), in an article concerned 
with theoretical and epistemological issues about 
physics. Jevops was similarly influenced by physical 
theories. Secondly, Tinbergen did not develop the idea 
of a mathematical model in the articles he wrote that 
show a clear influence of mathematical modelling in 
physics (e.g. Tinbergen, 1933a), but in articles 
concerned with macro-economic issues. This qualifies 
the hypothesis in the sense that  even though Tinbergen 
is a member of the second trend (since he contributed 
to the definition of the concept of a mathematical 
model in connection with econometrics), the 
mathematization of economics he achieved was neither 
presented in direct connection with mathematical 
physics (as it is the case with Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern) , nor did it amount to a mere transfer of 
the theories and the formalisms of mathematical physics
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to the case of economics. Thirdly, Jevons, who is a 
member of the first trend, did not contribute 
exclusively to the mathematization of economic theory 
but also to that of economic data (cf. Stigler, 1994, 
1982}. Finally, it is probable that between 1871 and 
the 1930s neo-classical economists, who have not been 
studied in this thesis, contributed to the development 
of the idea of a mathematical model. If this were 
proved true, the hypothesis that two different trends 
as defined above contributed to the mathematization of 
economic knowledge would lose its rationale.
Finally, it was expected that the 
experimental use of semiotic analysis (cf. chapter 5, 
section 302; chapter 6, section 303) would bring new 
insights into' mathematical economics. For this
purpose, a text in mathematical economics was defined 
as a text of the economic corpus that includes both the 
semiotic system of mathematics and that of vernacular 
language. _ In this view, a text in mathematical 
economics can be understood at different levels, also 
called 'isotopies' . A text consists of a set of 
'expressions' (graphic marks), with 'contents' (what 
makes the expression meaningful, that is, ideally, all 
the relationships - grammatical, lexical, phonological- 
between the expressions of the text). An 'isotopy' is 
the redundancy of expressions or contents in a text 
that produces a level of interpretation of a text.
In both texts, a 'notational and graphic isotopy' 
consists of expressions that are abbreviations,
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mathematical symbols or equations. The 'economic 
isotopy' consists of the expressions that belong to the 
econmic register in contemporary vernacular English. 
The 'mathematical isotopy' consists of expressions and 
contents that are used in contemporary mathematics (in 
Jevons' case), or that are openly given a mathematical 
content (in Debreu's case). In addition, there is a 
'mechanical isotopy' in Jevons' text, which is defined 
by the expressions and the contents that Jevons quotes 
from the corpus of mechanics. In Debreu's text, the 
'theoretical isotopy' consists of the expressions in 
italics that Debreu considers to be the formal theory 
proper.
The analysis shows that the notational 
isotopy establishes a correspondence between the 
economic isotopy and the mechanical isotopy (in Jevons' 
case) or the mathematical isotopy (in Debreu's case). 
In Jevons' case, the correspondence is based on 
mathematical formalism (equations), whereas in Debreu's 
case it is based on the regular use of mathematical 
symbols. So far as economic theoretical inferences are 
concerned, they are performed at the economic isotopy 
level with the help of mathematical symbols in Jevons' 
case, and at the mathematical isotopy level with the 
help of mathematical formalism as a whole in Debreu's 
case.
In both cases, the analysis shows that strict 
correspondence (interpretation) rules being established 
between isotopies do not eradicate inconsistencies 
between them. For example, the study of the
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correspondence between the 'mechanical isotopy' and the 
'economic isotopy' reveals a discrepancy between what 
Jevons writes about his use of differentials in 
economic theory, and his actual application of them. 
One could explain this discrepancy by saying that his 
mathematical knowledge was limited. We shall interpret 
this contradiction as a sign both that the use he makes 
of infinitesimals and differentials conflicts with his 
finitist or materialist metaphysical views (at the 
economic isotopy level) (cf.chapter 5,  section 102) and 
also that the use of symbolism offers a way to overcome 
these contradictions so as to pursue the argument and 
the unification of different parts of economic theory. 
In addition, this contradiction may be attributed to 
the other important semiotic function of the text, 
namely its pedagogical and vulgarisation function (cf. 
chapter 5 ,  section 102). Inconsistencies between 
isotopies also occur in the Theory of Value, between 
the economic semantics of the theory and its formal 
aspect. We consider that these inconsistencies do not 
challenge the contributions of Jevons and Debreu to 
mathematical economics. On the contrary, they prove 
that they are essentially theoretical (cf.Cheix 1996 ,
notes 3 and 11), and they show what the conceptual 
tours de force achieved by these authors consist in.
Having presented the reader with the results 
of this thesis, we shall formulate the methodological 
proviso that must be considered if these results are to 
be applied as indicated to conclude this thesis.
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The first criticism of our methodology was 
addressed to us by Professor Skorupski. It is that the 
attempts at defining 'models' we have referred to, and 
also our own are of a lexical and taxonomical nature 
only and not of a philosophical nature. Given that we 
hold the view on language that cognitive and semantic 
contents of words are interrelated (cf. chapter 6, note 
7), we also hold the view that an epistemological study 
may involve a terminological study.
A second criticism that could be addressed to 
us concerns the thesis' inter-disciplinary nature. It 
implies that this study partly rests on the results of 
research in other disciplines such as history and 
linguistics (e.g. on Perrot, 1992, cf. chapter 6, note 
11/ on Eco, 1968, 1984, and Herreman, 1993b). Inter­
disciplinarity 'also implies that we use the ideas of 
scientific fields other than economics and mathematics 
in a way less thorough than experts in these fields. 
This is not a drawback provided that secondary sources 
are used in a critical way (e.g. chapter 1 , section 2) 
and that conclusions remain of a hypothetical nature 
and remind the reader that they rely on other studies.
The third criticism that could be addressed 
to us is that the results of this thesis, and also our 
external approach to history conflict with our taking 
an intra-scientific approach to epistemological and 
methodological issues (cf. Cheix 1996 and chapter 2). 
We have shown that the methods of a science are often 
borrowed from another science, and also that some 
scientific practices (e.g. model building) appear to be
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a defining feature of a historical era and not of a 
particular science. This may also be an argument for
meta-methodology (cf. Cheix 1996 , note 11). To answer
this criticism, we would follow a line of argument
sketched in Cheix 1996 (note 11). This is that 
contemporary scientific methods resemble one another, 
not because there is an underlying (logical or 
intellectual) structure specific to scientific inquiry, 
but because today scientific information (including 
scientific methods) is widely and quickly disseminated. 
In addition, it has been shown that the function of
similar scientific tools (e.g. mathematical models) 
differs from one discipline to the other (e.g. 
economics vs. logic).
A fourth criticism could challenge our choice 
to limit our comments to strictly methodological issues 
and to exclude both praxeological and epistemological 
issues (e.g. Cheix 1996 , note 9 and note 15; chapter 4 ,  
section 202; chapter 6 , note 5, note 1 and note 23; 
chapter 7 ,  section 2; chapter 8 ,  section 102; chapter 
9 ,section 102).
For example, it could be argued with some justification 
that the assessment of the methods used in economics 
varies significantly, depending on whether economic 
knowledge is considered as a practice (e.g. the art of 
producing goods and allocating wealth) or as a 
theoretical science. In the first case, it can be 
considered that theoretical and practical protocols are 
valid because custom and habits have proved their 
success. In the second case (e.g. if economics is
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considered as an explanatory science), the success of a 
method is not enough to make it valid. There must be 
an explanation connecting the cause (the method) to the 
effect (success),
Similarly, it could be pointed out that epistemological 
and methodological issues cannot be separated in the 
manner we have applied. For example, it could be 
argued that our conclusion that Jevons and Debreu did 
not contribute to mathematics (cf. supra) depends on 
the view, on mathematical ontology, that it is not 
necessary for mathematical entities to have a concrete 
and physical interpretation in order to exist. A 
contrario, if one holds the view that mathematical 
entities exist only if they have a concrete 
interpretation, one can support the view that Jevons 
and Debreu contributed to mathematics. Jevons'
interpretation of infinitesimals as degrees of utility 
made their existence more probable. Similarly, it can 
be argued that Debreu increased the validity of the 
fixed point theorem (which apparently had only a formal 
and non-constructive proof), by showing that it meets 
theoretical expectations that arose concerning the 
study of an economy: the theorem provides equilibrium 
analysis with the result this theory had anticipated. 
Another example that could be mentioned to show that it 
is impossible to separate methodological from 
epistemological issues, is the debate concerning the 
emptiness of mathematical formalism (cf. chapter e, 
section 2). It could be argued that it amounts to the 
following question: what do mathematical statements
377
General Conclusion
refer toi, rather than to a question about mathematical 
economics in particular. The emptiness of mathematical 
statements is indeed an important issue in 20th c 
literature in Philosophy of Mathematics. Consequently, 
the argument that opposes economists praising 
mathematics because its terms have a fixed meaning 
(e.g. Jevons, cf. chapter 5)  and also the deductive 
structure of axiomatized economic theories and their 
rigor (e. g . Koopmans, 1957; Debreu, 1959, 1986)
against those who hold the view that these theories may 
still not be meaningful (e. g. Perroux 1991 and Van 
Parijs, 1990, p. 13) echoes a similar general argument 
about mathematics. For example, Ajdukiewicz (1960) and 
more recently Thom (1993) held the view that rigorous 
mathematics could be synonymous with insignificant 
mathematics. ^To conclude, this fourth criticism is 
perfectly relevant. However, there must be precise 
limits to research studies, which justifies our 
standpoint.
Some aspects of our application of semiotics 
can be criticized. We are grateful to Professor Petitot 
for drawing our attention to the hypothesis (cf. 
Cheix 1996 , section 4, first philosophical landmark and
chapter 2, section 2 , especially note 9) , that the 
scientific nature of knowledge is related to its being 
written. It could be argued that the defining feature 
of scientific thought occurs first and foremost in oral 
communication between scientists. If we had held this 
view, semiotic analysis could still have been used, but 
the semiotic corpus we would have referred to would
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have been the literature specialized in the study of 
speech.
The issue of the oral vs. written nature of scientific 
knowledge is relatively important, as it is implicit in 
many views which contrast mathematical economics with 
literary economics. For example, Jevons(1871) held the 
view that literary economics was already mathematical 
(cf. chapter 5 , section 101) and that his contribution 
to mathematical economics was to express it with 
mathematical symbols. Similarly Koopmans(1957, pl77)
viewed economic theory as a succession of mathematical 
models, connected to each other by the rules of 
deductive logic, just as statements expressed in 
literary economics.:
"The postulational structure of the mathematical tool parallels that of the substantive theory to be constructed, and the two are studied and apprehended simultaneously. The welcome result is that 'mathematical' and 'literary' economics are moving closer to each other. They meet on the ground of a common requirement for good hard thought from explicit basic postulates, rather than for manipulative skills in
calculus, differential equations, or determinants".
These views neglect an important point which
Gradies(1993) emphasizes (cf. summary and conclusion of 
Part 2) . It is that the logical structure of a 
reasoning (or at least the cognitive and psychological 
content of such a structure) depends on the syntactic 
structure of the semiotic system in which it is
expressed. In particular, if it were proved that the 
scientific feature of mathematics was relevant to oral 
communication, then the 'translation' from literary to
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mathematical economics could not be considered as a 
mere rephrasing. It should be considered instead that 
this 'translation' involves a fundamental change of the 
syntax of the semiotic system in which economic theory 
is expressed, and that this might imply an important 
change in the logical structure of the theory such 
that, contrary to the view held by Jevons (cf. chapter 
5, section 102), symbolic and formal logic cannot 
always be consistant with common sense as expressed in 
vernacular written languages. This syntactic change 
may be the cause of the difficulties pointed out by 
Mahieu(1989) about the axiomatization of economic 
theory (cf. chapter 6, section 202, note 8).
As suggested, the research undertaken for 
this thesis may be carried further with a stronger 
emphasis on the epistemological or alternatively on the 
sociological dimension of the issues approached (cf. 
chapter 2, section 101; chapter I, section 201; chapter 
3, note 2; chapter 6 ,  section 202; chapter 9 , section 
202) . However, we shall mention further research 
directions only in close connection with the results 
obtained and the methodology of economics.
First, the enquiry into the historical origin 
of mathematical economics can be continued. It has 
been shown that «there is a gap in the history of the 
term 'model' between 1937 and when it occurs in game 
theory in 1944. A likely cause of this is the 
interruption of war in Europe in 1939-1945. It was 
also suggested that the term might occur in 1927 in
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Russian economic literature (cf. chapter 7 , note 4; 
chapters, section 102). Further inquiry on this topic 
should explore: (a) the Second World War period and
especially operational research, because it is one 
origin of game theory; (b) Soviet mathematical 
economics in general, with a priority on the 1920's; 
(c) Mach Ernst's idea of a "parallelism" between mental 
and physical structures and also its influence on the 
scientific community (in particular in connection to 
attacks against mechanistic views on sciences) dating 
from 1890 at least; (d) the works of other neo­
classical economists; (e) the literature studied by 
Zylberberg (1990) (cf. chapter I , note 4), including the 
tradition of ingeneer-economists, their use of 
electrical models (cf. Allen, 1963, p. 281) and of 
ideas from computing science.
Secondly, the use of semiotic analysis could 
be continued in a more systematic manner since it was 
experimental and partial (e.g. chapter 2, section 202, 
note 14). Basic methodological issues that this would 
imply have been mentioned. Also it was kindly 
suggested to us by Professor Desclés that this analysis 
could be computerised. A  consequence would be the 
increase of both the corpus of mathematical economics 
to be analysed and the validity of the results. This 
would imply focusing more on the study of expressions 
with a syntactic or grammatical function than was the 
case in this thesis. In our study, we emphasized the 
role of notations in connecting the different levels of
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interpretation of a text, and neglected the role of 
syntactic and grammatical items.
We suggest that the following issues could be explored 
using this methodology: (1) Do syntactic and
grammatical units play the same role in mathematical 
economics and in mathematics? For example,
Herreman(1993b) describes the role played by these 
units in attributing topological contents to 
expressions with no mathematical content. (2) Is the 
concept of a 'borrowing' from one science to another 
identical with the borrowing of a syntactic structure 
or of a semantic field, or else of a semiotic 
function (cf. chapter 2, section 1) ? The use of 
mathematics in economics is often considered as just 
such a 'borrowing' and it is understood that this is 
illegitimate (cf. chapter 4, section 201, chapter 5, 
chapter 9 ) . But borrowings are common in science, 
even if it is difficult to justify them and to explain 
why some are successful and others are not. Many 
methodologists, such as Durkheim (1898), have attempted 
to clarify this issue. (3) Are contradictions between 
different levels of interpretation of theoretical texts 
in mathematical economics (cf. chapter e , section 3) an 
impediment to computerized analysis of economic 
surveys, such as the analysis provided by Planés et 
a l (1993)? This question arises first because this 
computerized analysis is based on there being different 
semantic levels in a survey. Secondly, the concept of 
demand (and that of offer) is central in this analysis
382
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and we have shown that to some degree, it was ambiguous 
in Debreu's version of neo-classical theory.
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